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ABSTRACT 
 
Samuel Beckett’s 
Late Aesthetics of Subjectivation 
 
by 
 
LIE Jianxi 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
No other writer has explored so metaphysically the problem of human 
existence as Samuel Beckett, the Irish writer who first gained world renown in 1953 
with the formal radicalism and existential angst of Waiting for Godot. In the bleakest 
forms, Beckett has denied human experience the most fundamental of all 
certainties – subjectivity and self-consciousness – and exposed conventional 
realism’s inability to convey the ungovernable flux of the world and the individual’s 
unfixed, subjective response.  
Taking Beckett’s manipulation of pronominal, spatial and temporal deixis as 
an entry point, this thesis captures the late works in its central dilemma of Beckettian 
poetics: the inability to end. For Beckett, ending, or silence, is at the same time the 
premise and also the vanishing point. In the literary arts the withdrawal into an inner 
space beyond speech, where the subject is absent, can never be completely successful: 
silence, ending in the absolute sense, remains an imaginary limit. Beckett strikes his 
vital poetic sparks off this aporia, in as much as his method of writing is 
characterized by attempts towards a self-conscious paradox. Consequently he aims to 
turn the impossibility (after a critical creative impasse after the Trilogy of novels) – 
and the inevitability – of a linguistic constitution of meaning back into linguistic 
form. A ‘solution’ to the problem is, of course, unthinkable. The literary 
object/subject is thus condemned to a permanent oscillation between the rooted-ness 
of the art form in language, and the disavowal of that rooted-ness. 
Instead of viewing his work as motivated by ambitions in the philosophy of 
language, the present thesis approaches it as an attempt to shore up a language whose 
progressive extinction had been the constant companion of Beckett’s life as a writer. 
Relating his late work to his early aesthetic views, the thesis seeks to show, on the 
one hand, that Beckett’s late work does not constitute a break from his early writings 
as they seem at first sight. Instead, they as whole witness the maturation of the 
writer’s aesthetics. On the other hand, drawing on a variety of performance, language 
and psychoanalytic theories, the thesis argues that subjectivity in late Beckett exists 
only as the experience of language, as the marks that the movement of language has 
left on the text or on us, in us, the reader, as we turn our attention towards the 
indecisive stirrings of language.  
         I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and 
I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been 
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PROLOGUE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What best befits an author is to preface a work with its apology, ornamenting it with 
the gilt of necessity. After all, one should not beg attention without excuse. That a 
writer provide some rudimentary justification for something he has written seems a 
modest enough expectation, but such a demand obliterates me, since this is a text 
which has been reared in perfect superfluity, clutching feebly at zero. There is not a 
single sentence which is other than a gratuitousness and a confusion; a cry at least 
half lamed and smothered in irony. Each appeal that is made to the name ‘Beckett’ 
shudders between a pretension and a joke. Beckett. I know nothing about him. His 
obsessions disturb me, his ignorances numb me, I find his work incomprehensible, 
the abrasion of his writing shears uselessly across my inarticulacy. In response I 
mumble, as a resistance to anxiety, maddening myself with words. Locked in a cell 
with my own hollow murmuring … but at least it is not that … (and even now I 
lie) …  
To succeed in writing anything of any kind about Beckett is already something 
wretched, because it is only in the twisted interstitial spaces of failure that contact 
and infection can take place – everything written about him, it would seem, is written 
contra him. Therefore this work does not make any special pleading for itself, it has 
only scratched about for needles in the most destitute gutters of ‘Beckett criticism’. 
Who cares what ‘anyone’ thinks, knows, or theorises about Beckett? The only thing 
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to try and touch is the intense shock-wave that still reaches us along with the textual 
embers … for as long, that is, as anything can still reach us.  
 iv
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the themes that Samuel Beckett has explored over the years, the most important 
and recurrent is undoubtedly that of subjective representation. In the bleakest forms, 
Beckett has denied human experience the most fundamental of all certainties – 
subjectivity and self-consciousness – and exposed conventional realism’s inability to 
convey the ungovernable flux of the world and the individual’s unfixed, subjective 
response.  
This thesis aims to explore Beckett’s late aesthetics of subjectivation in the light 
of the following four configurations. 
 
 
Beckett’s Histrionics of Pronouns 
 
My study of Beckett’s histrionics of pronouns chooses as its entry point a specific 
feature of dramatic and theatrical discourse that involves us immediately in the 
relationship of discourse to the performance field in which it is performed. This 
feature is deixis, defined by linguists to include those markers in discourse that refer 
to the situation of utterance. John Lyons defines deixis (which derives from a Greek 
 1
word meaning ‘positioning’ or ‘indicating’) as ‘the location and indication of persons, 
objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation 
to the spatio-temporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the 
participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee.’ The 
deictic function in discourse is assumed primarily by personal and demonstrative 
pronouns and demonstrative adjectives and adverbs (such words as here, there, this, 
that, these, those) and secondarily by such lexical features as person and tense. As 
Alessandro Serpieri and colleagues note, deictic expressions function in theatrical 
language to a degree beyond other literary genres. Noting that ‘drama consists first 
and foremost precisely in this, an I addressing a you here and now,’ Keir Elam 
suggests that deixis is the means by which the ‘dramatic world’ is removed from its 
status as ‘possible world’ and actualized as the hypothetical world we view on stage. 
In tandem with deictic gesture (physical references to the field of performance), 
verbal deixis completes a bridge between the material and verbal spheres. Because of 
its dual inscriptive function, then -- situating the stage within language, and language 
within the stage -- deixis offers a useful tool for exploring the play of person and 
actuality in dramatic discourse and between discourse and the embodied stage itself. 
If much of our contemporary critique of logocentric pretensions of the narrative 
voice has dismissed or eschewed the first-person discourse in general, Beckett’s 
critique of them has evolved around a working through rather than an abandonment 
of first-person utterances. And this endeavour is inextricably linked with the deictic 
referential capabilities of pronouns and the first-person in particular. Distinguishing 
for the first time the deictic functions of common nouns and pronouns, Emile 
Benveniste notes that while a common noun refers to a fixed or objective notion, 
there is usually no definable object that a pronoun can refer to in identical fashion 
(Problèmes de linguistique générale). What ‘I’ signifies, he explicates, is the person 
uttering the present instance of the discourse containing ‘I’; and contrary to common 
nouns, it no longer refers to a previously existing subjective substance, but rather to 
its own saying, becoming itself the ‘referent’ that it is supposed to signify. In this 
sense, ‘I am’ is no longer a constative, locutionary phrase, but a constantly renewed 
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performative, referring vertiginously to its own utterance: to say ‘I’ is to both to 
name and to act. Crucial here is how ‘I’ collapses the distinction between the 
signified and the referent, since utterance simultaneously creates what it represents. 
The importance of this to Beckett’s Company (and, in fact, to many of his 
post-trilogy works) is found, on the one hand, in how the production of meaning by 
‘I’ is a ‘work in progress’: the Beckettian ‘I’ continuously renews, rewrites or reutters 
itself, with a denial of continuity between instantiations; and, on the other, in the way 
Beckett stresses the ‘I’ as a sign which can never be saturated by the subjective 
consciousness it is meant to carry. In the first case, much as the ‘I’ strives for a 
temporality of coincidence, the Beckettian prose denies it by troubling the 
grammatical and syntactic structures on which the continuity of the reference of the 
‘I’ depends.  
In Company, what is perceived as the referential immediacy of the ‘I’ is 
conveyed by a skilful narrative choice which suspends the naming of it. ‘I’, as 
Roland Barthes so aptly points out, is ‘nothing other than the instance saying I’ (‘The 
Death of the Author’). In the second case, as the Beckettian subject talks, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for him to invest the ‘I’ with definite subjective intentions 
which make it his ‘I’ and not someone else’s. In other words, ‘I’ no longer cleaves the 
crucial distanced between the self and the other, but becomes simply a designating 
mark in a series of grammatical, syntactic and narrative options. Once first-person 
utterances and subjectivity (which comes to depend upon the former) are rendered 
problematic, the entire range of teleological suppositions displayed in Beckett’s 
works becomes equally unstable. Consequently, ‘only a small part of what is said can 
be verified’ and the whole of Company shows an ‘I’ that does not actually coincide 
with the image of the self produced by a conscious self: it tenaciously remains plural 
against all the traps of conceptual unifications.  
Ultimately we see a totally different narrative strategy that signifies a step 
further in the writer’s aesthetic quest. Of this quest, the most recurrent theme is 
perhaps that of human subjectivity, which Company’s addresses with an ongoing 
suppression of the subjective ‘I’ and its dispersal into the second- and third-person 
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narratives: a new hermeneutics based upon a revised conception of the relationship 
between language and reality. If in his early literary production Beckett had used 
language to scan reality, and reality to denounce the ‘falsifications’ of language and 
literature, he has since then used language as inseparable from reality, no longer 
maintaining the possibility of their opposition. With his late works, however, the two 
are no longer conceived of as being susceptible of separation.  
 
 
Theatre as the Site of Subjective (De)construction 
 
While the theatrical stage is generally considered to be a privileged space of presence 
or of the ‘present’, rooted as it is in the ‘here and now’ of the stage, Beckett plays 
representation against presentation and indeed presence, working not only in and 
through the dramatic medium, but against it, challenging its boundaries and codes 
and undermining its supposedly characteristic properties. Rather than a place of 
presence, the stage becomes a space where the processes of representation are 
repeatedly staged.  
Samuel Beckett’s late plays are both immediately, engrossingly present and 
troublingly absent, unfinished even while they are rigorously formed. They are 
theatre pieces that seem to pick apart the seams of the theatrical event; they both 
involve and baffle the spectator, giving her or him both the promise of physical 
immediacy (for, if nothing else, the late plays are troublingly there; each one relies 
for its effect on the precise delineation of a carefully crafted stage image) and the 
frustrating certainty that, in this world, few if any conventional dramatic processes 
are in operation. 
Having said that, we might be tempted to ask what is so remarkable about 
Beckett’s theatre. After all, the plays, from Waiting for Godot onwards, call into 
question those relations that exist, unremarked, in conventional theatre: the role of 
the spectator in decoding the text; the status of the image and of the text; and the 
relation between the two. It has also been widely noted that Beckett’s dramas, from 
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the first, rely on a reconfiguration of the conventional idea of time and space 
normally encountered in theatrical performance. There, we identify a fundamental 
confusion in the plays between the time and space of the drama and the time and 
space of the actors on the stage. 
This, of course, raises a fundamental question about these characters’ 
subjectivity: Is the character in a Beckett text occupying a world mapped out by the 
text or one delimited by the confines of the stage? Is he or she immediately present 
or infinitely removed from presence? How can she or he be understood by an 
audience, if the form of the play itself makes such an understanding problematic if 
not impossible? How can we, as audience members, make sense of these ‘people’ 
(Beckett’s own preferred term) if we are unclear about their precise location and of 
their precise position in what is normally considered to be the linear narrative of life? 
In the canon of Beckett criticism, a standard answer has evolved, one that relies 
implicitly on a conventional idea of the way in which subjectivity is fixed in 
dramatic space and time. It is fair to say that, in most pieces of theatre, the relation of 
space to time follows a standard pattern: the time-space indicated in the play exceeds 
the time-space of performance, but the two are sequentially related. That is, the 
enacted events are themselves excerpted from a larger number of events, imagined as 
taking place offstage. Similarly, the setting of the play is to be imagined as only one 
of a number of simultaneously existing settings that together form the world 
described in the text. The spatial and temporal hierarchy thus established will, if 
described in a manner that is internally consistent, allow the audience to accept the 
subjectivity of the characters presented; they exist in performance time-space 
because they are firmly rooted in dramatic time-space – because they have a 
coherently and sequentially described existence outside the immediate confines of 
the performance. A consistent narrative, therefore, relies on the sequential ordering of 
events in two time-spaces, simultaneously invoked by the dramatist and understood 
by the audience. 
 
 
 5
Writing of the Abject 
 
A mere glimpse at the titles of Beckett’s works is enough to give us a sense of their 
abjection: The Expelled, Six Residua, The Unnamable, Disjecta, and above all, Not I. 
His writing is riddled with images of expulsion (-pulsion and -jection are his 
favourite suffixes), of things, mainly body parts of contents, that have to be got rid of. 
What clearly dictates this is an abject need to expel the primary object which 
threatens engulfment, to keep shouting ‘Not I’, as so many of his characters do. 
If, as Julia Kristeva suggests, abjection is the movement by which the body and 
psyche dispute and affirm identity, it equally has important implications for reading a 
text, for reading can no longer be regarded as the depot of an assimilable meaning, 
but becomes the rather phantasmatic site of a series of negotiations and transmissions. 
The abject calls into question not only psychic but textual propriety, authority and 
appropriation: as is indicated by the baroque opening of Julia Kristeva’s Powers of 
Horror, it is into literary style that subjectivity may retreat, and yet the possibility of 
selfhood prior to the subject’s entry into language is ruthlessly questioned.  
As I shall illustrate, saying ‘not I’ in Beckett’s work is always underpinned by 
this dark abject lining. It is as if the failure of the signifier (this ‘I’ that language uses 
to refer to me alienates me) collapses something more psychologically disturbing, a 
disruption of the clarity of ‘I’ versus ‘not-I’ which every infant has to learn to 
negotiate. Instead of facing up to accepting a relationship of separation from the 
object, whereby the not-I becomes an autonomous ‘she’, the Beckett character harks 
back constantly to the trauma of that break and refuses to give due recognition to the 
‘she’.   
From the taut interplay of the ‘abject’ in selfhood and the narrative in which it 
may be seen to participate, we shall see a larger formal concern of the relationship of 
the literary work itself to conceptions of the organic whole. Beckett’s work displays 
an anxiety at constitution and separation around its own boundaries which may be 
seen to resonate with abjection. If I have been concerned, so far, with the periodic 
fusion and divergence of the abject with the signifiable, it is perhaps appropriate that 
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I now turn to an area in which the agency of the writer would be expected to be at its 
most marginal, and his or her concerns at their least visible. The tendency of writers 
and critics to refer to texts collectively as ‘corpus’ or ‘body of work’ may be no more 
than a metaphorical extension of the human, a fallacious visualisation of written 
production against the template of the body. It would nevertheless be difficult to 
pursue a study of the textual framing of the abject body without reversing the 
equation and examining the role texts play in promoting propriety and wholeness (or 
otherwise) through their collectivity and organisation. Apart from this, it will be 
argued that Beckett’s bilingualism poses a threat to conventional notions of what 
constitutes a proper body of work. 
 
 
Return to the Maternal Body 
 
In the previous part I outlined, following Kristeva, how abjection stems from the 
infant’s non-separation with the mother in the ‘archaic dyad’. From Peggy 
Guggenheim’s memoirs and from John Gruen’s interview, we are aware that at least 
twice in his life, as early as 1937 and as late as 1961, Beckett personally admitted his 
fearful memories of being swallowed up inside his mother’s womb. In this light, 
Deirdre Bair’s record of the turbulently ambivalent relationship between Beckett and 
his mother becomes all the more meaningful for explaining Beckett’s compulsion to 
speak.  
The engulfing dyad, to begin with, is both desired and feared, capable of giving 
rise to ambivalence. Talking about the subject’s fear of engulfment, Norman Holland 
quotes Edmund Bergler who ‘has suggested that all writers are involved in this 
deepest of human wishes; that writers emit words as a way of defending against the 
fearful desire to obliterate oneself in a total at oneness with some primal mother.’1 
                                                        
1 Norman N. Holland, The Dynamics of Literary Response. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1968, p.38. 
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Indeed, a psychological defense attempts to satisfy both the wish and the defense 
against the wish. Ambivalent to the end, Beckett had a fictitious ego ramble all the 
way to silence, trying to imagine himself free of the wish to return to the womb. 
Admittedly in Beckett, there is abundant textual and biographical unease with 
motherhood to take hold of our attention. If this unease does not welcome a 
psychoanalytic interpretation like Richard Stephenson’s, there is always to the 
possibility of such an intertextual reading as the similarities are encouraging.  
Beckett, too, shows a similar ambivalence towards motherhood. There is, on the 
one hand, the image of an inhospitable mother, as shown in various works such as 
the short story ‘The End’, the second book of the Trilogy, Malone Dies, and 
Company. On the other hand, there is the surreptitious wish to return to the womb as 
an anchorage that the foetus is unwilling to relinquish. Elaborating on Beckett’s own 
remark about the sound quality of his own works, I shall argue that his works can be 
thought of as an attempt to become attuned to ‘fundamental sounds’ at the limits of 
language, which is reminiscent of the mother’s womb.  
Drawing on Kristeva again, we can see this as a return to the Symbolic chora, 
which is described as a mobile and extremely provisional articulation constituted by 
movements and their ephemeral stases, a dynamic space where differences exist 
without duality and where the subject is caught up in the continual process of 
construction and destruction. This rhythmic energy constitutes a subversive force 
which repeatedly launches its assaults on the traditional structures of the Symbolic.  
Kristeva also associates the chora with the Freudian death-drive, through the 
interaction within the chora of the rhythm of the pulsions, and moments of 
temporary stasis, anticipating the final stasis of death: The semiotic chora, 
converting drive discharges into stases, can be thought of both as a delaying of the 
death drive and as a possible realisation of this drive, which tends to return to a 
homeostatic state. The mother’s body remains the site where difference is reconciled, 
but instead of being embraced in a process where difference is endlessly produced 
and dissolved, the maternal body is both restored as the original lost object and 
provides a space where reconciliation of difference may be imaginatively realised or 
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rehearsed. The implication of this for Beckett is that stasis and change, desire and 
entropy, identity and dispersal, are always intertwined in such a way as to give the 
body jouissance.  
 
 
 9
 [1] 
 
‘HE SHALL NOT … YOU SHALL NOT’2: 
FIRST-PERSON ABSENCE AND THE HISTRIONICS OF PRONOUNS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a 1961 interview, Samuel Beckett confessed to Gabriel D’Aubarède that he was 
not sure what he had left to say after The Unnamable.3 Coincidentally perhaps, 
shortly after How It Is was published earlier on in the same year, critics on both sides 
of the English Channel as well as across the Atlantic had voiced in near unison their 
initial diffident worries about the Irishman’s ability to ‘push further his quest’.4 
Raymond Federman, for one, had commented in somewhat understated compliment: 
                                                        
2 Samuel Beckett, Company [NO 4]. 
 
3 Samuel Beckett in an interview with Gabriel D’Aubarède, first published in Nouvelles 
Littéraires (16 February, 1961), now in English translation in Graver and Federman, Samuel 
Beckett: The Critical Heritage. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979, p.216.  
 
4 See, for example, Maurice Nadeau, Express (26 January 1961) 25: ‘After The Unnamable I 
naively imagined that Samuel Beckett would not be able to push further his quest, […] After 
The Unnamable there were Texts for Nothing, All that Fall, Embers, and today the 
appearance of How it is, after which I would be tempted – had I not been taught by 
experience – to repeat the same adventurous prophecy.’ (Graver and Federman 224) Also, 
Jean-Jacques Mayoux, Mercure de France (June 1961) 293-97: ‘Reading The Unnamable 
one might have thought that it was impossible to go further in the negation of the story, in the 
rejection of characters, in the the Catharian harshness of a retreat into the absolute.’ [Graver 
and Federman, Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage. London: Routledge, 1979, p.232]  
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‘It seemed that after L’Innommable, Samuel Beckett had led the novel into some kind 
of impasse from which it could never emerge, unless by a repetition of what had 
already been done…. Having reduced the essential elements of the novel – plot, 
character, action, language – to their bare minimum, how could any writer push the 
experiment further? Yet with the publication of Comment c’est, Beckett once more 
manages to carry the form of the novel into a completely new and original no man’s 
land.’5 What he refers to as the ‘impasse’ is, it seems, both thematic and technical, 
but with the ‘completely new and original no man’s land’ Federman is obviously 
slanted towards the latter in order to facilitate subsequent comments on Beckett’s 
narrative innovations. Such a partial stance anticipates more or less a critical turn in 
the interpretation of Beckett’s late works, where the ‘thematics’ in the narrow sense 
becomes less fascinating, while the vaguest, most aetheticised terms of stylistic 
analysis have gradually come into dominance. To this turn Jacques Derrida has lent 
his voice when he talked about the question of Beckett’s ‘nihilism’:  
 
The composition, the rhetoric, the construction and the rhythm of his works, 
even the ones that seem the most ‘decomposed’, that’s what ‘remains’ finally the 
most ‘interesting’, that’s the work, that’s the signature, this remainder which 
remains when the thematics is exhausted (and also exhausted, by others, for a 
long time now, in other modes).6
 
Derrida’s comment rings true, in part at least, for it seems that after the Trilogy 
Beckett did come to a thematic dead-end, with ‘impotence’ (a theme not sufficiently 
explored before) having been brought into full play by himself in The Unnamable. 
Yet he was never bereft of words re-saying what he had said. It would not be 
seriously contradicted, I believe, to suggest that the entire output of Beckett’s career, 
particularly that of the late period, can be best encapsulated as an ongoing process of 
repeating the already-said in increasingly radical forms.7 Such repetitiveness must 
                                                        
5 Graver and Federman, Samuel Beckett: The Critical Heritage, pp.594-595. 
 
6 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge. New York: Routledge, 1992, p.61. 
 
7 It might be better to refer to this ‘repetition’ as Beckett’s ‘self-reading’ – a ‘self-reading’ 
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have been galvanizing for Paul Davies when he made the audacious claim that if 
Beckett had written no other works than the four nouvelles and the ‘trilogy’ of novels, 
‘these alone would have secured for him in this century the eminence won in earlier 
times by Dante for the Divine Comedy, by Milton for Paradise Lost, and by Goethe 
for Faust.’8 While Davis’s short-listing of these works has its own agenda, it is 
nevertheless highly suggestive of Beckett’s laudable ability to say ‘little’ in much.  
Of the themes that Beckett has explored over the years, the most important and 
recurrent is undoubtedly that of subjective enunciation. It is hardly conceivable that a 
writer as sensitive as Beckett, living in an intellectual climate bustling with 
discussions on language and mind, two of the functions on which any subjective 
experience has to depend, should not have responded intimately, if not consciously, 
to this field. This chapter will examine how the theme of subjective enunciation has 
been exploited in terms of pronominal deixis and first-person utterances in Beckett’s 
works, with special emphasis on Company, the culmination of the Beckettian 
aporetic representation.  
 
 
Early Formations and the Paranoiac Closure 
 
Arguably, three stages can be identified in Beckett’s life-long exploration of the 
possibilities of subjective representation.9 Spanning from his literary debut to the late 
1940s, the early stage was marked by a poetic aversion to mimetic representation and 
                                                                                                                                                             
marked by the ‘anxious realisation that there was nowhere to turn except towards the earlier, 
already petrified Beckett’ (Renton 172). The most ‘outrageous’ self-reading is perhaps the 
last text published during his lifetime, Stirrings Still, in which we discern phrases, images, 
motifs, and themes reprised from works all the way back to the Trilogy (and even earlier). 
  
8 Paul Davies, ‘Three Novels and four Nouvelles: Giving up the Ghost Be Born at Last’ in 
John Pilling ed., The Cambridge Companion to Beckett. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994, p.43. 
 
9 Such categorical generalisation, though potentially perilous for the study of a writer as 
resistant to systematic theorisation as Beckett, is essential to our analysis of his aesthetic 
evolution, if not to anything else. It would stand more defendable, I think, if we take it less 
as strictly diachronic periodisation than as an attempt at conceptual and epistemic grouping.  
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a mocking attitude towards what he was doing as a writer. In Murphy, for instance, 
when he introduced a character like Celia with his ironic, hyper-detailed description 
[M 10], he was actually laying bare the techniques through which characters are 
defined and created in conventional mimesis. In Murphy still, we hear laughs from 
the author warning us that this is ‘an expurgated, accelerated, improved and reduced 
account’ of how the events occurred. In Watt and Mercier and Camier, it is once 
again through the narrator’s voice that we are made aware of the systematic 
demolition of fiction and of the creator’s playfulness. Despite these derisive attempts 
at deconstructing the novel, Beckett suffered in this stage from ‘a fiction-making 
impulse or compulsion that was constrained to flow, in part at least, in conventional 
channels, even as it manifested itself in a more or less heterodox fashion which 
threatened to exhaust, expose and, in due course, dispense with all conventions 
whatsoever’10. This is best shown by the textual evidence that his fiction was still 
situated in relation to reality while ironically mocking this reality. Expectedly, like 
most young writers of creative vigour, Beckett was still obsessed with a definite, if 
not authoritative, subjective voice: the ultimate question that he would have asked in 
this respect would perhaps be ‘with what authority does one speak?’  
It was then, however, that Beckett finished the most important of his ‘discursive’ 
writings on the arts and literature: his talent as a writer seemed to have been outshone 
at this stage by his great acuity as a critic. In Proust, his 1931 introduction to A la 
recherche du temps perdu, we come across this passage:  
 
the identification with Albertine is retrospective […] and proceeds to her 
acquaintance by a series of subtractions. […] Thus is established the pictorial 
multiplicity of Albertine that will duly evolve into a plastic and moral 
multiplicity, no longer a mere shifting superficies and an effect of the observer’s 
angle rather than the expression of an inward and active variety, but a 
multiplicity in depth, a turmoil of objective and immanent contradictions over 
which the subject has no control. [PTD 31-32] 
 
                                                        
10  John Pilling ed., The Cambridge Companion to Beckett. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, p.17. 
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A precocious piece of criticism indeed -- it was not until decades later in Company 
that Beckett has fully achieved these results which he praised in Proust. To this we 
shall presently return in greater detail.  
The early obsession with a definite subjective voice was to progress at the 
second stage towards its own negation11. We see a transformation from the early 
anti-novels into a-novels characterised by an emphasis on the absence of any 
ultimate subjective source, essence, or locus. Unlike most of our contemporary 
metafictions that attempt to erode the narrator’s ‘authority’ by dismissing the 
first-person discourse, Beckett had ironically imposed the first-person narrative voice 
upon the reader, not so much to sustain the narrator’s power as a near absolute 
monarch, though, as to raise the problem of whether a subjective voice existed at 
all – through what H. Porter Abbott identifies as the ‘unmediated contact’ between 
reader and narrator. By adhering to the first-person, such an ‘unmediated contact’ 
insists upon the reader’s unconscious identification with the narrator on the one hand, 
and toys with the bizarre situation of the speaking one literally loses his voice and 
subjective stance on the other. The immediate result is that the whole of The 
Unnamable seems to be directed towards a phrase like ‘I am the absentee again’ 
towards the very end [T 417]. There is a double bind in this claim: inasmuch as no 
‘mediated’ account is to be accepted, the subject has to claim its own absence; the 
subject’s power to claim its own ‘absence’, however, necessitates the erasure of this 
very ‘absence’ it is meant to establish. From this need to testify to one’s non-being 
and the dual impossibility this entails comes the nightmarish aspect of the Cartesian 
cogito for Beckett: the very fact of thinking ‘I am not’ proves that I am, yet should I 
cease thinking, how could I testify to this fact? The cogito depends on the 
self-reflexive moment at which thinking and thinking that one thinks are 
                                                        
11 Writing about Beckett’s (dis)engagement with the ‘I’, James Olney observes: ‘His [case] is 
the quintessential and comprehensive instance of the writer who would say I, would say the 
self – and did say it, especially early on – but who discovered that it was not the task of a 
moment or a single book but a life’s work, which could be accomplished only by not saying 
I….’ (James Olney, Memory and Narrative: The Weave of Life-writing. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1998, 266) 
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simultaneous – it is, in fact, this concurrency that necessitates the constant repetition 
of the cogito in its function as proof. The phrase, ‘I am absent’, however, could never 
be achieved in a temporality of simultaneity: its very articulation undoes its claims.  
A similar and yet more disturbing dilemma occurred later in the eighth Text for 
Nothing, where the narrator says: ‘…all I say will be false and to begin with not said 
by me, here I’m a mere ventriloquist’s dummy, I feel nothing, say nothing, he holds 
me in his arms and moves my lips with a string, with a fish-hook…’ [CSP 133]. The 
dilemma concerns the origin of the utterance, and the identity and authority of the 
voice saying ‘I.’ Whereas in traditional puppet-theatre, the absence of human bodies 
enables the audience’s leap of faith (it is the puppets who say ‘I’), in Texts for 
Nothing the ventriloquous presence of a human body (the ventriloquist) in the 
company of an obviously non-human body (the puppet) gives Beckett’s reader an 
eerie thrill: the voice does not appear to belong where it should. The surrender of the 
voice results in an anarchy of authorities, since readers cannot help assigning 
authority to the one who says ‘I’ over what he says while he seems to surrender all 
authority (he calls himself the ‘puppet’) to another (the ventriloquist) who cannot, in 
turn, speak for himself. To begin with, if the speaking ‘I’ is not to be trusted, then the 
voice is indeed the puppet’s and not some ventriloquist’s. If the voice is indeed the 
puppet’s, then the puppet is to be trusted because of its distinctive subjective stance. 
Once he is trusted, however, the deduction that the voice is indeed the puppet’s is 
overruled, and then it is not the puppet’s voice that is speaking, thereby validating the 
very claim that ‘all I say will be false and to begin with not said by me’, which 
surrenders the voice to the ventriloquist. Seen this way, the disqualifying and 
qualifying of the subjective voice can never coincide: in Beckett the methodical 
repetition is not that of a moment whose own finitude demands its eternal production, 
but rather the oscillation of two movements each of which always necessitates its 
own subsequent invalidation by the other: they can never achieve together a moment 
of finality.  
It proves dilemmatic, then, to juxtapose the pronominal ‘I’ and the canceling of 
subjective position, for invalidation paradoxically presupposes validation. On the one 
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hand, the Beckettian subject is ‘happy’ in a true Cartesian fashion, being able to 
conduct his search for his self without the assurance of a body. On the other hand, 
once he realises language’s failure to signify and its being the home of counterfeit 
being, he encounters a deadlock inasmuch as he has come to depend upon language 
itself to subvert linguistic indexicality: the Cartesian cogito thus assumes a 
nightmarish aspect. What looms from behind this nightmare is an irreducible division 
corresponding to that between enunciation and statement. The subject of the 
statement, being fixed in time, is a snapshot of a moment that has immediately 
passed, already fading in its enunciation. The speaker is already in principle out of 
the picture and all that remains is his representative in language. In other words, 
subjectivity comes into being in language alone and, in speaking, the subject is 
irreconcilably divided in himself: there is, therefore, a temporal disjunction between 
the subject speaking (enunciation) and the subject represented in speech (statement). 
What this implies is that with the single pronoun ‘I’, there are always at least two 
subjects: a subject who is speaking and a subject represented in speech. We expect 
them to coincide in an eternally present moment that covers up or sutures this 
fundamental disjunction, and the result is that a present moment (the moment of 
utterance) would eventually appear as a representation (the statement). In Beckett, 
however, the two variations of the old Cretan Lie present an ‘I’ that lives on beyond 
the ‘I’ who speaks and they obviously fail to coincide, which consequently leads to 
the above dilemma. This failure to either designate or cancel a definite subject 
position the Unnamable attributes to the nature of language: ‘it’s the fault of the 
pronouns, there is no name, for me, no pronoun for me, all the trouble comes from 
that…’ [T 372]. Indeed, to think, or speak, in ‘I’ the subject has to perform the trick 
of cogito in the full assurance that ‘he’ is nothing but words.  
Beckett’s approach at this stage to the problem of subjectivity is inextricably 
linked with the deictic referential capabilities of pronouns and the first-person in 
particular. Distinguishing the deictic functions of common nouns and pronouns, the 
French linguist Emile Benveniste notes that while a common noun refers to a fixed 
or objective notion, there is usually no definable object that ‘a pronoun can refer to in 
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identical fashion’12. What ‘I’ signifies, he explicates, is the person uttering the 
present instance of the discourse containing ‘I’; and contrary to common nouns, it no 
longer refers to a previously existing subjective substance, but rather to its own 
saying, becoming itself the ‘referent’ that it is supposed to signify. In this sense, ‘I 
am’ is no longer a constative, locutionary phrase, but a constantly renewed 
performative, referring vertiginously to its own utterance: to say ‘I’ is to both to 
name and to act. Crucial here is how ‘I’ collapses the distinction between the 
signified and the referent, since utterance simultaneously creates what it represents. 
The importance of this to Beckett is found, on the one hand, in how the production of 
meaning by ‘I’ is a ‘work in progress’: the Beckettian ‘I’ continuously renews, 
rewrites or reutters itself, with a denial of continuity between instantiations; and, on 
the other, in the way Beckett stresses the ‘I’ as a sign which can never be saturated by 
the subjective consciousness it is meant to carry. In the first case, much as the ‘I’ 
strives for a temporality of coincidence, the Beckettian prose denies it by troubling 
the grammatical and syntactic structures on which the continuity of the reference of 
the ‘I’ depends. In the second case, as the Beckettian subject talks, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for him to invest the ‘I’ with definite subjective intentions 
which make it his ‘I’ and not someone else’s. In other words, ‘I’ no longer cleaves the 
crucial distanced between the self and the other, but becomes simply a designating 
mark in a series of grammatical, syntactic and narrative options. 
The oscillation between assertion and denial, validation and invalidation creates 
a textual rhythm which Beckett’s exquisitely balanced and paced narratives are 
careful to maintain. One name he gives to this rhythm, and the impossibility of 
regarding in isolation any of its particular rises or falls, is aporia. But aporia, in 
addition to naming this sort of rhythm, is also created by it. For Beckett, aporia is 
never considered as a stable state of unknowing: not only can one not know, one 
cannot know that one cannot know. Aporia, to truly be aporia, can never be accepted 
                                                        
12 Emile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeht Meek. Coral 
Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971, p.218. 
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as a certainty. Like the subject, it must be continually asserted as effaced, in a rhythm 
that can never have a moment of resolution. Due to their obsession with the 
first-person pronoun, Beckett’s works of this period prove continuously compelling: 
however much it harps on fractured identity and dissolution of purpose, the narrative 
voice induces the reader to follow it along its tortuous ways and eventually end up in 
a mental vortex of indeterminacy and oscillation concerning subjective enunciation. 
As the reader tries desperately to extract a metaphysical subjective position from the 
work’s aporetics, he inevitably get further entangled, for in order to lift himself from 
the aporia, he first has to admit its existence which is constantly being invalidated: 
either that there is aporia, and then there is not aporia concerning the existence of 
aporia, or there is not aporia, and there is not aporia. Here, the ‘I’ as a ‘constantly 
renewed performative’ is only a process of circular movement that brings the subject 
back to where it has begun. The result of this is a paranoiac closure within a text of 
internal rifts and ruptures.  
 
 
The Deictic Carnival and the Enactment of the First Person 
 
Beckett’s (dis)engagement with the subjective ‘I’ is certainly not as simple and 
clear-cut as I have delineated. Apart from the ‘I’ as a mere puppet for a ‘he’ who 
gives the it speech and who is thus an ‘I’ beyond the ‘I’ of the text (Trilogy, How It Is, 
and Texts for Nothing), we have ‘I’s that disappear for a long time only to resurface 
in the most astonishing way, claiming to have been there all the time (Watt and 
Mercier and Camier), as well as ‘I’s that belong to someone dead before the story 
starts (‘The Calmative’ and ‘The End’). Due to the above-mentioned paranoiac 
closure, however, Malone’s promise, ‘I shall say I no more’ [T 285], was doomed to 
be broken in spite of all these absence and semi-absence of the ‘I’. It was not until 
the third stage that the promise was kept and that Beckett could be said to have 
achieved the voice his explorations had been inexorably leading him to, a voice 
always in the third person (and, sporadically, the second) but with an undeniable and 
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overwhelming pressure of the first person behind it – I can cite All Strange Away, 
Imagination Dead Imagine, The Lost Ones, Company, Ill Seen Ill Said, Worstward 
Ho, and Stirrings Still. As Beckett himself has put it, ‘Finally one no longer knows 
who is speaking. The subject disappears completely. That’s where the crisis of 
identity ends’13. While the subject – the first person – does disappear from the later 
work, it is, thanks to this disappearance, paradoxically stamped all over his drama 
and fiction. In Company, for instance, Beckett has achieved a Durcharbeitung, or 
working-through, of the first person by dispersing it into the second and third persons, 
and by staying, in particular, with the second person ‘you’, the voice of the memory, 
behind which there is all the exigency and desire and anguish of an ‘I’. The wish not 
to say I, which had ended up in saying ‘not-I’, is now fulfilled, after years of 
struggling.  
Up to now my argument has centered around Beckett’s prose work as if the story 
had transpired in the fiction only. He, of course, was also writing plays, which were 
undertaken in part try to circumvent the whole problem of the ‘I’ and point of view. 
Indeed, with the deictic mobility of stage performance, drama may have more easily 
shunned the dilemma rather than directly confront it, as narratives would. Inhabiting 
the margins between narrative and drama, Company undoubtedly leaves much space 
for coping with the dilemma.14 Later in this chapter, I shall elaborate on the problems 
                                                        
13 Charles Juliet, Conversations with Samuel Beckett. Academic Press Leiden, 1996, p.63. 
 
14 Despite the normal practice of putting it under the category of Beckett’s prose work, S.E. 
Gontarski did once claim Company to be the writer’s ‘latest play’ (Quoted in Constance 
Harvey, Press Release for Gontarski’s stage production of Company in English. February 15, 
1985). Indeed, since the composition of Krapp’s Last Tape (1958), the dividing line between 
Beckett’s prose monologues and stage monologues has been less distinct, and this Gontarski 
again identifies as a ‘generic androgyny’ in Beckett’s late prose. During an informal 
conversation in the winter of 2002, David Booth of the Theatre Action Company of Hong 
Kong remarked that Beckett’s late prose was increasingly intended ‘to be read aloud’. This 
drive ‘to be read aloud’ is significantly conspicuous in Company, and this, I think, must have 
been sympathetic to Katharine Worth when she observed: ‘It is not a great step from being 
actively involved as a reader [of Company] to imagining the text in performance, its subtle 
music being spoke by a fine, resonant voice’ [Katharine Worth, Samuel Beckett’s Theatre: 
Life Journeys. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.166]. Reading it aloud certainly 
makes Beckett’s text eminently ‘presentable’ through the verbal articulation of all its deictic 
pointers.  
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it poses for performance and the implications for subjective positioning in stage 
production.  
Opening with an injunction to ‘imagine’ a voice coming to ‘one in the dark’, 
Company immediately plunges us into an alternation between the third-person 
commentaries directed at the reader, and second-person descriptions of journeys into 
the past directed at the listener. If Beckett in the second phase had left the reader 
within a mental vortex of indeterminacy and oscillation concerning subjective 
enunciation, now he would allow no resting place for the reader, not with the initially 
comfortable notion of company which is progressively eroded but with the carefully 
prepared narrative structure which is itself a disorientating and alienating device. 
There are frequently moments in the third-person commentary when speculation 
leads the voice into the second person narrative or even the forbidden first, as, for 
example, in: ‘To confess, Yes I remember. Perhaps even to have a voice. To murmur, 
Yes I remember. What an addition to company that would be! A voice in the first 
person singular.’ [NO 12-13] In the course of this constant alternation, a throng of 
company is conjured up out of the dark. ‘Memories come into play, fantasies, deep 
thoughts and imaginings; we are let into the process by which they are shaped and 
sculpted till they live, become true company – for the narrator and for us’15. The 
‘company’, then, is no other than the accumulation of self-generated constructions in 
the form of inventions and memories, which the narrator and the voice address to the 
silent listener or unnamable ‘hearer’. But among these three ‘persons’ of the fable 
there is a strange intercourse: ‘Use of the second person marks the voice. That of the 
third that cankerous other. Could he speak to and of whom the voice speaks there 
would be a first. But he cannot. He shall not. You cannot. You shall not.’ [NO 6] Here, 
the narrator describes, with painstaking care, not only the relationship between the 
supine figure and the voice, but also the grammatical patterning of the work with its 
explicit prohibition of the first-person pronoun. The precise scene-setting appears, at 
least superficially, to be the antithesis of the scene-dissolving that frequently occurs 
                                                        
15 Katharine Worth, Samuel Beckett’s Theatre: Life Journeys, p.164. 
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in works such as the Trilogy and Texts for Nothing; but far from establishing certainty, 
it wittily generates confusion about the relationship of the second- and third-person 
pronouns to the reader, the narrator, the author, as well as to the third (infinitely 
multipliable) possible ‘other’ to whom the narrator periodically alludes: ‘May not 
there be another with him in the dark to and of whom the voice is speaking?’ [NO 6].  
 
 
Retrospective Subjective Reproduction and the Play of ‘I’ 
 
I mentioned earlier the qualities that Beckett praised in Proust about A la recherche 
du temps perdu: the retrospective identification of Albertine as multiplicities effected 
by ‘an inward and active variety’ and by ‘a turmoil of objective and immanent 
contradictions over which the subject has no control’. The significance of Beckett’s 
observation lies not so much in its revelation of the writer’s critical acuity as in its 
prophetic function: ‘retrospective’ was to become one of the defining keywords of 
subjectivation in Beckett’s late dramatic and prose production.  
In An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud stated that psychoanalysis makes a ‘basic 
assumption’ about two things ‘concerning what we call our psyche or mental life: 
first, its bodily organ and scene of action, the brain (or nervous system), and secondly, 
our acts of consciousness, which are immediate data and cannot be more carefully 
explained by any kind of description’ (13, emphasis mine). Very early in his career, 
Beckett was aware of the inadequacies of mere ‘descriptions’ of the ‘acts of 
consciousness’. The verbal drama of the Trilogy, for instance, has marked his 
suspicion about such ‘descriptive’ accounts, though his adherence to the ‘I’ has been 
suggestive of a vicarious attempt at another kind of ‘description’. Now, through 
Company’s pronominal action, this early diegetic endeavour is forsaken in favour of 
a mimetic reproduction of the process of consciousness, foregrounding the fallacy of 
what he called ‘the caricature furnished by direct perception’ [PTD 14]:  
 
In another dark or in the same another devising it all for company. This at first 
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sight seems clear. But as the eye dwells it grows obscure. Indeed the longer the 
eye dwells the obscurer it grows. Till the eye closes and freed from pore the 
mind inquires, What does this mean? What finally does this mean that at first 
sight seems clear? [NO 18] 
 
The self-evident ‘immediate knowledge’ of the deviser’s location, which ‘at first 
sight seems clear’, is for Beckett fallacious, for ‘the longer the eye dwells the 
obscurer it grows’. Indeed, right after the opening of Company we were already 
reminded that ‘only a small part of what is said can be verified’, and the subject 
eventually manifests itself as one that never totally coincides with himself: his 
subjective position is being constantly revised and redefined, now not by himself as 
in the Trilogy, but by a multitude of ‘others’, or his own ‘shadows’ as Søren 
Kierkegaard would have it16 , conjured up in the deictic carnival of the text. 
Ultimately, the whole of Company shows an ‘I’ that does not actually coincide with 
the image of the self produced by a single conscious self: it tenaciously remains 
plural against all the traps of conceptual unifications. Its reproduction as a figure of 
deferred finality oddly echoes another statement in Proust: ‘permanent reality, if any, 
can only be apprehended as a retrospective hypothesis’ [PTD 14]. This early 
observation is now translated, in Company, as the deconstruction of the ‘I’ into 
‘immanent contradictions’ of deictic plenitude so that it can be reconstructed 
‘retrospectively’: the ‘I’ is no longer characterised as the first person but as the ‘last’ 
person:  
 
For why or? Why in another dark or in the same? And whose voice asking this? 
Who asks, Whose voice asking this? And answers, His soever who devises it all. 
In the same dark as his creature or in another? For company. Who asks in the end, 
Who asks? And in the end answers as above. And adds long after to himself, 
                                                        
16 The non-coincidence of the subject with himself is skillfully described by Kierkegaard 
while talking about the ‘magic of the theatre’: ‘In such a self-vision of the imagination, the 
individual is not an actual shape, but a shadow, or, more correctly, the actual shape is 
invisibly present and therefore is not satisfied to cast one shadow, but the individual has a 
variety of shadows, all of which resemble him and which momentarily have equal status as 
being himself.’ (Fear and Trembling, 154) Obviously, Kierkegaard’s subject, like the one in 
Company, cannot posit either the verifiable objectivity of its ‘whole’, nor the verifiable 
‘truth’ of its existence.  
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Unless another still. Nowhere to be found. Nowhere to be sought. The 
unthinkable last of all. Unnamable. Last person. I. Quick leave him. [NO 19] 
 
Here, what is perceived as the referential immediacy of the ‘I’ is conveyed by a 
skilful narrative choice which suspends the naming of it. This deferral of the ‘I’ is a 
necessary deferral, as it reveals the ‘I’ only through the articulations of different acts 
of consciousness. The acts can structure the ‘I’ as the result of a verbal interplay of 
referents related to immediate perception and memory. Thus, in Company, what is 
perceived as the referential immediacy of the ‘I’ is conveyed by a skilful narrative 
choice which reflects a conception of the subject that is essential ‘plural’ and not 
immediate. The endless formulations which occur within the narrative show a 
constant movement within the linguistic referent: the subject-pronoun is caught and 
established by its relation to other pronouns.  
 
If the voice is not speaking to him it must be speaking to another. So with what 
reason remains he reasons. To another of that other. Or of him. Or of another still. 
To another of that other or of him or of another still. To one on his back in the 
dark in any case. Of one on his back in the dark whether the same or another. So 
with what reason remains he reasons and reasons ill. For were the voice speaking 
not to him but to another then it must be of that other it is speaking and not of 
him or of another still. Since it speaks in the second person. [NO 8-9] 
 
The effect of this kind of ‘reason-ridden’ speculation is to draw attention to the 
general literary question of who speaks and who is being addressed. Readers as well 
as the multitude of supine listeners conjured by the writing are drawn into the wide 
circle of speculation. In this process of being infinitely multiplied, the ‘one on his 
back’ loses any tenuous identity that he may have been gathering. The reader, too, is 
forbidden identification of any kind as the ‘one’ loses its unitariness and the single 
focus of traditional third-person narrative on a specific ‘he’ or ‘she’ is splintered. The 
effect of this is to keep the reader’s attention wary and mobile, forcing it away from 
any central focus, enabling it to move freely from the worlds of the work to the 
worlds of reading and writing. This identificatory mobility is structured around what 
Daniel Katz identifies as the ‘or-ness’ of the work’s narrative pattern: ‘Indeed, one of 
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the book’s principal stylistic traits could be called its “orness” – often two conflicting 
constatations of a given situation or condition will be placed on either side of an “or”, 
with neither being assigned definite validity. The “or”, then, is one of the text’s major 
devices for troubling ontological stability and grounding’17. Upon this, one may 
recall the aporetic oscillations we examined a while ago, which create a circular 
paranoiac closure where the subject gets hopelessly trapped. Yet there is a 
fundamental difference between this ‘or-ness’ and earlier paranoiac oscillations, for 
the ‘or’ is presented here more as an emphasis on the status of the subject of 
enunciation rather than a focus on any particular fictive enunciator: a primarily 
schizophrenic structure. ‘[L]iterature,’ write Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, 
‘is like schozophrenia; a process and not a goal, production and not an expression’, 
and they argue for an understanding of language as ‘no longer defined by what it 
says, even less by what makes it a signifying thing, but by what causes it to move, to 
flow and to explode – desire.’18 Company is, in this light, a work driven by clusters 
of conflicting desires. Yet, unlike many other Beckett works that explore the problem 
of the speaking subject, it does not generate a sense of despair or futility. Although it 
is schismatic to the point of schizophrenia, it is creatively and constructively so too.  
Thus the ‘I’ is established as the outcome of the dialogue of several selves. In 
this sense, Beckett’s Durcharbeitung of the first-person pronoun is achieved through 
an a posteriori reconstruction of a character through a series of hermeneutical 
hypotheses concerning identity, hypotheses that transform the text into a pronominal 
action suppressing the subjective ‘I’ and dispersing it into second- and third-person 
narratives. In other words, where the narrative used to presuppose an a priori, 
troubled ‘I’, we are now treated with a feast of fragmentary subjective positions 
neatly structured around the second and third persons. Very early in the text we read:  
 
                                                        
17 Daniel Katz, Saying ‘I’ No More: Subjectivity and Consciousness in the Prose of Samuel 
Beckett. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999, p.166. [my emphasis] 
 
18 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Robert Hurley and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p.133. 
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Use of the second person marks the voice. That of the third that cankerous other. 
Could he speak to and of whom the voice speaks there would be a first. But he 
cannot. He shall not. You cannot. You shall not.’ [NO 6]  
 
Were it not of him to whom it is speaking speaking but of another it would not 
speak in the second person but in the third. [NO 9] 
 
These two pieces of reasoning relate to the fact that the voice is speaking to him. 
Therefore we can infer that it is also of him that it is speaking, since it is speaking in 
the second person (were the voice speaking to him of another, it would speak in the 
third person). This laborious disclosure of a referent (a subject to whom and of 
whom the voice is speaking) is achieved only after the disclosure of a system of 
referentiality, on which the specific reference is shown to be totally dependent. In 
other words, the narrative suspends the direct reference to an ‘objective I’, and tells 
us precisely that the ‘I’ apprehends himself only by moving through a network of 
deictic referentialities. Far from being a priori, the ‘I’ is now achieved a posteriori 
by a voice which constitutes the subject as metonymical and as subject to temporality. 
It is metonymical insofar as it is one instance within the pronominal system, and it is 
temporal inasmuch as the subject of the enunciation is diachronically realised as the 
connection of different metonymical instances provided by the various subjects of 
each utterance.  
Beckett’s suspicion about ‘immediate knowledge’ and his representation of 
subjectivity as ‘deferred finality’ signify a move from the diegetic to the mimetic. 
This move was significantly prefigured by one of Beckett’s remarks on Joyce’s 
Finnegans Wake back in 1929: ‘Here form is content, content is form. You complain 
that this stuff is not written in English. It is not written at all. It is not to be read – or 
rather it is not only to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to. His writing is not 
about something; it is that something itself.’ [D 27] If the Trilogy, with its conflation 
of form and content, can be described as ‘mimetic’, it is only superficially and 
impurely so because this mimesis has evolved around ‘self-narrated’ protagonists 
who are torn between the need to presuppose an ‘I’ and the imperative to question the 
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subjective position of this ‘I’.19 Consequently, the narrative task becomes paranoiac 
and teleological, totally incapable of moving beyond the looking glass of traditional 
mimesis, that is, beyond a pre-conceptualised, though fragmented, image of the self. 
Now in Company, the protagonist is ‘enacted’ rather than ‘self-narrated’, whose 
aesthetic reproduction entails a dramatic, open, and dialogical imitation. This 
‘imitation’ is accomplished through fabling a ‘mirror’ which contains a reflection or 
image but which has no model or subject outside to reflect: the image in the ‘mirror’ 
is a pure reflection, with no external object available as its material referent. Yet the 
construction of the fable involves tremendous problems. As Eric Levy aptly points 
out, the story ‘cannot simply present a magical mirror hanging on a wall somewhere 
and containing an unfortunately stranded reflection, because in that case there would 
be something outside the mirror, and these externals would modify the reflection 
inside by entraining the mimetic expectations Beckett wants to avoid’ (99). If the 
‘mirror’ in Company is to escape these problems, it must ‘occupy the entire text’; the 
entire text must ‘become the representation of a mirror which has nothing inside it 
but the pure reflection and nothing outside but the act of imagination creating that 
reflection’ (Levy 99). In other words, the narration here is ‘more than self-reflective’; 
it abolishes the ‘clear, tenable boundary between the diegesis of the of the story told 
and the mimesis of story-telling’20. The abolition of that ‘tenable boundary’ requires 
that the self telling the story be incorporated into that story, that the diegetic be 
dissolved into the narrative to make up an uncontaminated mimesis of the acts of 
consciousness. The opening sentence of Company provides an illustrative example of 
this dissolution:  
 
                                                        
19 It seems that only through such a questioning can the Benjaminian ‘embarrassment’ be 
banished. Writing about the writer’s role as ‘storyteller’, Walter Benjamin asserted as early 
as 1936: ‘there is embarrassment all around when the desire to tell a story is expressed.’ 
[Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 1968, 
p.83]  
 
20 Carla Locatelli, Unwording the World: Samuel Beckett’s Prose Works after the Nobel Prize. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990, p.164. 
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A voice comes to one in the dark. Imagine. [NO 5] 
 
At first glance, the injunction seems to enhance the diegetic description by specifying 
the context of the message uttered by the voice. However, it also exceeds the borders 
of the diegetic text by being directly oriented towards the reader, inviting him or her 
to imagine, that is, to read. It is in fact an invitation to see the expanding boundaries 
of the text, moved by the constructive, imaginative act of reading. Thus Company is 
not conceivable as detached from ‘performance’: the text cannot be reduced to a 
mere diegetic discourse, because the reader’s imaginative experience has been 
prompted as the performance of the text. Therefore, the real implication of the above 
passage from Disjecta for our analysis is not so much in its exaltation of 
form-content conflation as in something that Beckett implied but did not quite say 
himself: ‘It is not to be written at all’. This suggests that, for Beckett, the text does 
not want to be written: it cannot be written with all diegetic weightiness; it has to be 
performed in the course of being read. Behind the mask of second- and third-person 
narratives, we sense the exigency and desire and anguish of an ‘I’ retrospectively 
constructed after the pronominal masquerade.  
 
 
Memory and Second-Person Utterances 
 
It is interesting to note how the second-person narrative is frequently devoted to the 
telling of stories whose mode is autobiographical in spite of the second-person 
construction they adopt. Some of these stories are more evocative of highly 
significant personal experiences in childhood and youth than anything else Beckett 
has written. Unlike the protagonists of the Trilogy who tell their own ‘stories’ in the 
first person, the ‘one in the dark’ in Company has an extraneous, and perhaps 
ventriloquous, voice telling him of a past that is possibly his own. The use of the 
second-person narrative imposes upon him all these recollections: ‘As for example 
when he hears, You are on your back in the dark. Then he must acknowledge the 
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truth of what is said.’ [NO 5] He listens, trying to see if it is his past or someone 
else’s, trying to see if the incidents repeated are significant or sentimental or simply 
invented for company. This second-person ‘autobiography’ is highly significant for 
Beckett’s late aesthetics in that the immediacy of presence brought by the 
autobiographical mode ‘wins credence’ for a ‘you’ that is probably non-existent (‘the 
greater part of what is said cannot be verified’), but shows an interlocutionary, 
implied ‘I’ that does not actually coincide with a conscious self.  
‘I suppose all is reminiscence from womb to tomb,’ Beckett once wrote to James 
Knowlson about the numerous literary reminiscences in Winnie’s near-monologue in 
Happy Days.21 Many things could be meant by Beckett’s apparently simple sentence, 
and, being Samuel Beckett, he no doubt intended them all. The sentence could mean 
that there is no perception and no cognition that is not altered by the intervention of 
memory. Before a perception can be registered in consciousness and thus become to 
us a perception, time will have passed and thrown it into memory, where other 
memories will affect and transform it.22 Herbert Read once said that we truly 
experience a colour or a sound only once, the first time, and that any subsequent 
experience of the colour or sound will be altered by this first encounter. Going 
beyond Reed, one could argue that even this first time is not pristine; yet we never 
know, because we cannot really remember any such first time as the one Reed 
indicates. To foreground the problematic nature of memory, Beckett has resorted to a 
narrative choice that forces the second person upon the supine listener(s) as well as 
the reader (or the audience in the case of a stage production), defamiliarising them 
from the process of subjective construction via memory.  
Very early in Company we read: ‘Use of the second person marks the voice. That 
                                                        
21 James Knowlson, ‘Beckett’s “Bits of Pipe”’, in Morris Beja, S.E. Gontarski, and Pierre 
Astier, 16.  
 
22 This is what Antonio Damasio has in mind when he writes: ‘Present continuously becomes 
past, and by the time we take stock of it we are in another present, consumed with planning 
the future…. The present is never here. We are hopeless late for consciousness.’ [Antonio 
Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Avon Books, 
1994, p.240.]  
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of the third that cankerous other. Could he speak to and of whom the voice speaks 
there would be a first. But he cannot. He shall not. You cannot. You shall not.’ [NO 6] 
Now, the impossibility of the first person comes not only from the impossibility of 
self-reference (‘of whom’) as in the Trilogy, but equally from the impossibility of 
auto-address (‘to whom’). The question is not only one of memory and 
self-knowledge, of speaking ‘truthfully’ and accurately about one’s past, but also of 
the ‘capacity’ to speak to oneself, to hear oneself, to witness one’s own 
identifications and subjective positionings. The significance of Beckett’s 
second-person imposition is thus manifested in: (1) its imperative for the reader to 
rethink terms like ‘real’ and ‘accurate’, which have lost all sense because no one can 
now say with certainty that this given memory is accurate, or pronounce with 
seeming assurance as one otherwise would: ‘I know this is the way it happened’; (2) 
the undeniability of the ‘memories’: because they are ‘imposed’, they are practically 
undeniable – undeniable both in the sense that it cannot be denied that these are 
memories and in the sense that the memories are obsessive and will not be denied -- 
consequently the question becomes: ‘Whose are the memories? His? Yours?’, from 
which arises the ultimate impossibility of auto-address: the memories can scarcely be 
mine because of the absence of ‘I’. What does it mean, then, to say that I can have 
your memories, you can have his, or he can have mine? Kafka’s famous axiom, ‘I am 
a memory come alive’, can perhaps be fairly rephrased here as ‘I is memory come 
alive’. Much as this would suggest that memory is the sole ground of subjectivity and 
consciousness, it nonetheless brings to light how the continuity of being has been 
structured by language. Of this, one of the earliest examples from Beckett’s oeuvre is 
the sixty-nine-year-old Krapp, whose voice of thirty years ago comes back to him, 
via a tape-recorder, to be answered by him, with both voices invoking the 
first-person pronoun that theoretically should have ensured sameness in spite of 
temporal separation. But is ‘I’ the same person ‘I’ was thirty years ago? In the end, 
Krapp seems to want to cry out in the tones of Mouth in Not I: ‘… what? … who? … 
no! … he! … HE! …’  
‘The important thing for the remembering author is not what he experienced,’ 
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writes Walter Benjamin, ‘but the weaving of his memory’ (Illuminations, 204). This 
tells us that the remembering writer is at least twice removed from the experiences he 
recalls – once by the act of recollection (which is an act of imagination) and once 
again by the act of writing. Both acts demand that experiences are sifted and sorted 
in ways that require as much forgetting as they do remembering – ‘Penelope work’, 
as Benjamin calls it, of weaving and unraveling. A memory is never complete or 
finite. It is open to endless revision and as Beckett well knows. Company 
demonstrates the extent to which remembering is not simply recuperative. It involves 
processes of cutting and editing: to remember is also to ‘dismember’. To remember is 
both to come close to one’s experience and to distance oneself from it sufficiently to 
observe it. It is simultaneously a journey back to lived events and an artificial 
construction of a new thing which itself alters the one who remembers. When 
Beckett offers variations on the formula, ‘Deviser of the voice and of its hearer and 
of himself. Deviser of himself for company’ [NO 20], he is giving recognition to this 
paradox.  
Beckett’s choice of the second-person narrative for the memory segments throws 
into prominence the way in which a person is constructed by memory (and by 
imagination more generally), made ‘other’ by it, and even, in the process of 
‘conjuring something out of nothing’, invented by it. ‘He speaks of himself as of 
another’ [NO 20]. His 1958 work, Krapp’s Last Tape, was the first full exposition and 
dramatisation of memory as the essential ground and agent of subjectivity and 
identity. Krapp, a ‘wearish old man’ (stage direction), records a tape each year on his 
birthday, in which he reflects on the year just past; he has also got into the habit of 
listening to a tape from a previous year. On the night of his sixty-ninth birthday, he 
listens to a tape he made thirty years earlier, the year when his mother died, when he 
bade farewell to love, and when he had a revelation that, he felt at the time, would 
help him create his own ‘opus magnum’. However, the sixty-nine year old Krapp has 
difficulty recognising his younger self, just as the thirty-nine year old Krapp could 
not understand the twetty-nine year old whose tape he in turn played (‘Just been 
listening to that stupid bastard I took myself for thirty years ago, hard to believe I 
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was ever as bad as that’). Krapp’s Last Tape is undoubtedly a precursor of That Time, 
a short play written in 1974, in which ‘Listener’ listens silently to three voices, all the 
same voice (‘Voices A B C are his own coming to him from both sides and above’), 
remembering three different periods in his life. Voice A recalls his futile effort in 
maturity to return to a place (Foley’s Folly) associated with an event from childhood; 
Voice B recalls a love that he ‘gave up for good’ when he decided he has to let the 
dark in; Voice C recalls his failure as an old man attempting something we might 
imagine to be the artist’s project. Beckett successfully weaves the voices together to 
produce a unique time line and sequence of events that reflect the cause of the man’s 
current state. Although each voice carries an individual mood and central focus, each 
is primarily concerned with finding ‘that time’. The voices demonstrate throughout 
the play, however, that the search for this time is merely another means of the 
self-illusion to keep the silence out and that a time that has passed cannot be relived 
or recreated.  
Thus Beckett is stripping human experience of the most fundamental of all 
certainties -- personal identity -- and he does it by exploiting the locus classicus for 
all affirmations of identity: the mirror. As I have pointed out, Company fables a 
‘mirror’ that contains a reflection or image with no model or subject outside to reflect: 
the image in the ‘mirror’ is a pure reflection, with no external object available as its 
material referent. Logically, identity means to be the same as oneself, as ‘A equals A’ 
is the formal statement of A’s identity. The self in front of the mirror affirms his 
identity by claiming his reflection; he knows himself as this self by recognizing the 
relation of sameness obtaining between himself and the reflection. But the pure 
reflection can have no such identity, for there is no other term outside the mirror in 
virtue of which a relation of sameness can be constituted: ‘And you as you always 
were. Alone.’ Even within the mirror the pure reflection cannot posit a relation of 
sameness with himself and thus confirm his identity. His experience is wholly the 
hearing of a voice that cannot be named and whose relation to the listener remains 
unknowable.  
To fully grasp the significance of this pure reflection we must understand that 
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the special mirror imagination has created for him is the mirror of memory: his 
present experience concerns a voice narrating a past he cannot claim. The mirror in 
Company will seem clearer if we elaborate upon the conventional approach to 
memory suggested earlier. Memory is the private mirror each of us holds up to see in 
the images of the past a reflection of our identity now. More precisely, from the 
succession of past images which the mirror of memory reflects, we construct the idea 
of a linear life, a journey or evolution through whose unfolding we discover our 
present identity. Beckett attacked this notion of memory in Proust, and his remarks 
there will help us grasp the function of memory in Company. In Proust, Beckett 
distinguishes between two types of memory: voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary 
memory, the conscious summoning of past impressions, cannot reveal any truth 
about the past and hence of present identity, for the images it reproduces are 
inaccurate records structured by our prevailing habits of attention. In these 
impressions, we do not see the past so much as repeated examples of our distorting 
processes of noticing. As Beckett writes of voluntary memory, ‘The material that it 
furnishes contains nothing of the past, merely a blurred and uniform projection once 
removed of our anxiety and opportunism -- that is to say, nothing.’ [PTD 32-33] 
Involuntary memory, on the other hand, triggered by the sudden association of a 
present stimulus with a past sensation; it is not simply a re-experiencing but a 
discovery. By making what now is a then into a now again, it uncovers the truth of 
the original experience: ‘… thanks to this reduplication, the experience is at once 
imaginative and empirical, at once an evocation and a direct perception, real without 
being merely actual, ideal without being merely abstract, the ideal real, the essential, 
the extratemporal.’ [PTD 75]  
Yet, where to Proust, through involuntary memory, the present becomes a means 
of achieving a clarifying perspective on the past, of reflecting the true meaning of the 
past, in Company, memory can only reflect the same emptiness in both past and 
present, the same experience without identity. In fact, memory as such is impossible 
for the pure reflection; his now always has been. Once again we can quote, adding 
the emphasis: ‘And you as you always were.’ The reminiscences narrated by the 
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voice are not the impressions of a genuine succession through time, but instead 
superimpose different contexts on the same inner darkness and isolation. Elements of 
the paradigmatic situation involving a supine body hearing a voice in the dark of 
isolation are recapitulated in the scenes of rememoration: the infant on his back in 
the cradle, hearing the murmur of his parents above him: ‘No trace of love,’ observes 
the narrator [NO 38]; the young boy alone on the diving board ‘high above the sea,’ 
pushed by the ‘far call’ of his father: ‘Be a brave boy’ [NO 14]; the young man lying 
supine in the ‘trembling shade’ of an aspen, hearing the voice of his lover: ‘Your eyes 
opened and closed have looked in hers looking at yours. In your dark, you look in 
them again’ [NO 39]; the young couple in ‘the little summerhouse’ [NO 26], after 
some unexplained rupture, silent, each ‘with eyes closed’ [NO 59]; the old man on 
the strand, head bent over his walking stick, hearing the tide ebb in the night: ‘Were 
your eyes to open dark would lighten’ [NO 44].  
 
 
Subjective Immediacy and Illusions of Presence on Stage 
 
Writing about her personal experiences with Samuel Beckett’s theatre, Katharine 
Worth observes: ‘It is not a great step from being actively involved as a reader [of 
Company] to imagining the text in performance, its subtle music being spoke by a 
fine, resonant voice’23. Indeed, ever since its publication by John Calder in 1980, 
Company has exerted a strong pull on actors and directors alike. In the very year of 
its publication, a reading by Patrick Magee was broadcast by the BBC and a staged 
reading was arranged by John Russell Brown as a platform performance at the 
National Theatre. A French production directed by Pierre Chabert was given in Paris 
in November 1984 with Pierre Dux as the sole role (an English-language version of 
his Compagnie was directed by S. E. Gontarski in Los Angeles the following year). A 
conversation with Pierre Chabert had led Katharine Worth to approach Beckett for 
                                                        
23 Katharine Worth, Samuel Beckett’s Theatre: Life Journeys, p.166. 
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the rights to produce a new English stage adaptation, the outcome being a staging at 
the Edinburgh Festival in 1987 with Tim Pigott-Smith as the director and Julian 
Curry as the Figure.  
Given Company’s deictic mobility, the most fundamental question about the 
staging would be determining the stage image. The original prose text posits a 
duality between a ‘he’ voice and a ‘you’ voice, while the narrator, the nexus of those 
two voices, is barely suggested: all the while it remains so illusory and imaginative a 
figment. The second-person voice, despite the obvious autobiographical touch of the 
past it creates for the third-person, is merely imaginative renderings, each episode of 
which the third person rejects, insisting, in effect, ‘that was not I’. This voice is, as it 
says, ‘devised for company’, but it does not provide much comfort24  and is 
periodically contrasted with another voice, that of the third-person, which, erecting a 
series of hypotheses, comments on the ambiguity and futility of the whole 
company-fabling enterprise. Now the snare that awaits all directorial endeavour 
would be the temptation to stage two characters, equally foregrounded and 
respectively for the second- and third-person narratives. This is certainly an 
effort-saving juxtaposition, yet as the audience’s attention is shifted from one figure 
to the other, the original prose’s pronominal action that builds towards a final, though 
illusive, ‘I’ consequently crumbles inasmuch as the narrator is now reduced to a mere 
onstage voiceover (which is more distractive than contributive) while the supine 
                                                        
24 Almost all the incidents that the voice evokes are painful to the supine figure in the dark. 
They suggest a loveless childhood where the boy was rebuked or derided by his parents for 
his comment on the perception of the sun [NO 8], or for his report of being able to see the 
mountains of Wales from his ‘nook in the goose’ [NO 19] in the Wicklow Hills. There is the 
loveless parents ‘stooping over cradle’; ‘the lack of parental concern for a child who, in 
desperate need of attention, throws himself from ‘the top of a great fir’ [NO 17]; or the 
embarrassment of the child’s being on exhibition, standing naked at ‘the tip of a high board’ 
before the ‘many eyes’ of his father’s cronies as he is urged to ‘Be a brave boy’ [NO 14]. The 
child in the memories seems never to have been the boy or man his parents wanted. The 
voice also recounts horrid, embarrassing and naïve incidents: the boy who believes he can 
play God by intervening in the life of an ill hedgehog, only to find it dead in the end [NO 
23-24], or the child who can look out the summer house window to see that ‘all without is 
rosy’. Even the sensual moments are painful. The erotic episode of the young adult’s feeling 
the ‘fringe of her long black hair’ on his face is intimately connected to the story of the loved 
one’s pregnancy, with its puns about her being ‘late’. The episode’s concluding line hints at 
the disastrous end to the love affair, ‘All dead still’ [NO 34].  
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figure becomes a humble locus of ‘spectator complicity’ (which serves only to 
further destabilise the work’s pronominal action). In other words, the dramatic 
functions of the second-person will be substantially altered if it is overtly dramatised 
or brought too much into physicality.  
It is not surprising, then, to see how all the above-mentioned productions have 
consciously avoided evoking the listener’s immediate physical presence: it is a 
common practice among directors to treat Company as a monologue, the narrator of 
which is situated in a murky, typically Beckettian dungeon-like closed place. In 
Katharine Worth’s production, for instance, though apart from the Figure (played by 
Julian Curry) there was ‘an effigy created (with the aid of a tailor’s dummy) out of a 
shabby, long-skirted, greenish coat, broad-brimmed hat, and stick’, throughout the 
performance the latter had remained ‘a dim shape, only just visible in the background 
[…]; then once or twice lit so as to become a suggestive shadowy “other”.’25 An 
earlier production by S. E. Gontarski had gone even further by evoking no ‘shadowy 
other’ at all. In such cases the figure on stage becomes narrator, hypothesiser, and 
‘supine’ listener in one; he is the principal – albeit illusive or ghostly – icon 
mediating the two pronouns, sharing the characters of both and yet refusing to 
identify with either. Understandably, the move to centrality demands a different stage 
position, if not more mobility, for the figure than that of ‘lying on his back’. In lieu 
of a ‘supine’ figure, both the Gontarski and Worth productions have opted for a 
figure sitting in a chair26, the only major difference being that where the Gontarski 
Figure could not rise from the chair, the Worth Figure was allowed a variety of 
postures: ‘sitting on or resting against it, or standing behind and looking over’, till at 
the end it lay prone, ‘arms crossed on his chest’.27 Such changes are benevolent, for 
                                                        
25 Katharine Worth, Samuel Beckett’s Theatre: Life Journeys, p.170. 
 
26 The choice of the chair was probably inspired by Rockaby (1980).  
 
27 Katharine Worth, Samuel Beckett’s Theatre: Life Journeys, p.170. Contrary to Figure’s 
relative mobility in Worth’s production, Gontarski’s character had been sparing, and perhaps 
more stylistically so, in bodily movements: ‘In the hypothesising mode Figure could move 
and speak normally in his chair. Here he existed in real time. The listening mode, however, 
would be highly stylised. As listener, Figure would move in slow, balletic motion searching 
 35
what works in writing would have been flat if simply transferred onto stage; and they 
undoubtedly give better, and more natural, expression of the energies in the original.  
Predictably, both productions have used the Figure’s real voice for the 
third-person narrative and his recorded voice for the second-person.28 On the one 
hand, the Figure resists the second-person imposition of memories, not only because 
these memories are painful to him (as I have pointed out earlier), but also because the 
voice has been objectified. ‘In order to be perceived,’ Gontarski observes, ‘voice 
needs to be objectified, separated from the perceiver, and so voice must always be 
something other than the subject, the self; it cannot be accepted as part of the I. In 
fact, both figments Figure creates, the figure of one lying on his back in the dark and 
the voice he hears, have been objectified and thereby separated from the perceiving 
self.’29 Consequently, such second-person company-fabling fails in a way strikingly 
similar to that dramatised in Beckett’s 1974 dramaticule, That Time, where we 
witness much the same pronounced split between the voice and the self: a spotlit 
head listens while three voices, coming from the darkness on both sides and above, 
describe events from a life increasingly devoid of human contact. The idea that the 
person in each voice is making up people or events is stated or suggested, as when 
voice B says, ‘Just one of those things you kept making up to keep out the void’ 
[CDW 390], only to prove the eventual loneliness when he admits that he keeps 
making up the same scene, bringing into question whether the girl in the earlier scene 
is real [CDW 393]. This solitude in B then starts to parallel the theme of solitude in A 
and C that is apparent throughout the work. In C, the man is ignored by the people 
                                                                                                                                                             
out for the source of the voice….’ [S.E. Gontarski, ‘Company for Company: Androgyny and 
Theatricality in Samuel Beckett’s Prose’ in James Acheson & Kateryna Arthur eds., Beckett’s 
Later Fiction and Drama: Texts for Company. London: Macmillan, 1987, p.196] 
 
28 Insufficient time for preparation had denied Pierre Chabert’s adaptation a recording, 
though Beckett, then partially involved in the production, had desired one. Yet Chabert had 
painstakingly worked out a way of lighting the actor’s face to disguise the fact that it was he 
who was speaking the second-person lines [see Katharine Worth, Samuel Beckett’s Theatre: 
Life Journeys, p.168].  
 
29 S.E. Gontarski, ‘Company for Company: Androgyny and Theatricality in Samuel Beckett’s 
Prose’ in Acheson & Arthur eds., Beckett’s Later Fiction and Drama: Texts for Company. 
London: Macmillan, 1987, p.199. 
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around him: ‘The eyes passing over you and through you like so much thin air’ (394). 
In A the man goes back to the places of childhood mentioned in B apparently to 
restore his memories of childhood and presumably to defy the solitude, but his 
attempt fails and he leaves as he comes: alone. Early in his preparation for the French 
adaptation of Company, Pierre Chabert had planned to minimise the narrator’s 
corporeality by staging a floating head. He decided to mask the source of light and so 
created a black box large enough to accommodate the lighting and the figure sitting 
on a black chair. Shrouded in a black cassock, the actor’s body would be invisible 
save the head, lit by sourceless light. This approach was apparently inspired by That 
Time,30 in which the severed head with ‘long flaring white hair as if seen from above 
outspread’ is simultaneously character, stage prop, and stage set, the rest being all 
silence. Enoch Brater in his study of Beckett’s late style in theatre notes that such a 
bodiless head ‘heightens the sense that one is watching a theatrical performance: this 
is a staged world, where script, direction, and design place props and characters at 
will.’31 For me, however, it is less a meta-dramatic deliberation than a mere theatrical 
device which serves to evaporate the illusions of subjective immediacy by 
highlighting the inconsistency between the listener and the second-person voice. This 
again recalls That Time, where we have voices that allegedly belong to the face on 
stage (‘Voices A B C are his own…’); but in performance the arrangement of the 
voices around the head gives the impression that the voices emanate not from his 
subconscious but from somewhere outside him. Here in Company, even if the voice 
recounts incidents from his past more or less accurately, its second-person imposition 
reminds the figure on stage that these accounts could be selected, recorded, 
re-emphasised versions of the past.  
On the other hand, the Figure as hypothesiser is not a stable reality or a 
transcendental creator either. He keeps an eye not only on his ‘supine’ creature, but 
                                                        
30 It was perhaps because of its close affinity to That Time that Beckett rejected the floating 
head image on the first rehearsal.  
 
31 Enoch Brater, Beyond Minimalism: Beckett’s Late Style in Theatre. New York & Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987, p.38. 
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over his own shoulder as well, wondering whether he too is only a figment, a created 
creature, or an imaginative construct. So finally, he is, for he is not an actual 
hypothesiser, Beckett continuously reminds us, but an actor, a representation in an art 
work created by a particular set of cultural forces that for convenience we call 
Samuel Beckett. But this Samuel Beckett too is glancing over his shoulder, 
wondering if he too has been written. Beckett thus explores the fictive possibilities of 
such an infinite regress by suggesting an infinite series of devisers: ‘Devised deviser 
devising it all for company’ [NO 37]. A transcendental unity is finally always 
arbitrary, for one can always ask, ‘Who asks in the end, Who asks? … And adds long 
after himself, Unless another still. Nowhere to be found. Nowhere to be sought. The 
thinkable last of all. Unnamable. Last person. I. Quick leave him.’ [NO 19] 
Consequently, the ‘I’ as ‘deferred finality’ is never verified, though all the while the 
text’s pronominal action has been building towards it. As the Figure recoils from the 
mention of the ‘I’ saying ‘Quick leave him’, he is in fact recoiling from the 
unverifiability of his self and perhaps from the unverifiability of that same 
unverifiability. This testifies to my earlier discussion of Company’s fable of the 
‘mirror’, which contains a reflection with no model or subject outside to reflect: the 
uncertainty about the I’s finality stems exactly from this absence of an external 
referent, though the ‘I’ keeps haunting the Figure with its ever-unverifiable presence. 
Plagued by the second-person memories and his being a ‘devised deviser’ with no 
ultimate deviser, the Figure is disturbed to the utmost by these closing lines:  
 
But with face upturned for good labour in vain at your fable. Till finally you hear 
how words are coming to an end. With every inane word a little nearer to the last. 
And how the fable too. The fable of one with you in the dark. The fable of one 
fabling of one with you in the dark. And how better in the end labour lost and 
silence. And you as you always were. 
 
Alone. [NO 52]  
 
Typical of Beckett’s late theatre, language, rather than subjective presence, 
which the voices tend to highlight, is now central to Company. Language creates 
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stories as much as it ‘unwords’ the subject. The narrator’s phrasing, the often baroque, 
inverted, elliptical, poetic phrasing of both voices, is as much, if not more, a source 
of company as the actual hypothesising. Conscious of this, S. E. Gontarski avoided in 
his own adaptation a literal illustration of the text, maintaining that the text’s 
linguistic emphasis should be retained as much as possible, and that no attempt 
should be made to ‘dramatise the stories of the second-person voice’ or to ‘illustrate 
the image of the third-person as described …’32. With an idiosyncratic Beckettian 
directorial touch, he limited the range of theatrical sign systems on stage, and such 
reduction of what theatrical semioticians would call ‘transmitters’ (that is, costume, 
props, lights, etc.) not only erases possible illusions of subjective immediacy brought 
by too much physicality, but more importantly focuses the audience’s attention on the 
imaginative and illusive nature of the figure and propels them into more linguistic 
engagement with the play.  
Earlier on I talked about the reason-ridden passage as a reminder of the question 
of the speaker and the addressee (‘If the voice is not speaking to him it must be 
speaking to another. [...] were the voice speaking not to him but to another then it 
must be of that other it is speaking and not of him or of another still. Since it speaks 
in the second person’). In a stage production of Company in which the Figure is only 
an illusive presence, such speculation naturally becomes, specifically and urgently, 
that of dramatic indexicality. Writing about the function of deixis in theatre, Keir 
Elam remarks:  
 
Deixis […] allows the dramatic context to be referred to as an ‘actual’ and 
dynamic world already in progress. Indeed, deictic reference presupposes the 
existence of a speaker referred to as ‘I’, a listener addressed as ‘you’, a 
physically present object indicated as ‘this’. It resides in ‘shifters’ […] in so far 
as it does not, in itself, specify its object but simply points, ostensively, to the 
already-constituted contextual elements.33
                                                        
32 S.E. Gontarski, ‘Company for Company: Androgyny and Theatricality in Samuel Beckett’s 
Prose’ in Acheson & Arthur eds., Beckett’s Later Fiction and Drama: Texts for Company. 
London: Macmillan, 1987, p.194. 
 
33 Keir Elam, The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama. London: Methuen, 1980, p.140. 
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 As dramatic communication is so much dependent upon deictic markers, an indexical 
expression such as ‘You are on your back in the dark’ remains totally ambiguous 
unless uttered in a context where the ‘shifter’ you has an evident referent. Yet ‘you’ is 
never evident in Company, for a multitude of supine listeners have been conjured by 
the writing and drawn into the wide circle of speculation. Thus the ‘one on his back’ 
loses any tenuous identity that he may have been gathering. The audience, too, is 
forbidden identification of any kind as the ‘one’ loses its unitariness and the single 
focus of traditional third-person narrative on a specific ‘he’ or ‘she’ is splintered.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Beckett’s narrative strategy, so obstinately paradigmatic, fragmentary and obscure, 
posits here the question of the legitimacy of translatability of persons into referents. 
This translatability occurs in language all the time, mostly through pronominal and 
tropological exchanges. However, in Beckett these exchanges do not and cannot 
mirror an uncracked, unified, ‘I’, endowed with referential self-sameness; at best 
they show a configuration of positions, never extraneous to language. This 
configuration becomes readable as a sequence or a coherence, and produces the 
effect of an ‘I’.  
The narrative makes clear the fact that the self administers but cannot master the 
full meaning of the subject, which is to say that consciousness can only capture the 
self as an object, ignoring the simultaneous double of its subject-object relation. 
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 [2] 
 
‘STOCK STILL STARING OUT’34: 
TEMPORAL-SPATIAL DIMENSIONS OF PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Let’s just say you’re not all there.’35
 
 
Samuel Beckett’s late plays are, it might be said, both immediately, engrossingly 
present and troublingly absent, unfinished even while they are rigorously formed. 
They are theatre pieces that seem to pick apart the seams of the theatrical event; they 
both involve and baffle the spectator, giving her or him both the promise of physical 
immediacy (for, if nothing else, the late plays are troublingly there; each one relies 
for its effect on the precise delineation of a carefully crafted stage image) and the 
frustrating certainty that, in this world, few if any conventional dramatic processes 
are in operation. 
Having said that, we might be tempted to ask what is so remarkable about 
Beckett’s theatre. After all, the plays, from Waiting for Godot onwards, call into 
                                                        
34 Samuel Beckett, A Piece of Monologue [CDW 425]. 
 
35 Beckett to Billie Whitelaw during rehearsals for Footfalls. Quoted in Jonathan Kalb, 
Beckett in Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p.235. 
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question those relations that exist, unremarked, in conventional theatre: the role of 
the spectator in decoding the text; the status of the image and of the text; and the 
relation between the two. It has also been widely noted that Beckett’s dramas, from 
the first, rely on a reconfiguration of the conventional idea of time and space 
normally encountered in theatrical performance (one thinks of Ruby Cohn’s 
persuasive term ‘theatereality’, for example, a term that identifies a fundamental 
confusion in the plays between the time and space of the drama and the time and 
space of the actors on the stage36). 
This, of course, raises a fundamental question about these characters’ 
subjectivity: Is the character in a Beckett text occupying a world mapped out by the 
text or one delimited by the confines of the stage? Is he or she immediately present 
or infinitely removed from presence? How can she or he be understood by an 
audience, if the form of the play itself makes such an understanding problematic if 
not impossible? How can we, as audience members, make sense of these ‘people’ 
(Beckett’s own preferred term) if we are unclear about their precise location and of 
their precise position in what is normally considered to be the linear narrative of life? 
In the canon of Beckett criticism, a standard answer has evolved, one that relies 
implicitly on a conventional idea of the way in which subjectivity is fixed in 
dramatic space and time. It is fair to say that, in most pieces of theatre, the relation of 
space to time follows a standard pattern: the time-space indicated in the play exceeds 
the time-space of performance, but the two are sequentially related. That is, the 
enacted events are themselves excerpted from a larger number of events, imagined as 
taking place offstage. Similarly, the setting of the play is to be imagined as only one 
of a number of simultaneously existing settings that together form the world 
described in the text. The spatial and temporal hierarchy thus established will, if 
described in a manner that is internally consistent, allow the audience to accept the 
subjectivity of the characters presented; they exist in performance time-space 
                                                        
36 Ruby Cohn, Just Play: Beckett’s Theater. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1980, pp.30-31. 
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because they are firmly rooted in dramatic time-space – because they have a 
coherently and sequentially described existence outside the immediate confines of 
the performance. A consistent narrative, therefore, relies on the sequential ordering of 
events in two time-spaces, simultaneously invoked by the dramatist and understood 
by the audience.37  
                                                        
37 It is precisely this model, it has been argued, that Beckett’s theatre invokes and then 
frustrates. [See, for example, S.E. Gontarski, The Intent of Undoing in Samuel Beckett’s 
Drama. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.] The characters are simply present. 
Vladimir and Estragon may not know precisely what happened yesterday, but they know that 
their present existence is confirmed, if only by the presence of each other; similarly, Hamm 
and Clov are adrift in the present moment, relying on the dialogue to fix them in place. 
Krapp’s past is, it seems to him, the tale of another man; Winnie’s past drains away from her 
as she sinks into the earth; but both confirm themselves in the present time-space of 
performance each time they utter or move. All these characters exist in a dramatic time-space 
that is indistinguishable from the time-space of performance. They cannot rely on a past 
history to confirm their own existence, their own subjectivity; but they can define themselves, 
even if it is only from moment to moment, in the actions and the words that they perform day 
after day and night after night. However, I would argue that, in the later plays – from Not I 
(1972) onwards – the relation between time, space and the self changes yet again. The nature 
of this change is prefigured in an area of Beckett’s work that has arguably yet to attract the 
dedicated study that its importance in his canon merits: the texts created for the electronic 
media in the 1960s. In Words and Music: A Piece for Radio (1962), Film (1965), Eh Joe: A 
Piece for Television (1966), and Cascando: A Radio Piece for Music and Voice (1963/64), 
Beckett, at first schematically but with a rapidly increasing ease and sophistication, uses the 
technical resources of the form to explore the fragmentation of the self. In Film, most 
obviously, Buster Keaton is pursued by himself. In Eh Joe, more interestingly, Joe tries to 
stifle a voice that is both his (it may, it says, be coming from his head [CDW 364]) and not 
his (the voice is a woman’s; it is tied in some unexplained way to a moving camera and to a 
light that rises and falls with the voice). In the radio plays, the creation of the text is 
presented alongside the editing of the text. Words and Music plays at the bidding and 
direction of Croak; in Cascando, Opener breaks the last, gasping efforts of both Voice and 
Music into separate sections. The net effect of these texts is to render any notion of the single 
subject, present to itself in the time-space of performance, profoundly problematic. As an 
example of this, take the relationship between the camera, the voice, and Joe in Eh Joe. On 
paper, it would seem to be unproblematic; the camera and the voice both home in on Joe’s 
face, presenting the viewer with a simple visual analogy for the inner workings of his 
guilt-ridden but defiant mind. However, as filmed, the relations are by no means as clear. 
Both voice and camera are experienced by the viewer as external, but not necessarily linked 
(in the original BBC production, Jack MacGowran looks to the camera’s left in an attempt to 
locate the voice; a subtle gesture, but enough to invest the camera with an unstated but 
insistent agenda of its own). In Cascando, Opener would seem to be simply an editor; but the 
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‘Will you never have done … revolving it all?’: Beckett’s Poetics of Offstage 
 
Hanna Scolnicov, in an essay titled ‘Theatre Space, Theatrical Space, and the 
Theatrical Space Without’, draws a key distinction between theatre space and 
theatrical space: ‘the physical space in which a performance takes place is its theatre 
space. Within a given theatre space, the production will create its own theatrical 
space’38. Moreover, she identifies the theatrical space:  
 
The unseen theatrical space is no less real and dramatically important than the 
visible theatrical space. Actions of great moment like Macbeth’s murder of 
Duncan, may take place off stage, in which I propose to call the theatrical space 
without as opposed to the theatrical space within. The difference between them 
is the difference between perceived space and conceived space.39
 
In Beckett’s earlier theatre, for instance, the ‘theatrical space within’ refers to the 
road, the tree and the mound in Waiting for Godot, the interior and ashbins in 
Endgame, the mound in Happy Days, and the darkness or semi-darkness in most later 
plays. Scolnicov goes on to explain the significance of the theatrical space in the 
theatre:  
 
In the novel all space is conceived, because its apprehension is always mediated 
                                                                                                                                                             
character displays momentary flashes of a subject never fully incarnated elsewhere in the 
text, and Opener’s spatial and temporal relationship to both words and music is never made 
clear. In fact, one might say that Opener’s editing function in the text creates an ambiguous 
spatiotemporal relation to that text; detached for much of the performance and then 
disturbingly engaged at the end, when it seems as though Words and Music may finally 
finish the tale of Woburn. Similarly, the late plays employ the idea of the editor, still working 
on the text, and the idea of a voice whose relation to the image is unfixed. 
 
38 Hanna Scolnicov, ‘Theatre space, theatrical space and the theatrical space without’, in J. 
Redmond ed., The Theatrical Space. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.11. 
 
39 Ibid., p.14. 
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by words, so that there can be no real perception of space. But, in the theatre, the 
theatrical space within is perceived directly and sensuously, and the theatrical 
space outside can be conceived as extrapolations of the concrete visible space on 
stage.40  
 
The theatrical spaces within and without demand an imaginative response on the part 
of the spectator. This is significant as we look at subjectivity in Beckett late theatre 
pieces, which are usually short and austere, with the actions located essentially in the 
minds of characters who are often listening to the voices of consciousness reeling out, 
like Krapp’s tapes, ‘ends and odds’ of disjointed memories and stories: the 
fragmented awareness of being in time, but not in harmony with it. The conflict, as 
almost always in Beckett’s works, is between a disintegrating body/body part and the 
questioning mind, the former caught inexplicably in the presence of the theatrical 
space within, whereas the latter, while it escapes the stage presence, gets trapped in 
time – both slowly moving towards death.  
So much of the drama in Beckett’s late theatre takes place in a world offstage. It 
should be admitted that, while references to the offstage are normal, they are usually 
made in order to elucidate the onstage reactions of the characters primarily involved 
in dramatic action: Phèdre hearing with horror of the arrival of her husband, or 
Hamlet obsessed with the death of his father. Political and horticultural realities of a 
wider social world outside are given in detail in The Cherry Orchard because of their 
effect on the plot and characters onstage. But such counterfactual background in 
Beckett’s plays is increasingly of quite a different order and has a different purpose. 
In the earlier plays, there are still more conventional interactions between time and 
space in the theatrical space within, the ‘dialogue’ between time and space on stage 
is still capable of making things ‘happen’, and the dramatic possible worlds still 
extend beyond the mimetic space in a sparse but fairly conventional way. Gogo, for 
instance, refers to a place where ‘they’ beat him up; Clov describes the ‘corpsed’ 
world outside and the boy; the wall between the interior and the outside world 
                                                        
40 Ibid., p.14. 
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represents a spatial line separating Hamm and Clove’s future from the present; 
Winnie’s life is controlled by the mystical space where the bell-ring comes from. 
From then on, however, the theatrical space on stage is gradually reduced to 
inactivity and darkness: the relationship between onstage signs and icons, references 
to possible worlds beyond, and spectator, consequently becomes more complex. 
There is no plot, only dynamic representation of a mental state, which becomes filled, 
peopled, rounded, and actualised in subtle and suggestive ways by the spectator.  
In the 1974 play That Time, for example, the only visual material on stage is the 
image of the head of the Listener, situated just off centre stage, separated spatially 
both from the absent body and from the text which is in turn fragmented into three 
disembodied and recorded voices, issuing from loudspeakers to the left, centre and 
right of the stage. The image of the Listener therefore focuses on the function of 
perceiving, although utterance and perception are interdependent in almost all of 
Beckett’s dramatic works. The only movement of the head, until the end, is the 
opening and closing of eyes, which highlights the activity of perception. Yet what the 
head ‘sees’ is the spoken text – the process of seeing is transformed into that of 
listening, and vice versa.  
Unlike many of the earlier plays in which there are relatively dynamic stage 
image to dominate the content of the text, in That Time for the most part, there is 
little but the spoken text to maintain our attention. A space which is usually 
associated with the visual is therefore dominated by the verbal. Yet precisely because 
of the lack of visual scenic material, the faculty of seeing, both that of Listener and 
that of the audience, shifts from the outer ‘eye of the flesh’ to the inner eye of the 
imagination. The audience’s imagination becomes the scene where the Listener’s 
memories are staged. The two categories of perception, external or physical, and 
internal or imaginative, are thereby juxtaposed, creating both contrast and ambiguity.  
As Anna McMullan suggests, ‘[t]he separation of the head from the three voices 
external to it emphasizes the ambiguity of the stage space’41. The visual image of the 
                                                        
41 Anna McMullan, Theatre on Trial: Samuel Beckett’s Later Drama. New York and London: 
Routledge, 1993, p.49. 
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head seems to suggest an external view of an old man on his death bed: ‘Old white 
face, long flaring white hair as if seen from above outspread’ [CDW 388]. Yet the 
haunting quality of the spotlit image, the pale skin and the long white hair, as well as 
the position of the disembodied head, situated unnaturally three metres above stage 
level and seen as if from above, has a disorienting effect on the spectator, preventing 
him or her from perceiving the stage space as a naturalistic death-bed scene. As the 
Listener closes his eyes to listen to the voices, he seems to be retreating into an inner 
world. While the voices appear to occupy a space that is external to the head, this 
space can also be seen as an externalisation of the inner space of the Listener’s mind 
or memory. The impression of internality, even of intimacy, is reinforced through the 
sound of the breathing which is heard before the voices begin. This tends to 
transform the space into an internal cavern which threatens to engulf auditorium and 
stage, conflicting with the external perspective offered by the head. Indeed, much of 
the haunting quality of Beckett’s dramatic texts comes from the power of evocation 
of l’ailleurs, despite the powerful visual images he always creates on stage, and 
despite the importance given to physicality in his stage directions and in his own 
productions.  
The absence of body in That Time, apart from the head, and any other scenic 
information means that images or memories of body and world are produced solely 
through the text. While the stage image stresses the ‘here and now’ of the speaker’s 
voices relayed to him across the stage space, the text recreates other spaces and other 
times, opening up a vast perspective of history: ‘perhaps way back in childhood or 
the womb worst of all or that old Chinaman long before Christ born with long white 
hair’. Such a multiplicity of identities recalls Nietzsche’s parade of historical masks. 
Yet this immense perspective is telescoped into the stage present, as the image of an 
old man with long white hair referred to in the text parallels the stage image of the 
Listener. Since the old Chinese man has just been born while the Listener is on his 
death-bed, the juxtaposition not only superimposes past and present, but death and 
birth, in a pattern that is repeated throughout the play, where the interplay between 
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identity and difference simultaneously posits and demolishes the spatial (here or 
there, internal or external, bounded or unbounded) and temporal (now or then, past or 
present, finite or infinite) categorisation of experience. 
Gérard Genette distinguishes three modes of récit42, or narrative, which relate to 
the categories of space and time, internal and external. The first two are narration 
and description, both of which tend to refer to experiences of the protagonist in the 
external world. Narration, however, tends to deal with the succession of events in 
time, while description is more static, fixing the objects described in space: 
 
Narration restores, in the temporal succession of its discourse, the equally 
temporal succession of events, whereas discourse must modulate, in discursive 
succession, the representation of objects that are simultaneously juxtaposed in 
space.43  
 
Gérard’s third category of récit, is termed discourse. The other two modes both have 
a certain visual reference, even the narration. The third, however, deals with the 
internal activity or functioning of the production of discourse. Whereas the first two 
describe external events or scenes, the third is concerned with the subject in its 
relation to language: ‘“subjective discourse” is that in which, explicitly or not, the 
presence of (or reference to) I is marked, but this is not defined in any other way 
except as the person who is speaking this discourse.’44 Genette’s first two categories 
seem to correspond in That Time to passages of movements and description in the 
récit of the protagonist’s past, and the third to the regular breaks in the narration, 
particularly the repeated phrase ‘when was that’ which returns the focus to the 
moment of utterance or enunciation, as in the following passage:  
 
                                                        
42 I am using the French term of Gérard Genette to avoid confusion caused by its English 
equivalents, for ‘Récit’ is often translated as discourse, plot, narrative, subject, or narration. 
  
43 Gérard Genette, Figures of Literary Discourse, trans, Alan Sheridan. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1982, p.136. 
 
44 Ibid. p.138. 
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A: straight off the ferry and up with the nightbag to the high street neither right 
nor left not a curse for the old scenes the old name straight up the rise from the 
wharf to the high street and there not a wire to be seen only the old rails all rust 
when was that [CDW 388-389]  
 
The text also shifts from image or narrative to the reporting of speech reduction: 
 
A: or talking to yourself who else out loud imaginary conversation there was 
childhood for you ten or eleven on a stone among the giant nettles making it up 
now one voice now another till you were hoarse and they all sounded the same 
[CDW 390]  
 
That Time continually shifts from the narrative to the descriptive mode – from an 
emphasis on movement and the passing of time to moments of description usually 
associated with an object or objects, when time seems to have been temporarily 
halted. Yet if these modes can be identified in Beckett’s texts, their differentiation 
also serves to highlight their interpretation. The stillness of description is interrupted 
by the impossibility of arresting motion, either that of the body or that of time, while 
the experience of time is frequently presented in terms of spatial difference. Beckett 
therefore exploits two modes, yet also confuses them, so that if time is spatialised, 
space is also infused with time.  
Indeed, as Martin Heidegger observes in Being and Time, the terminology 
available in Western languages for expressing time is remarkably impoverished. 
Since we lack adequate temporal language, we always express time in some spatial 
image or other, for example in the movement of the hands of a clock. Beginning with 
visual and performing arts, the organisation of space and time is critical and always 
constrained by particular limitations of form, mostly spatial, but sometimes temporal 
as well.  
To this time-space (con)fusion, Mikhail Bakhtin has given a name, chronotope, 
or ‘the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are 
artistically expressed in literature’45. Upon this definition, chronotope means the 
                                                        
45 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, trans. Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist. 
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expression of the relationship between time and space. Regarding time and space as 
the basic structure of literary works, Bakhtin stresses the inseparability of space and 
time – time as the fourth dimension of space. 46  Besides inseparability, the 
relationship between time and space is complementary, i.e. they serve as twin axes of 
fictional worlds: ‘In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators 
are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, 
takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and 
responsive to the movements of time, plot, and history. This intersection of axes and 
fusion of indicators characterises the artistic chronotope.’47  
Time, according to Bakhtin, is originally invisible. Once cooperative with spatial 
concepts, however, it becomes visible. The trace of time is reflected in space, and 
becomes significant to it: ‘Space becomes more concrete and saturated with a time 
that is more substantial: space is filled with real, living meaning, and forms a crucial 
relationship with the hero and his fate’ 48 . Therefore, the chronotope, or the 
intersection of time and space, makes the abstract explicit and visible:  
 
… the chronotope, functioning as the primary means for materialising time in 
space, emerges as a centre for concretising representation, as a force giving body 
to the entire novel. All the novel’s abstract elements – philosophical and social 
generalisations, ideas, analyses of cause and effect – gravitate toward the 
chronotope and through it take on flesh and blood, permitting the imaging power 
of art do its work. Such is the representational significance of the chronotope.49  
 
Here Bakhtin notes how the chronotope can function as the ‘primary means of 
materialising time in space’ and can become ‘a centre for concretising representation’. 
In the literary chronotope, time and space can sometimes turn through ninety degrees, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Texas: University of Texas Press, 1982, p.84. 
 
46 Ibid., p.84.  
 
47 Ibid., p.84. 
 
48 Ibid., p.120. 
 
49 Ibid., p.250. 
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as it were, and act as indicators on the other axis. Here, the indicators of time and 
space tend to fuse, allowing different spaces to be represented by different times, and 
different times to be represented by different spaces.  
Bakhtin’s theory of the chronotope is crucial for visualising and conceptualising 
spatio-temporal relations in literature of antiquity. He emphasizes the dominance of 
exteriority in this literature: 
 
The square in earlier (ancient) times itself constituted a state (and more – it 
constituted the entire state apparatus, with all its official organs), it was the 
highest court, the whole of science, the whole of art, the entire people 
participated in it .… And in this concrete and as it were all-encompassing 
chronotope, the laying bare and examination of a citizen’s whole life was 
accomplished, and received its public and civic stamp of approval …. Here the 
individual is open on all sides, he is all surface, there is in him nothing that exists 
‘for his sake alone’, nothing that could not be subject to public or state control 
and evaluation. Everything here, down to the last detail, is entirely public.50
 
Yet, Bakhtin also anticipates the fragmentation of chronotopes in modern literature, 
linking this development with the increasing emphasis on interiority, on the invisible 
and the unnamable: 
 
In following epochs, man’s image was distorted by his increasing participation in 
the mute and invisible spheres of existence. He was literally drenched in 
muteness and invisibility. And with them entered loneliness. The personal and 
detached human being – ‘the man who exists for himself’ – lost the unity and 
wholeness that had been a product of his public origin. Once having lost the 
popular chronotope of the public square, his self-consciouness could not find an 
equally real, unified and whole chronotope; it therefore broke down and lost its 
integrity …. The human image became multi-layered, multi-faceted. A core and 
a shell, an inner and an outer, separated within it.  
 
The text of That Time seems to contrast two different types of chronotope: first, the 
external images and narratives of the life-history of the protagonist, and second, the 
non-visual internal space animated by discourse. If Beckett’s reduction of the 
                                                        
50 Ibid., p.84.  
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theatrical space within to darkness, its evocation of an outer metal conceptual space, 
as well as the narrative voice in a ‘three-fold source’ [CDW 387] emphasise the 
fragmented and divided (or, after Bakhtin, the ‘multi-layered’ and ‘multi-faceted’) 
nature of the ‘self’, then this fragmentation gains a special dynamics through the 
interplay of differing spaces and times both within the text, and between the text and 
stage, boundaries may shift, but, being two-dimensional, they cannot metamorphose 
into each other.  
Take Voice A’s narrative for instance. It relates the middle-aged protagonist’s 
journey back to the city of his birth in search of the ruin where he used to hide as a 
child. Thus the interminable spatial trajectories of the body are linked with the 
protagonist’s life-journal through time, in the attempt to make contact with an earlier 
space, time, and identity.51 ‘that time you went back that last time to look was the 
ruin still there where you hid as a child when was that’ [CDW 388]. But this is a 
failed journey, as all means to reach Foley’s Folly, the goal of the protagonist’s visit, 
are frustrated: ‘not a wire to be seen only the old rails all rust’ [CDW 389]. The 
halting of the journey is underlined by the shift from the narration of movement to 
description, particularly in section II, where the protagonist attempts to reach his 
destination by rail. The station proves not to be a stage on the way, but a terminus to 
his journey: ‘no getting out to it that way so what next no question of asking not 
another word to the living as long as you lived so foot it up in the end to the station 
bowed half double get out to it that way all closed down and boarded up Doric 
terminus of the Great Southern and Eastern all closed down and the colonnade 
crumbling away so what next’ [CDW 391]. Yet these supposedly static descriptions 
of the tram rails or of the railway station, or indeed of the childhood refuge, are 
descriptions of ruins, and are therefore impregnated with time and motion, evoking 
the same passage of time and processes of decay to which the protagonist and his 
                                                        
51 Here we are reminded of Bakhtin’s association of the temporal and spatial ‘peregrinations’ 
of the protagonist of Apuleian fiction: ‘The most characteristic thing about this novel is the 
way it fuses the course of an individual’s life (at its major turning points) with his actual 
spatial course or road – that is with his wandering.’ [Ibid., p.120] 
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‘loved ones’ (narrative of Voice’s B) are also subject. Here, static spatial terms are 
temporalised into a fluid progression.  
Not I begins with a movement from incoherence to coherence; the text instructs 
the actress to ad-lib from the text until the image – Mouth, gabbling away upstage to 
the audience’s right, suspended in the darkness, auditor dimly lit downstage to the 
audience’s left – is revealed [CDW 376]. The text proper begins at a conventional 
moment (the birth of the character); we seem to be at the beginning of a 
comprehensible, if extreme, narrative. But then, almost as soon as this story is begun, 
it seems on the point of ending: 
 
Mouth: … out … into this world … this world … tiny little thing … before its 
time … in a godfor- … what? … girl … yes … tiny little girl … into this … out 
into this … before her time … godforsaken hole called … called … no matter … 
parents unknown … unheard of … he having vanished … thin air … no sooner 
buttoned up his breeches … she similarly … eight months later … almost to the 
tick … so no love … spared that … no love such as normally vented on the … 
speechless infant … in the home … no … nor indeed for that matter any of any 
kind … no love of any kind … at any subsequent stage … so typical affair … 
nothing of any note till coming up to sixty when – … what?... seventy?.. good 
God!.. coming up to seventy … wandering in a field … looking aimlessly for 
cowslips … to make a ball … a few steps then stop … stare into space … then 
on … a few more … stop and stare again … so on … drifting around … when 
suddenly … gradually … all went out … all that early April morning light … 
and she found herself in the – … what?. .who? .. no!.. she!.. [CDW 376–77, my 
emphasis] 
 
The play’s récit, as we can see, is largely in the narrative mode that is dominated by 
action and movement. Unlike That Time, in which the protagonist’s attempt to make 
contact with an earlier space, time, and identity is interrupted by the descriptive 
mode which slows down the narrative time. In Not I, however, within the first minute, 
we have moved from birth to a state close to death: we have no sooner learned that 
the girl’s parents have both vanished, than we are with her at the age of (perhaps) 
seventy, at the moment when the world in which she has lived in the intervening time 
fades to nothing. A conventional departure leads to a conventional ending (birth 
moves to death), but the movement is abrupt, disorienting, unsignalled. Also, the 
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narrative is frequently mediated by an unheard voice that edits the narrative (marked 
by the Mouth self-interrogations in italics), the mediation directs the narrative back 
to the enunciating present as is the case with the phrase, ‘when was that’, in That 
Time when the focus is shifted back to the moment of utterance.  
For the duration of the play, the audience listening to Mouth’s narrative is as 
dislocated in time as she is; we move back and forward through the life she describes 
without any sense of the fragments of experience ever cohering, or, indeed, any sense 
that they are ever likely to cohere. When, as the voice begins to fade, it declares, ‘no 
matter … keep on … […] hit on it in the end …’ [CDW 383, stage directions 
omitted], we as an audience are still unsure what ‘it’ is, or, indeed, whether we or 
Mouth will recognize it when we hear of it. The dislocation, though, goes deeper 
than this. It is not simply that the timeline of the play is uncertain: the character of 
the woman whose story we hear seems to be alarmingly contingent, as though Mouth, 
at the promptings of an unseen voice, is deciding on the facts as she speaks. Note, in 
the speech quoted above, that the sex of the child is not immediately established; 
Mouth needs the prompting of the unheard voice before she decides that the child is 
female. 
It would seem, given the play’s title and the emphatic nature of Mouth’s repeated 
denials, that the question of the relation of the character described to the speaking 
voice should be easily decided; the character described is Mouth, and Mouth’s 
refusal to accept this identity is evidence of her extreme mental dislocation. However, 
the sheer contingency of the narrative constantly undercuts the easy identification 
that we might otherwise be inclined to make between Mouth and her narrative. It 
seems as though we are listening not simply to one voice recasting its experience but 
to the interaction of three characters in one narrative – the narrating voice, the 
unheard voice that edits the narrative, and the absent subject, never entirely 
incarnated either in the narrative or in the narrator. This is established not only in the 
text but in the ambiguous spatial relations that the play in performance establishes. 
The auditor gazes at Mouth: its intentness is signaled only in the hopeless gestures 
that accompany Mouth’s denial of identity. However, the text in performance 
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suggests the unseen presence of a third character, to whom Mouth defers. One might 
imagine this as an internal voice questioning and prompting her; however, it can also 
be imagined as external, an interrogator unseen and unheard by the audience, but 
ever present to Mouth. A linear narrative, establishing a character unambiguously in 
time and space, is fragmented not only in the matter but in the manner of its telling; 
the very idea that this narrative describes and incarnates a subject (even though the 
subject might deny subjectivity) has been fatally undermined.  
Another play, A Piece of Monologue, is mapped out in different types of 
chronotope. Unlike That Time and Not I which tell of life-stories in the past, A Piece 
of Monologue focuses on the present and future times, rather than with the past, as 
Linda Ben-Zvi has aptly pointed out: ‘the focus is less on a replaying of the past than 
on the experience of the present and the future’52. Certainly, within the text of That 
Time, the present is not directly mentioned at all, while the narrative in A Piece of 
Monologue frequently refers specifically to ‘Now. This night.’ Yet, as in That Time, 
the whole relationship between the temporal categories and past and present, and 
indeed between narrative and stage present, becomes problematic. In A Piece of 
Monologue, the present, whether that of the stage or of the narrative, is presented as 
merely one frame in a series of identical frames stretching both backwards and 
forwards in time, between the poles of birth and death: ‘Birth was the death of him. 
Ghastly grinning ever since. Up at the lid to come. In cradle and crib. At suck fiasco. 
With the first totters. From mammy to nanny and back. All the way. Bandied back 
and forth. So ghastly grinning on. From funeral to funeral. To now. This night.’ ‘This 
night’ becomes almost immediately ‘Every nightfall’. The ‘now’ of the narrative 
present, and indeed of the stage present, becomes engulfed in a series of identical 
past reflections, like a temporal equivalent of the receding image within an image. 
Yet the temporal distance between the moment of birth and the (however temporary) 
present is also emphasized, the reference to funerals underlining the losses imposed 
                                                        
52 Linda Ben-Zvi, ‘The Schismatic Self in A Piece of Monologue’, in Journal of Beckett 
Studies, 7 (Spring 1982): 12.  
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by Time. The process of existence is seen not only as a continual repetition of the 
same, but as a series of repetitions with ever-diminishing material, a gradual process 
of reduction or fading: ‘Dying on. No more no less. No. Less. Less to die. Ever less’.  
However, despite the evocation of vast stretches of time, the text also 
emphasizes the relationship or parallels between birth and death and between coming 
and going, where the one seems to metamorphose into the other. As in Nietzsche’s 
theory of the eternal return, such perpetual repetition questions the very notion of 
beginning and close, as origin and end are continually reproduced within the cycle. 
This ambiguous relationship between beginning and end also characterizes the 
relationship between the two main scenes to which the text returns.  
While the first lines of A Piece of Monologue are mainly concerned with the 
evocation of repeated cycles of movement, the first visual image presented by the 
text is the scene of birth, the origin of the protagonist’s life in time. Yet the process of 
birth is not itself described, but rather the room in which it implicitly occurs. Indeed, 
the activity of birth seems to have been displaced onto the description of the budding 
of the young leaves beyond the room in which presumably the protagonist has been 
born: ‘Born dead of night. Sun long sunk behind the larches. New needles turning 
green. In the room dark gaining. Till faint light from standard lamp. Wick turned 
low’. Death and birth, however, are also juxtaposed within the image, as Linda 
Ben-Zvi has noted: ‘the death of the day is contrasted with the birth of the year’53. 
Footfalls begins, if not in the real world, then in a world in some respects more 
concrete than that of Not I and That Time. A woman, fully (if dimly) visible, conducts 
a conversation with a voice situated offstage; the relationship between the characters 
(daughter speaking to mother) is established quickly and clearly: 
 
M: Mother. [Pause. No louder.] Mother. 
[Pause.] 
V: Yes, May. 
M: Were you asleep?  
V: Deep asleep. [Pause.] I heard you in my deep sleep. [Pause.] There is no 
                                                        
53 Ibid., p.13.  
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sleep so deep that I would not hear you there. [Pause. M resumes pacing. Four 
lengths. After first length, synchronous with steps.] One two three four five six 
seven eight nine wheel one two three four five six seven eight nine wheel. [CDW 
399] 
 
Not I and That Time begin in indeterminacy; we as an audience have to wait for the 
narratives to cohere – and we are never given the unambiguous promise that this 
coherence will come about. Here, we have characters fully accepting not only their 
subjectivity but also their relation to each other; more than this, the text exactly 
describes the image before us – as Beckett’s own stage directions indicate, the words 
synchronise with the action.  
However, as the play develops, once again this identification becomes more and 
more uncertain. The very formality of the initial exchanges casts their status into 
doubt: this seems more ritual than conversation – and this sense is heightened by the 
near-exact repetition of the exchanges, recast into the past and into the third person, 
in both May’s and V’s monologues. By the time these exchanges recur, our sense of 
the reality of the opening dialogue has been further eroded, not only by the switch 
from dialogue to monologue but also by the spatiotemporal displacement of the story. 
From V, we hear of the prehistory and evolution of the image. The story she tells is a 
familiar Beckettian one: the child, marked as different from her earliest days, slowly 
degenerating into the ragged figure who paces before us. But the tale is clouded by 
the overt intrusion of the vocal tone that so characterises Not I. As we hear the tale, 
we are always aware that it is being edited for us, and perhaps that the version that 
we are hearing is not authentic but is being adapted moment by moment: 
 
V: I walk here now. [Pause.] Rather I come and stand [Pause.] At nightfall. 
[Pause.] She fancies she is alone. [Pause.] See how still she stands, how stark, 
with her face to the wall. [Pause.] […] Where is she, it may be asked. [Pause.]) 
Why, in the old home, the same where she – [Pause.] The same where she began. 
[Pause.] Where it began. [Pause.] It all began. [Pause.] But this, this, when did 
this begin? [Pause.] When other girls of her age were out at … lacrosse she was 
already here. [CDW 401] 
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The narrative begins with a momentarily confusing statement (‘I walk here now’); 
although the impression is only fleeting, for an instant it seems as though the image 
of the absent mother has been transposed onto the visible image of the daughter. 
From here to the narrative’s end, the insistent presence of an editorialising voice is 
felt as strongly in Footfalls as in Not I; indeed, in this play, its impact is not limited 
to the audible rejoinders to an inaudible prompting. V’s voice incorporates both 
narrative and editorial (‘But this, this, when did this begin?’). 
With May’s monologue we return to the characteristic rendering of experience 
found in the first two plays under discussion. May speaks, apparently, of herself; but 
she recasts her experience into the past and narrates and edits it as though the 
experience were not hers. The story she has to tell, though, is far more halting and 
unsure than V’s; indeed, at one point it seems to be on the verge of total collapse: 
 
M: […] The semblance. Faint, though by no means invisible, in a certain light. 
[Pause.] Given the right light. [Pause.] Grey, rather than white, a pale shade of 
grey. [Pause.] Tattered. [Pause.] A tangle of tatters. [Pause.] Watch it pass – 
[Pause.] – watch her pass before the candelabrum, how its flames, their light … 
like moon through passing rack. [Pause.] Soon then after she was gone, as 
though never there, began to walk, up and down, up and down, that poor arm. 
[CDW 402] 
 
M finds it nearly impossible to arrive at an adequate description of the image she 
embodies; the voices – narrating and editing – compete for mastery of the unfolding 
story until the final, haunting image (‘like moon through passing rack’) is eventually 
reached. M can achieve this description, however, only by adopting the invocations 
previously used by V (‘Watch her pass…’ echoes V’s ‘But let us watch her move…’ 
[CDW 401]). An adequate description, it seems, can be achieved only by abandoning 
all pretense to a single, unfragmented experience; M can speak of herself only by 
speaking of herself as other. The following sentence – ‘Soon then after she was gone’ 
– mirrors the compressed prose found in Beckett’s later texts (‘Still’, ‘For to End Yet 
Again’, and so on). It comes close to indecipherability both in word choice and in 
phrasing – the individual clauses seem to have only the most tenuous link to each 
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other (‘as though never there, began to walk’). 
The only way to continue is to retreat. M recasts her narrative not simply into the 
past, as V has done, but into a new/old story within the drama. The mother/daughter 
relationship established so strongly at the play’s beginning is now recapitulated in the 
story of Mrs. Winter and her daughter Amy, a couple trapped in the same relation as 
M and V. However, these characters are introduced to the audience as though they 
had already been encountered (‘Old Mrs Winter, whom the reader will remember’ 
[CDW 402]), and the narrative that contains them also contains echoes of the 
narrative reported by both M and V (the child always disassociated from her 
surroundings, the church in which she speaks and walks, and the repeated question 
‘Will you never have done … revolving it all?’ [CDW 400, 403]). In effect, Footfalls 
tells the same story three times; but with each retelling the story is distanced further 
and further from its original source, and its status as the unambiguous relation of 
direct experience is rendered increasingly problematic. The effect of this 
displacement is similar to that encountered in other Beckett texts, most notably the 
troubling prose work How It Is: the apparent suffering of one character is multiplied 
as mirror images of that suffering are described. As this happens, the original story is 
lost. At the end of How It Is, the narrator dismisses the story he has told us; at the end 
of Footfalls, M disappears, her story unresolved, its motivating factor – the thing 
‘revolving … In [her] poor mind’ [CDW 400, 403] – still unexplained. 
Retrospectively, she has cast doubt over the apparent ‘reality’ of the opening 
exchange; before she disappears, she does not recreate but re-enacts a version of the 
opening exchange, using three registers – Mrs. Winter’s, Amy’s, and, in a low, hoarse 
whisper, that of a stage manager, telling the audience the speaker’s name. She has 
shifted herself away not only from a new incarnation as Amy but also, perhaps, from 
her first incarnation as May. The opening exchange, reviewed in the light of the 
play’s ending, now seems very far removed from immediate presence (it is worth 
remembering that her name in the printed play is not May but M; May may be 
nothing more than the momentary tag assigned to an unclassifiable entity).  
Catastrophe seems something of an anomaly in Beckett’s theatre. Its visual style 
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is less obviously late Beckettian – indeed, a bare summary would indicate that the 
play itself is a pointed joke at Beckett’s expense: a tyrannical director treats a silent 
actor as an object, moulding him into the correct, if rather humiliating, final image. 
The dialogue consists mainly of curt instructions intended to facilitate the creation of 
the perfect ‘catastrophe’: 
 
A: [Finally.] Like the look of him? 
D: So so. [Pause.] Why the plinth? 
A: To let the stalls see the feet. 
[Pause.] 
D: Why the hat? 
A: To help hide the face. 
[Pause.] 
D: Why the gown? 
A: To have him all black. [CDW 457] 
 
However, a closer examination reveals the distinctive pattern of Beckett’s late work; 
but this time the pattern is worked out in reverse, as it were. The three plays 
discussed above use a coherent spatial organisation (at least in terms of the 
development of the image) against a temporal framework that becomes increasingly 
uncertain as the narrative supposedly incarnated in the text is displaced further and 
further from the present time of the image. In Catastrophe, we watch a text, a 
narrative, unfold sequentially, in a perfectly conventional fashion; the image, though, 
that had been so fixed in the other plays, is this time the contingent factor in the 
production. It cannot be trusted; it must be refined, worked on, edited: 
 
D: [Finally.] Something wrong. [Distraught.] What is it? 
A: [Timidly.] What if we were … were to … join them? 
D: No harm trying. [A advances, joins the hands, steps back.] Higher. [A 
advances, raises waist-high the joined hands, steps back.] A touch more. [A 
advances, raises breast-high the joined hands.] Stop! [A steps back.] Better. It’s 
coming … [CDW 459] 
 
Note that it is not a matter of simply refining the image: both D and A are unsure of 
the final version of the stationary character whose body they are manipulating. If the 
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body of the actor is the play’s text (as it seems to be: D and A’s obsessive worrying 
away at the image would seem to suggest that, in Catastrophe, the actor’s body is the 
equivalent of Footfalls’s ‘it all’, That Time’s memories, or the unnamed ‘it’ that 
Mouth in Not I hopes that she will finally express), then it is an unfinalized text. As 
in the other plays, there is no predetermined narrative for the characters to unearth, 
no straight path for them to take. However, the play’s end overturns their efforts; and 
it does so by disrupting the spatial organisation and the chronotope that the play, to 
this point, has carefully established. The figure, this time, it seems, confronted with 
an audience, raises his head (against instructions) and gazes back at them; this simple 
gesture is enough to still the applause that has greeted the director’s final version of 
the image. However, there is some confusion over the precise provenance of this 
move. It seems, initially, to take place in the director’s imagination: 
 
D […] Now … let ’em have it. [Fade-out of general light. Pause. Fade-out of 
light on body. Light on head alone. Long pause.] Terrific! He’ll have them on 
their feet. I can hear it from here. [Pause. Distant storm of applause. (…)] [CDW 
461] 
 
But the figure’s unexpected movement seems to happen not in the director’s 
imagined chronotope but in the chronotope of performance. The moment is 
unsettling, both because it is an assertive act from an otherwise passive object and 
because it cannot be wholly understood as the assertion of subjectivity in a decisive 
act of defiance. We do not know why the figure has reacted like this; we do not know 
when the reaction happens; we do not know where the reaction takes place. The 
fragmented subject, shaped by the influence (visible this time) of an editor/director, 
has declared itself without, as would have happened in the earlier work, establishing 
its subjectivity through action. 
 
* 
Beckett’s plays are studies in absence; from the moment when Victor Krapp turns his 
back on the audience, through Godot’s non-arrival, through the unprovided 
 61
conclusions of Endgame, Happy Days, and Play, the unacknowledged past in 
Krapp’s Last Tape, the missing rings in Come and Go, the plays have always relied 
for their theatrical effectiveness on the audience’s awareness of gaping holes in the 
dramatic chronotope as explored in performance.  
In the late plays, however, the nature of that absence changes. To return to the 
categories briefly outlined in the opening section, it could be said that, in the plays 
from Godot (1953–1955) to Breath (1969), dramatic chronotope equals performance 
chronotope. All that we can be sure of in the lives of these characters, and in the lives 
of these plays, is what we see in front of us in performance. Similarly, the characters 
do not find their selfhood in a coherent past or in a planned-out future: they exist 
only as they act. In the later plays, even that certainty has gone. The chronotope of 
performance is still closely structured; even the monologue in Not I betrays a pattern, 
a rondo constructed around Mouth’s denial of selfhood. The dramatic chronotope – 
the constructed, coherent, organized sequence of thoughts, actions, and events that 
provides the basic structure of the self in conventional drama – is still being created 
for us, however, even as we view the play. We watch events, and listen to words, 
whose precise spatial and temporal arrangement cannot be finally determined; 
because of this, we encounter characters whose subjectivity can never be fully 
incarnated, since their place in the actions and the words of the play can never be 
grasped, even from moment to moment. As Beckett told Billie Whitelaw, M in 
Footfalls is ‘not all there’. The comment applies to all the characters in the later 
works, characters whose subjectivity is disturbingly evanescent, performed as it is in 
fragments of action that have no clear temporal or spatial connection with each other. 
These late plays are still studies in absence; now, though, they are studies of the 
partially absent self through the interplay between an (half-)empty stage and ‘vast 
tracts of time’ evoked offstage, between the perceptual and conceptual when other 
times and places are contrasted with the visceral power of the stage present.54
                                                        
54 Beckett is, of course, not alone in such explorations, though he may well be one of the 
most radical experimentalists in this respect. As Leo Essif argues in Empty Figure on an 
Empty Stage, the greatest contribution of twentieth-century dramatists to the historical 
evolution of theatre art has been ‘the development of a new poetics of space for the text, one 
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In other words, much of Beckett’s late theatre challenges the individual borders 
of identity and shift between the space-time perspective of the actor and that of the 
spectator. His plays seem to imply a recognition of the identity as a series of masks, 
as the representation of ‘self’ becomes the reproduction of interchangeable images of 
existence. Through the juxtaposition of scenic and textual forms, spaces, and, by 
extension, times embedded within, there is a constant evolution in the perception of 
what is being represented, as the categories of time and space, past and present, 
external and internal, absence and presence, identity and difference, are undermined. 
Behind the apparent immobility of the stage space, there is always a dynamic lying in 
the shifting perspectives in Beckett’s theatre, particularly within the perception of 
stage and text. As Stanton B. Garner argues:  
 
It is Beckett’s genius in his later plays to explore the activity lodged within 
stillness and to sound the depths of visual latency. The result … is to etch the 
contours of performance even more within the spectator and to replace a theatre 
of activity with a theatre of perception, guided by the eye and its effort to see.55
 
 
Significance of the Stage Present 
 
In Beckett, as we can see from the above, the stage reality within the mimetic space 
is often a pretext for evocation of another reality – another place, another time, 
another self – a seeming negation of the importance (or solidity) of the events within 
the mimetic space. 
                                                                                                                                                             
based on emptiness’ in order to ‘rid themselves of the straightjackets of naturalism and 
bourgeois psychology.’ One of the major challenges for them, Essif goes on to argue, is the 
‘portrayal of inner life on the stage. […] One cannot deny that this century has been s shift 
toward a new interest in the mind as space. Thanks to Freud and the surrealists at the 
beginning of the century, we have begun to think of our mental space as an independent 
spatial field.’ [Leo Essif, Empty Figure on an Empty Stage: The Theatre of Samuel Beckett 
and His Generation. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001, 
pp.19-20.] 
 
55 Stanton B. Garner, ‘Visual Field in Beckett’s Late Plays’, in Comparative Drama, Vol. 
XXI, No. 4, Winter 1987-88, p. 371. 
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Such duality, this ex-centricity or off-centredness, as Colin Duckworth suggests, 
is ‘the source of the strange relationship that develops between a Beckett 
performance and aware spectators’56. In a review of Carla Locatelli’s Unwording the 
World, the poet Lachlan Mackinnon quotes Andrew Bush’s statement that Beckett 
‘creates a new interior space – indeed recreates the res cogitans as a res extensa’. 
Mackinnon, echoing Beckett’s marginal note in his copy of That Time ‘Less is more’, 
goes on to comment: ‘The paradox of late Beckett is that the narrower the area 
surveyed, the more ground there is to be covered.’57 Shimon Levy, in Samuel 
Beckett’s Self-Referential Drama, focuses the idea along lines that interest me for 
present purposes, saying that ‘in presenting the stage full of emptiness, Beckett 
activates the audience’s imagination and involvement, and extends an invitation to 
make this stage space their own.’58 A realistic décor may appeal to the eye, but 
cannot compete with the suggestiveness of an empty one. 
Levy’s topoanalysis of the major plays is attractive, but involves a simplification 
of degrees along the stage/offstage/inner space axes. How, for example, can one 
speak of ‘emptiness’ of Beckett’s stage without failing to recognise the strongly 
visceral power of the visual image he creates there?   
The precarious links between the verbal and the visual in the later plays have 
been subtly analysed by Enoch Brater in his Beyond Minimalism – indeed, it is very 
difficult to go beyond Brater, only to have a dialogue with him. I wonder, for 
example, if it is true to say that ‘[t]he experience for the audience in the theatre is 
like the experience of reading a poem, except that in this instance the poem has been 
staged.’59 What poem I wondered, when I first read this, what poem, read by an actor 
                                                        
56 Colin Duckworth, ‘Beckett’s Theatre: Beyond the Stage Space’, in Beckett and Beyond, ed. 
Bruce Stewart. Monaco: The Princess Grace Irish Library, 1999, p.95. 
 
57 Lachlan Mackinnon, ‘Gripping Simplicities’, in Times Literary Supplement, 28 December 
1993 – 3 January 1991, p.1407. 
 
58 Shimon Levy, Samuel Beckett’s Self-Referential Drama: The Three I’s. London: Macmillan, 
1990, p.17-18. 
 
59 Enoch Brater, Beyond Minimalism: Beckett’s Late Style in Theatre. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987, p.17. 
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on stage, can establish the same intense and haunting relationship between performer 
and spectator/auditor as, say, Ohio Impromptu? Of course, if one calls ‘a very short 
metaphysical poem’60, as Stephen Barker has suggested it might be, then one extends 
the genre to include almost any text. I doubted Enoch Brater’s postulation of the 
staged poem experience until I first saw Not I performed, on videotape. I was alone 
in my room, the screen at one side, I sitting at the other. Without the reassurance of 
other bodies breathing and coughing as in a theatre, I was perhaps more intensely 
conscious of the intentional isolation of visual metaphor on the screen and of my 
own peculiarly transformative response to that isolation, but I trusted that response as 
real. After the voice had ceased, I sat alone in the dark, my mind racing, aware 
perhaps for the first time that ‘I’ was not ‘me’, that the only ‘self’ I could claim was 
the communicative energy I had just experienced as activity -- outside my body and 
moving away from any identity that I had previously thought mine. I still trust that 
response. Now, every time I see Not I performed, either on video or on the stage, I 
collide with the feeling of being in the presence of the unspeakably sublime that I felt 
seeing the play for the first time. 
When played on stage, Not I requires a nearly naked and unnaturally dark stage 
set that bleeds into the undisguised dark of the auditorium. The solitary actress is 
cloaked, boxed, and elevated above the black painted stage with only her mouth 
opening and closing, cleanly and clearly, against the dark, teeth visible and 
disturbingly white, lit by a single spotlight. Located downstage from the Mouth, a 
tall figure, the Listener, cloaked from head to toe in black, hands and face covered 
with fabric, stands also elevated above the stage platform. This wordless figure is 
turned obliquely from the audience so that s/he may look directly on the moving 
Mouth. Both figures are fixed with an uncomfortable permanence to the stage and 
the space between them vibrates with an electric absence. 
Even before the first word was spoken that afternoon in my half-empty room, I 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
60 Barker, Stephen, ’Recovering the Néant: Language and the Unconscious in Beckett,’ in The 
World of Samuel Beckett, ed Joseph H. Smith. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 
1996, p.269. 
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was overwhelmed by an awareness of loneliness so acute that it felt as if attached to 
my skin with invisible barbs. I was both separated yet incomprehensibly linked to the 
two fixed figures on the stage (or on the screen, to be exact) -- the cloaked standing 
shadow man and the moving Mouth. I felt the weight of the space between 
performers and the darkness settle as marked distance on my spine. My bones itched, 
and by the end of the performance, my mind was melting as if thawed by unexpected 
winter warmth. I was as speechless as the solitary Mouth had been overrun with 
rapid overflow of words. In less than one-half hour, I had collided with a complete 
life compressed into an explosive energy that, when released, flooded the 
surrounding dark and entered my every pore. Somehow, that released life belonged 
with me but not to me. 
Today, I can think about Not I as separated from that volley of silence and word I 
felt that afternoon. I came to see how Beckett carefully ordered his play to transform 
text -- a series of signs -- to unfailing agency. I understood how he used the unwritten 
symbols of Dark and Mouth both metaphorically and metonymically to evoke an 
awareness of the intense isolation necessary for the emergence of a ‘self’ that knows 
the impossibility of its own existence at the very moment that existence is recognized. 
Stripped of excess and filed to spareness, Not I unveils the painful yet exquisite core 
of human experience: the knowledge that the very characteristic that grants human 
beings their unique position on the planet -- the singular ability to identify the ‘self’ 
as separate, thinking, and individual -- is, after all is said and done, an artificial 
construction. To abandon possession of the ‘self’ as a marker of being human is to 
lose a sense of grounding, but if at the same time that the ‘self’ as possessed ‘self’ 
disintegrates, we also discover ourselves as connected to others, we then find new 
moorings more various and numerous that are, ultimately, more stable and useful. 
Watching Not I, we are disconnected from the conventional and the familiar and 
as a consequence, we become hyper-sensitive to our need for connections; our minds 
substitute the desired for that which has been preternaturally removed. Using the 
power inherent both in the confrontation of opposites (silence against sound, light 
against dark) and in the representation of isolation (mouth separated from body, 
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viewer separated by dark from conventional response), Beckett focuses our 
awareness of multiple connections. We hunger for human interaction because the 
lack of activity on stage denies us such interaction. We are conscious of presence 
because of absence, sense light because we are in the dark, and feel our bodies 
because the Mouth on stage has lost its frame. 
Accepting these transformative substitutions based on the experience of seeing 
the play is easy, but analysing how the transformation occurs is another story. I 
believe that Beckett crosses and ‘folds’ visual metaphor into verbal metonym in a 
manner that Roman Jakobson recognizes with his theories concerning both binary 
opposition and metaphoric/metonymic competition as essential to effective poetic 
communication. Roman Jakobson suggests that we have a tendency to analyze 
imagery and meaning using either metaphor or metonym, deciding whether ‘the 
symbols and the temporal sequences used are based on contiguity ... or on 
similarity’61 and further suggests that the poetic function of language is foregrounded 
when metaphoric dimensions are projected on -- and somehow entangled with -- 
metonymic functions. I would agree, and I would also suggest that the most effective 
art, such as Beckett’s Not I, depends on such dynamic intersection of metaphor with 
metonymy for an effective delivery of transformative message. This ‘folding’ of 
metaphor and metonym dissolves the expected and juxtaposes the unexpected, and 
we respond emotionally and intellectually to both metaphoric and metonymic 
substitutions without privileging either, thus entering into a fresh philosophical 
dialogue unimpeded by conventional expectation either of cause and effect or of plot 
design. 
Both metaphor and metonymy construct meaning through an imaginative 
reconstruction of the familiar world, and both require a trust of psycho-social and 
historical signifiers within the language, but as a conceptual process that uses 
likeness or analogy between actual object and its signifier, metaphor is perhaps more 
                                                        
61 Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, Fundamentals of Language. The Hague: Janua 
Linguarum, 1956, p.95.  
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visually oriented than metonymy. Because of its associative quality, defining (often 
through cause and effect) logical relationships between objects, metonymy includes 
time -- and the vagaries of time -- as an essential element in the construction of new 
meaning62. If we consider metaphor and metonymy thus, we understand how the 
Mouth both as a metaphor for sexual orifices and as a synecdoche for the human 
body can serve as an icon for the producer and the consumer of words while 
simultaneously acting as a metonymy for the ongoing processes of entry and exit, 
birth and death. Such an intersection of metaphor with metonym alters the initial 
metaphor and causes conceptual and even metaphysical transformation. 
Beckett’s dark theatre and black stage, for example, alarm us at first because 
such darkness metaphorically signifies death and dissolution. We are culturally aware 
of that particular metaphor, and instinctually, we feel threatened when we are 
abruptly confronted by such unyielding dark, but as the play progresses, the intrusion 
both of narrative voice and of the notion of time passing remind us of the metonymic 
significance of Dark both as night and as a necessary complement to light. By 
overlaying the paradigmatic functions of Dark as Death with the metonymic function 
of Dark as Passage, the Mouth’s non-stop narration overrides the static and symbolic 
structuring of the stage set, permitting us to revise the visual metaphors for death and 
for isolation that confront us as the play begins. As the disconnected and slightly 
threatening Mouth discusses the ineffectiveness of light, the viewer turns to the Dark 
for comfort. The Mouth tells us that the moon comes and goes, ‘always shrouded’ 
and that April morning is experienced with the Mouth's disconnected ‘face in the 
grass’. Initial spoken ‘sudden flashes’ are followed by the repetition of the word 
‘foolish’, and the slant rhyme of ‘flash’ and ‘foolish’ erases, or at least confuses, any 
impulse to understand ‘sudden flash’ as enlightening, so when later ‘sudden flashes’ 
are followed by expressions of negativity – ‘even more awful’, ‘it can’t go on’, ‘not 
that either’ -- we accept this rejection of light in favour of the dark. Describing the 
                                                        
62 Robert Scholes, Structuralism in Literature. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974, 
p.20.  
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Dark through the inadequacy of light highlights the metonymic functioning of Dark 
in Not I as positive and progressive, thus eroding the powerful and emotionally 
affective metaphor of Dark as Death. 
When the Mouth tells us that words come like a sudden unexpected thaw in 
winter months during ‘days of darkness’, we understand intellectually that speech, 
and consequently poetry, is born not of gathered light but of gathered dark, and 
because that understanding comes at the very moment that we are physically 
experiencing the dark for the first time as embracing, rather than threatening, Mouth 
and Dark, essential to the visual setting of Not I, lose their ability to terrify. Another 
transformation of visual metaphor then occurs as the Mouth, initially encountered as 
an isolated metaphor for sex (the vagina with teeth or the ‘mouth’ of the anus), is 
transformed through the narration from menace to a symbol having a metonymic 
relationship with speech and thus with history. Grappling with its staged isolation as 
metaphoric threat, highlighted in darkness, the Mouth speaks to have its histories 
heard -- by the dark, by the watchers in the dark beyond the fourth wall, and by the 
dark-dressed listener, standing yards away elevated on a platform just high enough to 
preclude any movement towards or away from the Mouth.  
When those histories are heard, the visual metaphor recedes in importance as the 
verbal reasserts its power. Speech itself acquires its own metaphoric existence that 
projects neatly on its own metonymic agency. Signifying the gate between life and 
death, the portal of sexual and verbal intercourse, when limits are erased, when 
silence gains volumes, when dark moves to light, the Mouth spills words in bursts as 
metaphoric of the ‘little death’ of orgasm, primary for the continuance of life, as they 
are metonymic of poetry, that spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling, primary for 
the continuance of the creative life. Then, as the disconnected Mouth tells stories in 
floods of words collapsed into an all embracing dark, the stark misery of those stories 
told collides with the captured status of the voice, boxed and removed from human 
gesture. As a result of that confrontation, viewers inevitably experience a compassion 
birthed by an awareness of the obvious physical imprisonment of voice and of the 
psychological imprisonment of the incomplete narrated histories of isolation and 
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abandonment. With the emergence of that compassion, the terrifying metaphor of 
mouth as toothed vagina is banished and an open embrace of the metonymic 
relationship of the Mouth to open passage occurs. Once again, metaphor folds into 
metonym, and a clear transformation occurs. 
This transformation of metaphor -- Dark as Death, Mouth as Dangerous Sex -- 
through an intersection with metonymic function creates an open environment that 
permits that redefinition of the ‘self’ that I experienced that late afternoon when ‘I’ 
shifted to ‘not I’, and I realised that I only existed because of my connectivity. Not I 
opens with the mouth forming words that cannot be heard, and we first see those 
moving lips as iconic of the human possessed of a ‘self’ grounded by language. 
Isolated from both head and body, the Mouth serves both as a visual signifier of the 
‘word’ -- an essential marker of the human -- symbolizing speech as clearly as it 
symbolizes the human who speaks the words, but then, speaking in the Dark, the 
mouth is stripped of its metaphoric threat by its own narration. Listening, we are 
acutely conscious at first of ourselves as being isolated and in the dark, but when the 
narration shifts both Mouth and Dark from being zones of danger to being zones of 
comfort, we become aware of ourselves first as listeners, individuals, and then 
unexpectedly, as beings connected to Dark as Passage, Mouth as History. One 
repeatedly performed gesture, the raising and lowering of the silent Listener's arms, 
accomplishes this transformation. 
‘What? ... Who? ... No ... She!’ the Mouth demands again and again, first 
acknowledging herself and then isolating herself in the third person as the generic 
‘she’. That deliberate isolation nearly always draws a response from the on-stage 
Listener who raises and drops masked hands in a gesture of ‘helpless compassion’, 
suggesting the inevitability of setting aside the ‘I’ in favour of the ‘she’, of moving 
from ‘self’ to ‘unself’ in order to discover the ‘self’, of knowing that the ‘self’ exists 
neither as narrated nor remembered, and of knowing the utter surrender required to 
accomplish any of that. The single repeated gesture of the Listener interrupts the 
current of words, ceaselessly delivered by the Mouth, and that interruption 
reintroduces the palpable loneliness of the wordless opening of the play. 
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Re-experiencing that loneliness as the mouth narrates a tale of moving from silence 
to speech focuses the audience on the ‘self’ as separated exactly at the moment when 
an awareness emerges of the existence of ‘self’ as dependent on communication, on 
being heard at a time when the ‘self’ must move closer to the ‘unself’ and recognise 
itself as wholly dependent for its existence on knowing not the ‘self’, but the space 
that exists between the ‘self’ and others -- the active space of creative 
communication. 
In conversation with Morton Feldman, an American composer, Beckett once said 
that that there was only ‘one theme in his life’. When pressed by Feldman to reveal 
that theme, Beckett wrote this on a musical score Feldman handed him: ‘To and fro 
in shadow, from outer shadow to inner shadow. To and fro, between unattainable self 
and unattainable non-self’. After scribbling those words, Beckett promised to write 
Feldman if he thought of anything he might add. Several weeks later, Feldman 
received a postcard with the following revision penciled on the back: 
  
to and fro in shadow 
from inner to outer shadow 
from impenetrable self to impenetrable unself 
by way of neither [CSP 258] 
 
The unattainable becomes the impenetrable, and the non-self becomes the unself 
while self and unself remain separated yet linked by their mutual essential ‘not’-ness 
-- not attainable, not penetrable, not in full light, not free of shadow, not stable. 
Always in motion, as trajectory, as agency, this struggling ‘self’ of ‘Neither’ 
resembles the self/unself of Not I. The Mouth of Not I moves rapidly from being 
mutely unconscious of self to an acute speaking awareness of Self. ‘What?... Who? ... 
No ... She!’ 
The possession of existence, the claiming of the ‘I’, is of no consequence 
whatsoever. What creates the Self may not be our ability to speak, to remember, to 
create stories, but rather the fact that to really speak -- to really be ourselves -- we 
must be understood by at least one other human being. When the Mouth speaks, it 
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addresses no one except the watcher -- inside the Dark and away from light, the real 
flesh and blood person, who can reply only with a gesture of helpless compassion. 
 
 
Memory and Time 
  
The only access to history or memory that Beckett’s characters have is through 
language. For the characters of Beckett’s late plays, language appears to give access 
both to variety of form, spaces and light of the external world, absent from the 
darkness of the stage present, and to the accumulated knowledge or memories of the 
past, whether their own past or that of a civilisation. Yet this past can be seen simply 
as a function or a construct of the language system, preserved in the pages of dusty 
tomes in public libraries or deployed in the present moment of utterance. History and 
memory are presented both as means of restoring the past and as the collected debris 
of the present, emphasized by one of the images in voice B of a dead rat floating 
down the river. And A’s trip to Ireland has been a failure: not only has he been unable 
to visit the ruin where he hid as a child, he has been denied the possibility of gaining 
a firmer grip on his identity by revisiting an important childhood scene. His sense of 
who he is and was slips away from him, and he finds himself ‘making it all up on the 
doorstep as you went along making yourself all up again for the millionth time’.  
In Proust, Beckett quotes the author of A la recherche du temps perdu who 
insists that true possession of the other (or of the self) is dependent on possession of 
the entire history, the merging of discrete spatial and temporal moments of a life into 
a homogeneous whole: 
 
We imagine that the object of our desire is a being that can be laid down before 
us, enclosed within a body. Alas! It is the extension of that being to all the points 
of space and time that it has occupied and will occupy. If we do not possess 
contact with such a place and with such an hour we do not possess that being. 
[PTD 58]  
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Yet, as the author of Proust emphasizes, such an ideal is impossible to achieve since 
‘all that is realized in Time (all Time produces), whether in Art or Life, can only be 
possessed successively, by a series of partial annexations – and never integrally and 
at once’ [PTD 17-8]. Hence the narration of the protagonist’s past is splintered into 
the three separate voices, each dealing with a different period in the Listener’s life. 
According to Walter Asmus’ report, Beckett specified that B is the young man, A the 
middle-aged man and C the old man. Moreover, each period is not narrated 
continuously, but is broken into fragments, intercut by the fragments of the other two 
periods63. Memory, inscribed in language, therefore produces a myriad of times, 
spaces and identities, transforming the space of the stage into a space animated and 
ruptured by temporal differences, while such temporal differences are presented on 
stage as spatial discontinuity. The reassuring ‘wholeness’ or fixity of the stage space 
as stable visual ground is disrupted.  
The attempt to possess or perceive also ironically creates another level of 
difference – between the subject and the representations of his own existence in 
language, questioning the illusion of unity and identity suggested by the pronoun ‘I’: 
‘did you ever say I to yourself in your life come on now’. This alienation or divorce 
is indicated within the text – where the subject is referred to as ‘you’, creating a 
difference between the enunciating or narrating subject and the subject or persona of 
the narrative – and on stage through the separation of voice(s) from the listener. The 
stage image therefore concretizes in spatial terms the divisions between 
listener-perceiver, voice and textual persona(s), while the spatial and temporal 
fragmentation of the text emphasizes the lack of continuity between the fragments 
which constitute the representation of the old man’s life-history. The interplay 
between head and voices and between various fragments of the text thus prevents the 
audience from locating any stable, unified center of subjectivity in the play.  
                                                        
63 Walter Asmus, ‘Practical aspects of theatre, radio, and television: Rehearsal notes for the 
German premiere of Beckett’s “That time” and “Footfalls” at the Schiller Theater Werkstatt, 
Berlin’, in S.E. Gontarski (ed.), On Beckett: Essays and Criticism. New York: Grove Press, 
1986, p.340. 
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All times and spaces are engulfed or contained in the indeterminate space-time 
of the mind, reversing the categories of internal and external. The ambiguity of the 
space is emphasized through the juxtaposition of installments where the space 
described is sometimes the space of the mind and sometimes the interior of a room, 
frequently used by Beckett as a space which is simultaneously external and internal. 
The ‘background’ space is therefore foregrounded and the focus shifts from the 
narratives to the spatial frame into which they are inserted.  
This space is not static, but is animated by the process of perceiving and the 
desire for these images to relieve the darkness. The tension ‘outward’, the 
imaginative recreation of the external world, is contrasted with the return to darkness. 
This image also links text and stage spaces, as the audience also has been 
concentrating on the content of the images until the two intervals in the text, where 
there is silence for three seconds and then breathing for seven seconds before the 
voices resume, confronting the spectators with a silent, almost empty stage, apart of 
course, from the Listener. The description within the text therefore acts as a ‘mise en 
abyme’ for the performance as a whole, where the darkness of the stage is relieved by 
the image of the head and the scenes related by the voice, as the darkness of the 
protagonist’s consciousness is relieved by the remembered scenes.  
Since the scenes appear as contained within the space-time of stage or skull, they 
appear not as recreations of a previous reality, but as concretizations of the void, 
shapes and sounds constructed from silence and darkness by the function of the 
imagination/memory: ‘hard to believe harder and harder to believe you ever told 
anyone you loved them or anyone you still just one of those things you kept making 
up to keep the void out just another of those old tales to keep the void from pouring 
in on top of you the shroud’.  
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 [3] 
 
‘TEXTS FOR NOTHING / TEXTES POUR RIEN’: 
TEXTUALIZING ABJECTION, ABJECTING TEXTUALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nothing of the pompous monolithic architecture of our ego can resist the torrent of 
Beckett’s prose when it first surges most ruthlessly out of zero in a flux of 
scatological images: 
 
The smell of corpses, distinctly perceptible under those of grass and humus 
mingled, I do not find unpleasant, a trifle on the sweet side perhaps, a trifle 
heady, but how infinitely preferable to what the living emit, their feet, teeth, 
armpits, arses, sticky foreskins and frustrated ovules. [‘First Love’, CSP 26] 
 
I’ll let down my trousers and shit stories on them: stories, photographs, records, 
sites, lights, gods and fellow-creatures, the daily round and common task. 
Observing all the while, Be born, dear friends, be born. Enter my arse. You’ll 
just love my colic pains. It won’t take long, I’ve the bloody flux. [The 
Unnamable, T 383-4] 
 
The vindictive glee of such passages bespeaks a significance well beyond the 
scatological mockery of Modernist aesthetics, the high valuation of writing, that it 
might at first seem to be.  
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All this has arguably begun with the mother.  
Critics have long been interested in Beckett’s textual unease with motherhood. 
From Peggy Guggenheim’s memoirs and from John Gruen’s interview, we are aware 
that at least twice in his life, as early as 1937 and as late as 1961, Beckett personally 
admitted his fearful memories of being swallowed up inside his mother’s womb.64 In 
this light, Deirdre Bair’s record of the turbulently ambivalent relationship between 
Beckett and his mother becomes all the more meaningful65 for explaining Beckett’s 
compulsion to speak.  
If the mother represents, in Freudian terms, the primal object of the subject’s 
desires66, then the non-separation of the ‘archaic dyad’ between the infant and the 
                                                        
64  In Confessions of an Art Addict, Peggy Guggenheim writes, recalling Beckett’s 
ambivalence about his love for her: ‘Ever since his birth he had retained a terrible memory of 
life in his mother’s womb. He was constantly suffering from this and had awful crises, when 
he felt he was suffocating.’ [Confessions of an Art Addict. New York: Universe Books, 1979, 
p.175.] On another occasion, Beckett confirms these ‘memories’ with John Gruen: ‘I have a 
clear memory of my own fetal existence. It was an existence where no voice, no possible 
movement could free me from the agony and darkness I was subjected to.’ [John Gruen, 
‘Samuel Beckett Talks about Beckett’, in Vogue, 127 (February 1970) no.2, P.108.] 
 
65 Deirdre Bair, Samuel Beckett: A Biography. New York: Vintage, 1991. 
 
66 We recall, first of all, that in psychoanalytic theory of Lacanian inspiration, the acquisition 
of language during the mirror phase marks the intervention of the Symbolic 
(Name-of-the-Father) into the child’s universe, and his/her separation from the idyllic state 
of harmony which, psychically, is the mother. A resultant experience of loss is constitutive of 
language and desire. The loss, we have noted, is illustrated by Freud’s ‘Fort-Da’ anecdote. In 
effect, the acquisition of language allows the subject to symbolise his/her pre-Symbolic 
existence – a time when the ‘I’ (subject) was united with the ‘mother’ (object). The extent to 
which the prior state is symbolisable is a measure of actual separation. To experience this 
loss, to be subjects of this loss and thus subjects of language, is to be quintessentially human. 
In my unarticulated fantasy, then, I desire the idyllic state which existed before my 
separation from my object. Before separation, too, all my desires were satisfied; in fact, 
desire as such did not exist, and I wished for nothing. Now, every as-yet-unsatisfied desire 
awakens the original sense of loss; satisfaction of them, the original harmony. Let it be 
underlined: I desire this state. For Lacan, moreover, one is fundamentally a subject as subject 
of desire. Julia Kristeva, on the other hand, suggests that the Lacanian position needs to be 
nuanced: its strokes are just a little too bold. Indeed, are there not things (let us not call them 
objects) outside of me which do not give me the least satisfaction, and which I find repulsive. 
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mother, as in Beckett’s case, represents such a threat to the subject, who ‘risk[s] the 
loss not of a part (castration) but of the totality of his living being’67, that the object 
of desire must be violently jettisoned in an attempt to maintain the clarity of psyche 
and bodily boundaries. This results when the lure of merging with the mother is so 
strong that it threatens individuation. ‘I imagine a child,’ Julia Kristeva graphically 
explains, ‘who has swallowed up his parents too soon, who frightens himself on that 
account, “all by himself”, and to save himself rejects and throws up everything that is 
given to him – all gifts, all objects.’68  
It was to these expelled objects that Kristeva gave the name ‘abjects’. We 
experience abjection, she writes, ‘only if an Other has settled in place and stead of 
what will be “me”’69, only if there has been, as it were, an unlawful takeover of the 
ego. In this case, the stakes are so high that only the most violent of battles will 
enable the ego to survive ‘separately’. For the body ‘must be what the French call 
propre’ – both clean and one’s own. It must bear no trace of its debt to nature’70 if it 
is not to be ‘defiled’. Horror arises when the borders between subject and object 
collapse, when the edges break down and the body’s contents flow out, threatening 
repulsive engulfment. Kristeva writes: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Whence, then, comes this repulsion, or, in its strongest form, horror? If the objects in the 
world are a fundamental displacement of my desire for my mother, what is the status of these 
things? In broad outline Kristeva’s answer is that before the full intervention of the Symbolic 
begins, a prior state is necessary, one which will be the repressed desire and the Symbolic. 
Before the beginning of the Symbolic, there must have already been moves, by way of the 
drives, towards expelling/rejecting the mother. The point is that the symbolic is not, of its 
own accord, strong enough to ensure separation; it depends on the mother becoming abjected. 
‘The abject would thus be the “object” of primal repression.’ [Julia Kristeva, Powers of 
Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1982, 12. Original emphasis.]  
 
67 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p.64. 
 
68 Ibid., p.5-6. 
 
69 Ibid. p.10. 
 
70 Ibid., p.102. 
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It is as if the skin, a fragile container, no longer guaranteed the integrity of one’s 
‘own and clean self’ but, scraped or transparent, invisible or taut, gave way 
before the dejection of its contents. Urine, blood, sperm, excrement then show 
up in order to reassure a subject that is lacking its ‘own and clean self’. The 
abjection of those flows from within suddenly become the sole ‘object’ of sexual 
desire -- a true ‘ab-ject’ where man, frightened, crosses over the horrors of 
maternal bowels and, in an immersion that enables him to avoid coming face to 
face with an other, spares himself the risk of castration. But at the same time that 
immersion gives him the full power of possessing, if not being, the bad object 
that inhabits the maternal body. Abjection then takes the place of the other, to the 
extent of affording him jouissance…71  
 
So the abject is above all the ambiguous, the in-between, what defies boundaries, a 
composite resistant to unity. Hence, if the subject’s identity derives from the unity of 
its objects, the abject is the threat of unassimilable non-unity: that is, ambiguity. 
Abjection, therefore, is fundamentally ‘what disturbs identity, system, order’72. Thus, 
the corpse which is both human and non-human, waste and filth which are neither 
entirely inside or outside of the socio-subjective order, are examples of the abject. 
 
 
‘I’ll let down my trousers and shit stories on them’: Writing Abjection 
 
Simply to list the titles of Beckett’s works is to place his writing within a context of 
abjection: The Expelled, Six Residua, The Unnamable, Disjecta, and above all, Not I. 
His writing is riddled with images of expulsion (-pulsion and –jection are his 
favourite suffixes), of things, mainly body parts of contents, that have to be got rid of. 
What clearly dictates this is an abject need to expel the primary object which 
threatens engulfment, to keep shouting ‘Not I’, as so many of his characters do. 
If abjection is the movement by which the body and psyche dispute and affirm 
identity, it equally has important implications for reading a text, for reading can no 
longer be regarded as the depot of an assimilable meaning, but becomes the rather 
                                                        
71 Ibid., p.53-54. 
 
72 Ibid., p.4.  
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phantasmatic site of a series of negotiations and transmissions. The abject calls into 
question not only psychic but textual propriety, authority and appropriation: as is 
indicated by the baroque opening of Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, it is into 
literary style that subjectivity may retreat, and yet the possibility of selfhood prior to 
the subject’s entry into language is ruthlessly questioned:  
 
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, 
directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or 
inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It 
lies there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated ... Unflaggingly, like an 
inescapable boomerang, a vortex of summons and repulsion places the one 
haunted by it literally beside himself.73
 
This is essentially a writing practice that is impregnated with its objects: an 
engagement with the recovery of a paradoxical plenitude from bodily sickness and 
disintegration demands a stylistic practice which deals not in the monolithic but in 
the aformal, multiple, and discontinuous. At this point, we shall recall Roland 
Barthes’ jouissance, the free-falling potential for liberation which style contains, is 
defined by gravity, by the prospect of falling and annihilation, and by abjection’s 
wrestling of value or identity from the very edge of dissolution, extinction. 
 In light of this, the range of grammatical and psychoanalytic meanings that can 
be attributed to the phrase ‘not I’ makes it an ambivalent nodal point of Beckett’s 
works. Let us begin by tracing its polysemantic progress in the third novel of the 
trilogy, The Unnamable. Here, clearly, saying ‘not I’ involves at one level an 
investigation of narrative practices, in particular what it means for the narrator to say 
‘I’. As I have illustrated in Chapter 1, Beckett was not alone in the 1950s in his 
challenge to conventional concepts of narrative voice and identity. As the novel 
moved out of the Modernist period, which had culminated in the work of Virginia 
Woolf, D.H. Lawrence, and James Joyce, among others, concepts of stable identity 
began to erode into a scepticism about the possibility of representing identity. 
                                                        
73 Ibid., p.1. 
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Beckett has sometimes been referred to as a writer of anti-novels, for the reason that 
his novels seem to be preoccupied with untelling stories rather than telling them, 
with revealing the arbitrariness and absurdity of the conventions of truth telling, 
reliability, coherence, and meaning on which the novel as a genre has traditionally 
depended.  
So when the Unnamable says ‘I say I, knowing it’s not I’ [T 408], we are clearly 
being asked to participate in a tragic-comic uncertainty about semantic boundaries. If 
narrators adopt a first-person mode, what is their relation to their characters? Where 
the nineteenth-century novelist generally replied ‘omniscient and proprietorial’, 
Beckett clearly replies that the relationship is one of ignorance and impotence. I, the 
Unnamable, has unlike Malone given up all attempt at creating ‘characters’. His 
problem is that this ‘I’ may also ‘be’ one of several names or characters lurking in the 
wings – Basil, Mahood, or Worm in particular. Let us trace the progress of this doubt 
throughout the novel:  
 
But now? Is it I now? I on me? Sometimes I think it is. And then I realise it is 
not. [T 312] 
 
But it’s time I gave this solitary a name: nothing doing without proper names. I 
therefore baptise him Worm. It was high time. Worm. I don’t like it, but I 
haven’t much choice. It will be my name too, when the time comes, when I 
needn't be called Mahood any more, if that happy time ever comes. [...] But let 
me complete my views, before I shit on them. For if I am Mahood, I am Worm 
too, plop. Or if I am not yet Worm, I shall be when I cease to be Mahood, plop. 
On now to serious matters. [T 340] 
 
But enough of this cursed first person, it is really too red a herring. I’ll get out 
of my depth if I’m not careful. But what then is the subject? Mahood? No, not 
yet. Worm? Even less. Bah, any old protagonist will do, provided ones sees 
through it. [T 345] 
 
I don’t know where I end. [...] The stories of Mahood are ended. He has realized 
they could not be about me. [...] Worm. [...] To think I saw in him, if not me, a 
step towards me! To get me to be he, the anti-Mahood... [T 348-349] 
 
In the meantime no sense in bickering about pronouns and other parts of blather. 
The subject doesn't matter, there is none. [T 363]  
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 This ‘blather’ about pronouns, touching sardonically on but never really engaging 
with fundamental ontological questions, begin about half way through The 
Unnamable to turn into the more postmodern question of the role of language in 
signification. From a linguistic convention, a signifier which misses its mark, the ‘I’ 
becomes that which is held in thrall by others – ‘they’, who dictates the terms of its 
use and rob it of its individual ownership. ‘Is there a single word of mine in all I 
say?’ [T 350], the Unnamable wonders, anticipating by nearly two decades the 
arguments that were to be put forth in the late sixties by Roland Barthes for ‘death of 
the author’. What Barthes would come to call the ‘tissue of quotation’74 which makes 
up the storehouse of a writer’s repertoire Beckett calls ‘the voices and thoughts of the 
devils who beset me’ [T 350]. These voices, mimicking conventions of pronoun 
consistency, have the Unnamable say that ‘since I couldn’t be Mahood, as I might 
have been, I must be worm, as I cannot be.’ [T 350] 
However, traces of nostalgia for authenticity remain:  
 
I imagine I hear myself saying, myself at last, to myself at last, that it can’t be 
they, speaking thus, that it can only be I, speaking thus. Ah if I could only find a 
voice of my own, in all this babble! [T 351] 
 
Trouble arises when he is silent, for silence reveals the yawning chasm – ‘these gulfs’ 
[T 351] – of unsignifiability beneath the babble. Neither he nor ‘they’ dare be silent 
for long, as ‘the whole fabrication might collapse’ [T 351]. And yet as soon as he 
starts talking, guilt about his complicity with ‘their’ manipulation returns:  
 
Did they ever get Mahood to speak? It seems to me not. I think Murphy spoke 
now and then, the others too perhaps, I don’t remember. But it was clumsily 
done, you could see the ventriloquist. [T 351] 
 
                                                        
74 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, in Image Music Text, trans. S. Heath. London: 
Fontana, 1977, p.146.  
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What distinguishes Beckett’s view of ventriloquism from Barthes’ is both this guilt 
and a psychic anxiety about the ‘gulfs’ beneath words. Immediately after exposing 
language as a set of arbitrary signifiers, all surface, he ‘falls’ into a terrifying but 
desirable phantasy of a pre-Oedipal space beyond or beneath language, where it is 
safe and protected, where Worm might ‘be’: 
 
all their balls about being and existing. Yes, now that I’ve forgotten who Worm 
is, where he is, what he’s like, I’ll begin to be. Anything rather than these 
college quips. Quick, a place. With no way in, no way out – a safe place. Not 
like Eden. And Worm inside. Feeling nothing, knowing nothing, capable of 
nothing, wanting nothing. Until the instant he hears the sound that will never 
stop. Then it’s the end, Worm no longer is. We know it, but we don't say it: we 
say it’s the awakening, the beginning of Worm. For now we must speak, and 
speak of Worm. It’s no longer he, but let us proceed as if it were still he [T 351 
my emphasis] 
 
The italicised in the middle, embedded within the enclosing narrative, represents an 
anxious, guilty snatch at a ‘not-Eden’ (the denial is again telling). The moment of 
safe enclosure in a womb-like space with ‘no way in, no way out’, beyond verbal or 
physical incursion, remains an evanescent and precarious utopia at the centre of 
Beckett’s nightmare, in-between landscapes – before language takes up again to 
continue on its stupefying yet reassuring way.  
Saying ‘not I’ in Beckett’s work is always underpinned by this dark abject lining. 
It is as if the failure of the signifier (this ‘I’ that language uses to refer to me alienates 
me) collapses something more psychologically disturbing, a disruption of the clarity 
of ‘I’ versus ‘not-I’ which every infant has to learn to negotiate. Instead of facing up 
to accepting a relationship of separation from the object, whereby the not-I becomes 
an autonomous ‘she’, the Beckett character harks back constantly to the trauma of 
that break and refuses to give due recognition to the ‘she’.  
 
Kristeva: 
 
‘If one wishes to proceed further still along the approaches to abjection, one 
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would find neither narrative nor theme but a recasting of syntax and vocabulary 
– the violence of poetry and silence.’75
 
It is indeed through aporetic ‘recasting[s] of syntax’, the ‘violence of poetry and 
silence’, that Beckett’s works can ever be said to ‘end’. Each end is always a ‘going 
on’; to conclude is to mark where one text/body ends and another begins, to draw a 
clean line of demarcation. For the abject phantasy, the impossibility of marking 
boundaries takes the form of a perpetually frustrated attempt to do so. From the 
Trilogy on, Beckett never moved far beyond the problem of where one person or 
narrative begins and another starts. If the Trilogy is essentially a narrative quest for 
the right (pro)noun, the conclusion is, as the Unnamable puts it at the end, that ‘there 
is no name for me, no pronoun for me’ [T 408]. All is overtaken by continuity or 
flows (or sometimes dribbles), whether these be the flowings on of language, endless 
verbiage, or the vast array of fluids that gush, ooze or leak out of the decrepit bodies. 
According to the logic of separation, as Kristeva puts it, ‘it is flow that is impure. 
Any secretion or discharge, anything that leaks out of the feminine or masculine 
body defiles.’ [Powers of Horror, 102] The messy ‘going on’ from one text, body or 
pronoun to the next is the only jouissance.  
After The Unnamable, published in the early 1950s, Beckett’s fiction did the 
inevitable but seemingly impossible and ‘went on’, in spite of ever-decreasing 
momentum. By the end of the decade he was saying that he had given up all thought 
of writing for theatre and radio for the time being and was ‘struggling to struggle on 
from where the Unnamable left me off, that is with the next next to nothing’ 
[Knowlson 461], that is, with the text that would become How It Is. This text plunges 
us as it does still further into an abject space, beyond the minimal props of the 
shambles, asylums, and marine drifts of the Trilogy, into an exclusively digestive 
terrain where the narrator’s progress, in struggle and involuntary spasm, is through 
the human gut. Eaten but unable to be spewed, ‘no going back up there’ [HII 8], he 
wallows like a worm in an intestinal morass of ‘mud’ which is both the source of 
                                                        
75 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p.141. 
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nourishment and its end product.  
 
* 
Julia Kristeva clarified the mystical element in our ambivalence toward the 
fascinating and yet repulsive images of the violated and ugly bodies through her 
theories of the ‘abjection’. An artist at boundary positions, according to Kristeva, 
goes through abjection, ‘whose intimate side is suffering and horror its public 
feature’76. The abject is the filthy and bad parts that the body/culture/history wants to 
cleanse away. It is not because of its lack of cleanliness that causes abjection, but 
‘what disturbs identity, system, order; what does not respect borders, positions, and 
rules; the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite’77. We could not tolerate the 
ambiguous within us, the violence, the terror, the madness, in the same way that the 
culture executes its purgation. Sliced-open corpses, torn-out eyes, and severed limbs, 
are the extreme abject conditions that we fear to face. Through art, or through 
language, we see the artist’s ‘sublimation of abjection’ in the scenes of violence, 
madness and jouissance, through the process of working-out and working-through78. 
Going through or experiencing the process of the sublimation of abjection, we come 
to realise what had been suppressed or excluded within us. 
It can be contended that, underpinning Beckett’s own life, there was a strong 
sense of abjection – of his country, his (conscious) memories, his ‘mother’ tongue – 
so too his texts jettison as much as possible to clear away for an eerie spatial and 
temporal borderland, between inside and out, beginning and end, life and death. One 
can understand his liking for the word ‘limbo’, which he suggested as a subtitle for 
his story ‘The end’. Limbus, in Latin, means a border or edge, and by extension the 
edge of nowhere, oblivion. ‘The End’ is about (a memory of) ‘a story [told] in the 
likeness of my life’, a story ‘without the courage to end’ [CSP 99]. For ending means 
                                                        
76 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p.140. 
 
77 Ibid., p.4. 
 
78 Ibid., p.26. 
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separating, which is the one thing Beckett’s texts never stop representing their 
inability do.  
 
* 
Now, from the taut interplay of the ‘abject’ in selfhood and the narrative in which it 
may be seen to participate, arises the larger formal concern of the relationship of the 
literary work itself to conceptions of the organic whole. Beckett’s work displays an 
anxiety at constitution and separation around its own boundaries which may be seen 
to resonate with abjection. If I have been concerned, so far, with the periodic fusion 
and divergence of the abject with the signifiable, it is perhaps appropriate that I now 
turn to an area in which the agency of the writer would be expected to be at its most 
marginal, and his or her concerns at their least visible. The tendency of writers and 
critics to refer to texts collectively as ‘corpus’ or ‘body of work’ may be no more 
than a metaphorical extension of the human, a fallacial visualisation of written 
production against the template of the body. It would nevertheless be difficult to 
pursue a study of the textual framing of the abject body without reversing the 
equation and examining the role texts play in promoting propriety and wholeness (or 
otherwise) through their collectivity and organization.  
As abjection is itself the sign of the unsignifiable, the degree to which it may be 
apprehended in narrative is highly problematic. If images of food abomination, 
coprophilia, coprophagia as well as necrophilia that are normally related to the body 
abject are more liberally strewn all through the earlier and middle works up to How It 
Is, the later texts as a whole undergoes a yet larger-scale formal translation of 
abjection into Beckett’s corpus of works. 
Beckett takes a rather problematic standpoint towards wholeness, apparently 
associating literary production with a weary disgust like that shown sex and 
reproduction in his works, and only admitting collections to the corpus under the sign 
of bodily expulsion. The Precipitates which accompany ‘Echo’s Bones’, the six 
Residua, Tête Mortes, and the Foirades all evoke cast-off bodily material, as does the 
later collection edited by Ruby Cohn, Disjecta. ‘Precipitates’ designate solids left 
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over after a chemical process, ‘residua’ indicate what remains of a pre-existing whole, 
a ‘foirade’ (rendered as ‘fizzle’ in English) is a sort of feeble farting noise, and a ‘tête 
morte’ a dried skull. The overwhelming impression is that Beckett’s anthologies are 
deeply marked by the spectre of the abject body. Disjecta, however, is the most 
striking: the term is etymologically very close to abjection (we might even coin 
abjecta as a collective description of the fallen bodily matter which is never far from 
Beckett’s protagonists). Cohn’s foreword to the collection cannot help but dramatize 
the relish of the unpublished in the uncomfortably bodily terms: 
 
I believe that the miscellany harbours an esthetic, but Beckett’s criticism 
nevertheless resists a Procrustean coherence. Beckett himself observes (on 
Feuillerat’s ‘ordering’ of Proust): ‘[…] a beautiful unity of tone and treatment 
would have, as it were, embalmed the whole’. To avoid embalming the whole, 
we should savour Beckett’s morsels in all their variety. [Disjecta, 7] 
 
The remark posits material seen as extraneous to the literary corpus precisely as 
bodily waste which becomes the object of a ghoulish delectation; and as Cohn says, 
‘Disjecta is Beckett’s own title for this miscellany of criticism and a dramatic 
fragment’, deliberately figuring the attachment to the main body of work of 
‘improper’ texts in terms of bodily expulsion.  
How is this strange correspondence between form and thematics to be 
understood? While it might be suggested that, by the time of the publication of 
Disjecta, Beckett was well-placed to make the judgment that the body’s incessant 
dynamics of breakdown and expulsion were central to his literary production and 
decided to punningly anthologize his miscellaneous texts accordingly. There is plenty 
of evidence that something rather more subtle is implied in the relationship of the 
narrative presence of an abject body to the corpus at large. If it is underwritten with 
morbid gourmandise, Disjecta also carries a promise of plenitude, offering, precisely 
by supplying these miscellaneous texts, to make Beckett’s literary corpus complete. 
The move implied both the restoration of ‘proper’ material which has been 
mistakenly removed and, more sinisterly, the prospect of the closure of the body of 
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work which was to be announced by Beckett’s own death. If abjection describes the 
body’s spasmodic wrestling with itself from the threat of death, literary corpus, 
conversely, is finally constituted as properly complete only by the biological death of 
its human agent (who could imagine a proper ‘Compete Works’ of a living author, 
though Harold Pinter’s Complete Works was already out in 199079 while he lives to 
receive the Nobel Prize in literature in 2005? Precisely by the fact of continuing to 
function as a living being, the author disables the claims of the corpus to wholeness.) 
Beckett’s own conceptions of the unity (or otherwise) of his written production, 
however, disrupt the end-determined scheme.  
Beckett made a number of remarks which distinguish relatively clearly between 
a primary and secondary body of work. He claimed ‘I wrote all my work very fast – 
between 1946 and 1950’, that The Unnamable represented a terminus in the creative 
process (‘there’s complete disintegration. No ‘I’, no ‘have’, no ‘being’. No 
nominative, no accusative, no verb. There is no way to go on’), and that the Texts for 
Nothing constituted ‘an attempt to get out of the attitude of disintegration, but it 
failed’80. I do not propose these comments as tenable value judgments, but as 
indicative of a certain standpoint taken by Beckett towards the form of his literary 
corpus. If all the works except the Trilogy, on the basis of these remarks, may be said 
to be radically fragmentary and abortive, a view emerges of a body of work which so 
thoroughly problematises the status of certain works as to utterly deny them 
admission to it. This is body which constitutes itself by a radical inner disavowal, by 
disowning part of its matter.  
As readers of a breadth of material which indisputably extends beyond the 
Trilogy, we may be tempted simply to dismiss the remarks in which all the other 
works are sidelined. The comments may have a formal significance beyond the 
message they purport to convey, however: like Beckett’s comment on the two thieves, 
                                                        
79 Harold Pinter, Complete Works vols.1-4. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1990. 
 
80 Beckett, quoted in Israel Shenker, ‘An Interview with Beckett’, New York Times, 5 May, 
1956, section II, reprinted in Lawrence Graver and Raymond Federman, Samuel Beckett: 
The Critical Heritage. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, p.148. 
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flimsy contents are sometimes the vehicle for larger formal concerns. A comment 
which Beckett made on the Residua in response to the ‘questionnaire’ sent to him by 
Brian Finney replicates the form of the remarks on the Trilogy in a different context:  
 
‘They are residual (i) severally, even when that does not appear of which each is 
all that remains and (ii) in relation to whole body of previous work.’81
 
If the categorisation of the Residua as ‘minor’ works left over in the wake of the 
constitution of the main corpus recalls Beckett’s earlier pronouncement on the status 
of his writing after the Trilogy, it also comes close to contradicting it. The 
marginalisation of the Residua is plausible except for the fact that all works other 
than the Trilogy have already been dismissed as secondary. The reader is caught 
between envisaging a progressive ‘residualisation’ of Beckett’s works, each 
newcomer designated as a fragment expelled from the unit formed by its 
predecessors and excluded from body of work which they constitute, or concluding 
that the remarks are mutually contradictory. In the latter case, the only possible 
conclusion is that the comments fulfill some rhetorical or phatic function other than 
the apparent one, and that Beckett is talking about something other than the works in 
question. It is possible that Beckett’s taut formulation is really angling at the form or 
dynamic by which the exclusion to which he refers takes place, that is, expulsion 
itself, which, properly abject (abjection’s fundamental movement), can only be 
signified by proxy. Indeed, this view is promoted by the first part of the comment: 
Beckett explicitly stated that the composition of the Residua is predicated on the 
non-appearance of an entity of which it was previously part, so that literary 
expression itself is caught up in a primal act of separation whose site cannot be 
recalled, and of which the text is a fragmentary remainder. Leslie Hill, in Beckett’s 
Fiction: In Different Words, identifies the central paradox of the derivation of 
wholeness from fragmentedness:  
                                                        
81 Beckett, quoted in Brian Finney, Since How It Is: A Study of Samuel Beckett’s Later 
Fiction. London: Covent Garden Press, 1972, p.10. 
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The residues are described as the sole remaining remnants of a whole which, if 
it exists, is not available, but absent […] But their status as residues is solely a 
function of that whole. If it is absent, their residual character cannot be 
instantiated or verified. It remains external to them.82  
 
Hill’s argument brings a rare insight into these formal problems. Although it never 
mentions abjection by name, I suggest that it is deeply preoccupied with a struggle 
for differentiation like that in the experience of abjection, and with the paradoxical 
dialectic of a bodily wholeness derived from the threat of dissolution. The central 
paradox is that fragmentation is precisely the sign of integration in Beckett’s body of 
work: 
 
If Beckett’s work is a whole body, it evidently must include the later residues, 
since otherwise it would cease to be whole. If the residues, as the author 
suggests, are not part of this whole body, the whole body can no longer claim to 
be whole. One could argue that Beckett does make a clear distinction here 
between his previous and present bodies of work. Again, however, if that is true, 
the whole body negates itself by dividing into two, into a whole body proper, 
and a supplementary corpus improper, part residual testament and past 
revisionary codicil. To do this denies either body the attribute of wholeness. 
Thus if one maintain the separation Beckett makes between the residua and his 
earlier texts, one must reject the terms in which that separation is formulated. 
The only whole body in evidence here is more like a phantom or ghost than a 
fully present organic structure. Neither the early nor the late bodies of work are 
whole, and if the residues have no part in a whole body which expels or rejects 
them, it is not only because they are residual or fragmentary in themselves but 
also because, as fragments, they are an integral part of Beckett’s work.83  
 
Beckett sections off the later works are ‘residual’ in such a way as to fragment the 
‘whole’ body from which they are excluded: if the main body is not a whole, the 
fragment subtracted from it cannot properly be described as a fragment, since 
fragmentation necessarily implies a defining plenitude. Although the problem is in 
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close proximity to Derrida’s philosophy of presence, in particular the economy of the 
dangerous supplement84, there is a distinction to be made. Rather than the ‘phantom’ 
corporality to which Hill alludes, the bodies of the large-scale organization of 
Beckett’s work may be seen precisely as bodies. Their intermittence and threat of 
disintegration are indicative of those disturbances and dysfunctionalities most proper 
to human physicality rather than simply arising from the logistics of raw materials. 
The recurrent evocation of the experience of abjection in Hill’s argument (‘the 
fragmentary, residual text crosses the limit of frontier between inside and outside, 
inscribing and effacing the line of separation in the process’ [145]) suggests that he is 
only a step away from describing Beckett’s as an abject corpus, a description which 
that corpus so strongly invites.  
The ambivalent standpoint to wholeness which is everywhere in evidence in the 
narrative of Beckett’s fiction thus proves to have a subtle counterpart on the 
macro-level of the constitution of the literary corpus. If anthologisation is one 
instance of this unsuspected corroboration of the thematics of wholeness, propriety 
and exclusion, another crucial case is the bilingual aspect of Beckett’s work. 
Although the problem of ‘translation’ or ‘bilingualism’ in Beckett has received 
considerable critical attention in recent years, its emulation of the refusals of unity in 
Beckett’s narrative themselves has rarely been remarked upon. In what follows I do 
not propose a comprehensive treatment of this large formal problem, but rather a 
reading of Beckett’s bilingualism in the light of the thematics of abjection.  
 
 
Across Two Languages: Abject in Self-Translation 
 
Beckett’s bilingualism poses a threat to conventional notions of what constitutes a 
proper body of work. It has for some time been realized that Beckett’s work inscribes 
                                                        
84 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: John 
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a deeply felt instability within traditional ideas of ‘original’ work and ‘translation’. 
While we might be tempted to conceive of a relatively finished literary work which 
is subsequently reproduced in another language, according to the demands of another 
set of linguistic constraints and cultural points of reference, the nature of Beckett’s 
literary production in English and French throws this scheme into confusion. Not 
only does Beckett, like Joseph Conrad or Vladimir Nabokov, adopt a foreign 
language as a language of composition (most consistently from the Trilogy onwards), 
but the ‘mother tongue’ continues to play an important role. That ‘versions’ of 
Beckett’s works begin to appear in both English and French after the success of the 
Trilogy destabilizes the distinction between author and translator, since Beckett is the 
author of both. For this reason, criticism has spoken of Beckett’s ‘self-translation’. 
The picture is frequently complicated, however, by the nature of the differences 
between the two ‘versions’: I suggest that there are important cases in which the 
differences cannot be accounted for by the demands of the language in question, nor 
even by the need to create recognisable cultural references. In this case, how may the 
curious slippage between ‘original’ and ‘translation’ be explained? One text cannot 
be properly be said to be a ‘version’ of its counterpart in the other language, and must 
be seen to be a ‘version’ or product of something else, the contingency of the two 
texts’ composition producing an unexplained agency in which they are complicated, 
but which they do not contain.  
It is interesting to see, in this context, that Deleuze and Guattari refer 
specifically to Beckett in the theorisation of a ‘minor’ literature:  
 
Usage de l’anglais et du français chez Beckett. Mais l’un ne cesse de procéder 
par exuberance et sur-détermination, et opère toutes les réterritorialisations 
mondiales. L’autre procède à force de sècheresse et de sobrieté, de pauvreté 
voulue, poussant la déterritorialisation jusqu’à ce que ne subsistent plus que des 
intensités.  
 
[The use of English and French in Beckett. But the former does not cease to 
operate by exhilaration and over-determination, and brings about all sorts of the 
worldwide reterritorialisations. The other proceeds through dryness and sobriety, 
of willed poverty, pushing deterritorialisation to such an extreme that nothing 
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remains but intensities.]85
 
Irrespective of whether the generalisation on Beckett’s English and French styles can 
be maintained, the insight into the ‘déterritorialisation’ effected by bilingual writing 
is an important one. Although the poverty or disempowerment that it involves is 
frequently referred to in relation to Beckett’s adoption of French, it may perhaps be 
seen to exist not at the level of style, but rather in the loss which occurs between 
English and French. If the coexistence of English and French works is constantly 
accompanied by an inexplicable patch of difference, the form of the body of work 
which they inhabit may be seen, once again, to produce loss and exclusion.  
At this point, a discussion of the poet’s role as self-translator seems to be in 
order. In one of the first essays to address Samuel Beckett’s activity as a 
self-translator, Ludovic Janvier describes his experiences of translating Watt into 
French in collaboration with Beckett (as well as the experiences of other translators 
with whom Beckett worked, such as Robert Pinget and Richard Seaver) in terms of a 
conversation or dialogue: ‘Beckett nous faisait entrer avec lui dans ce dialogue à une 
voix que l’écrivain entretient avec le langage où il cherche à s’installer le temps d’un 
livre’ [my emphasis].86 Raymond Federman also employs the notion of dialogue in 
his discussion of Beckett’s bilingual production and concludes that ‘Beckett, in his 
bilingual work, allows us to listen to the dialogue which he entertains with himself in 
two languages.’87 It is hardly surprising that both Janvier and Federman evoke 
dialogue as a trope for what George Craig calls Beckett’s ‘double venture’88 and 
what I would term his literary bi-discursivity, for the metaphor of dialogue, which 
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presupposes the presence of two entities – a speaker and a listener, or in the case of a 
literary text, an author and a reader – and which calls attention to the materiality of 
language, enables the scholar to account for the basic dualities of Beckett’s endeavor: 
the use of both English and French as the primary language of composition and the 
literal and figurative rewriting of each text that occurs in the act of self-translation. 
However, while at first glance these formulations of dialogue or conversation 
may appear to embrace the duality (or multiplicity) that both characterises and 
governs Beckett’s work, upon closer examination they reveal the same shortcoming 
as most theories of self-translation: they reduce duality to unity89. Whereas theorists 
                                                        
89 Walter Benjamin’s notion of ‘pure language’ has led theorists of self-translation to reduce 
duality to unity. In ‘The Task of the Translator’ (Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn. New York: 
Schocken Books, 1969, p.79),  Benjamin asserts that outside of the original and the 
translation and their corresponding languages, there exists ‘pure’ language, which can only 
be approximated, never attained. In the act of translation, according to Benjamin when two 
languages come into contact with one another, one may catch a glimmer of this ‘pure’ 
language.   
Benjamin’s theory has attracted self-translation scholars. Beaujour, for one, talks about 
the versions in both languages ‘rejoin[ing] one another and be[ing] reconciled’ (as in the 
‘pure’ language evoked by Benjamin) [Alien Tongues 112]. Fitch employs the identical 
terminology to describe the relationship between a text and its self-translation: ‘with the 
coming into existence of [the] second text […] the [first] text is rendered retroactively 
incomplete: it is suddenly revealed to be unfinished’ [Beckett and Babel, 131, original 
emphasis]. James McGuire also evokes Benjamin’s ‘pure’ language to explain the 
relationship between what he calls Beckett’s ‘parallel texts’: ‘the two texts […] become 
interdependent, forming one bilingual text. The implication here of a third, extralingual text 
is clear, and it is reminiscent of Benjamin’s concept of a “pure language”’[McGuire 260].   
As we can see in the above quotations of Beaujour, Fitch, and McGuire, their primary 
move is to recast Benjaminian ‘pure’ language as ‘pure’ text, hoping to redeem the 
self-translated text as an object worthy of study; for, the translation is revealed to be an 
integral part of the original, rather than a mere copy. By taking this step, they are actually 
appealing to a pre-linguistic or non-linguistic entity, a concept that is the complete opposite 
of what Benjamin refers to as ‘pure’ language. In short, theorists of self-translation rely on 
the presence of a transcendental referent or universal meaning – what translation theory has 
long called the tertium comparationis, ‘the “something” which presumably hovers 
somewhere between languages in some kind of air bubble and “guarantees” (no less) that a 
word in the language you translate into (target language) is, indeed, equivalent to a word in 
the language you translate from (source language)’ [Lefevere & Bassnett 3].  
The conception of a ‘pure’ text conflicts with Benjamin’s notion of ‘pure’ language and 
his theory of translation on two levels. First, far from conceiving of translation as something 
that takes place outside of language, Benjamin views it, on the contrary, as ‘a relation from 
language to language, not a relation to an extralinguistic meaning that could be copied, 
paraphrased, or imitated’ [de Man 82]. Once again, theorists of self-translation have 
transformed what Benjamin says into its exact opposite: not extralinguistic becomes 
extralinguistic. Second, this ‘pure’ text functions in a manner similar to that of the tertium 
comparationis which is itself predicated on the belief that equivalence can be attained in 
translation, that equivalence is a valid criterion in the comparison and evaluation of a 
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of self-translation most often seek unity by positing the existence of a pre-existing 
‘pure’ text, here, Janvier and Federman deprive dialogue of its multiple nature by 
locating it within Beckett himself -- with the attendant assumption that the self is a 
unified entity. Note that Federman qualifies the dialogue as being one that Beckett 
‘entertains with himself’ and that Janvier refers to it as ‘ce dialogue à une voix’; in 
short, Beckett assumes the roles of both speaker (author) and listener (reader). Ann 
Beer posits that this desire for unification and the concomitant appeal to authorial 
intentionality are inevitable reactions to the dilemma Beckett’s bilingualism -- and, 
by extension, his activity as a self-translator -- poses for scholars: ‘[it] does not 
appear in the individual text, and can therefore only be discussed in some larger, and 
extra-textual, framework that examines the author or the oeuvre as a whole’.90  
Brian T. Fitch, on the other hand, while viewing Beckett’s bilingual production 
in terms of ‘one work, two texts’, is aware of the problematic orientation towards 
authorial intentionality and argues that the two versions of a given work should have 
a complementary relationship and that it is only ‘in the coming together of the two’ 
that we may begin to have ‘an adequate representation of “what the author had in 
mind”’91. Fitch reluctantly and almost apologetically defends his approach against 
the critique he (correctly) anticipates will be leveled against it: 
 
The underlying justification for such a manner of proceeding is obviously 
                                                                                                                                                             
self-translated text and its original.   
This (mis)reading of ‘The Task of the Translator’ is particularly problematic for it is 
precisely Benjamin’s break away from equivalence that renders his theory of translation so 
useful to a poetics of self-translation, as Bassnett’s remarks illustrate: ‘Equivalence in 
translation, then, should not be approached as a search for sameness, since sameness cannot 
even exist between two TL versions of the same text, let alone between the SL and TL 
versions’ [29]. Indeed, only when freed from the constraints of ‘equivalence’ could scholars 
examine the differences among the multiple versions of a given text as something other than 
moments of ‘unfaithful’ translation. 
 
90 Ann Beer, ‘Beckett’s Bilingualism’, in The Cambridge Companion to Beckett, ed. John 
Pilling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.217. 
 
91 Brian T. Fitch, Beckett and Babel: Investigation into the Status of the Bilingual Work. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988, p.101. 
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related to authorial intentionality: it presupposes the preexistence of the fictive 
universe, subsequently realized by the text, in some nonlinguistic form 
antedating the actual writing of the work of which the two merged universes 
would somehow provide a more adequate representation than either one of them 
alone. Such a hypothesis, in spite of the indisputable problems it would pose in 
the context of contemporary literary theory with the latter’s rejection of any 
transcendental signified, is not ruled out in the first instance [...].92
 
Despite Fitch’s attempt to distance himself from authorial intentionality by moving 
the site of unification from the author to the fictive universe of the text, Lance St. 
John Butler accurately characterises Fitch as ‘having immediate and frank recourse 
to the notion of authorial intentionality in order to hold his two texts in the same 
focus.’93 Butler also clearly articulates the untenability of this position: ‘[the] status 
of this mystical X, this entity suspended in ‘some nonlinguistic form’ is surely too 
much for us to swallow at this time of day’94. 
 Having rejected any appeal to authorial intentionality -- including Fitch’s notion 
of a pre-linguistic Ur-text -- Butler turns his attention to the multiple versions of the 
texts themselves and, in particular, to the language(s) of which they are 
constructed.95 In contrast to the approaches outlined above, Butler completely 
removes the author from discussion, stripping him of his agency; instead, language 
                                                        
92 Ibid., p.101. 
 
93 Lance St. John Butler, ‘Two Darks: A Solution to Beckett’s Bilingualism’, in Samuel 
Beckett Today/Aujourd’hui: An Annual Bilingual Review/Revue annuelle bilingue 3 (1994), 
p.124. Butler’s comments pertain to Fitch’s article, ‘The Relationship Between Compagnie 
and Company: One Work, Two Texts, Two Fictive Universes’, in Beckett 
Translating/Translating Beckett, pp.25-35, which reappears in Beckett and Babel as part of 
chapter six. In the chapter on the status of self-translation that follows, Fitch further reveals 
his dependence on authorial intentionality: ‘the crux of the matter here is not the product but 
the process that gave birth to it. In this case the writer-translator is no doubt felt to have been 
in a better position to recapture the intentions of the author of the original than any other 
ordinary translator for the very good reason that those intentions were, in fact, his very own. 
If no distinction is made between the two versions of a given work, it is because they appear 
to share a common authorial intentionality’ [Beckett and Babel 125, original emphasis]. 
 
94 St. John Butler, ‘Two Darks: A Solution to Beckett’s Bilingualism’, p.125. 
 
95 Beer views this emphasis on textuality as characteristic of work done by scholars of the 
French-language tradition (in particular the Structuralists and Post-Structuralists) to whom 
she attributes the beliefs that ‘the author is “dead” or a mere a construct’ and that ‘only 
textual reality is available’ [‘Beckett’s Bilingualism’ 217]. 
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itself assumes the active role: 
 
where there are changes between the two versions they are imposed by the 
different grammatical styles of English and French. […] This is not Beckett 
arrogating an illegitimate freedom to himself or following some internal law 
that tells him to make his original intentions clearer; this is Beckett the good 
translator bowing to an external law -- the law that French goes one way, 
whoever is handling it, and English another.96
 
Once again, dialogue is reduced to a single element: language. In removing Beckett 
from the equation -- either as author or reader -- Butler’s analysis becomes less a 
study of Beckett’s literary bi-discursivity and more an exercise in comparative 
stylistics.  
Both trends, as I see it, focus on the production of language (the speaker or the 
utterance) in isolation, and this is where the problem lies: the unity-sameness and the 
duality-difference approaches presuppose either a ruling, unchanging 
writing/translating subject, or two established, finished texts. In other words, they 
both look at the issue of language from without (language has therefore remained the 
object of discussion), while overlooking the author/self-translation’s experience of 
language from within.  
In what follows, I shall draw on the duality-difference approach by stressing the 
differences between two ‘versions’ based on their respective cultural and linguistic 
contexts. Revising unity-sameness approach (particular that of Fitch’s), I shall argue 
that the two ‘versions’ evoke an unrecoverable but essential pre-linguistic or 
non-linguistic presence, i.e. the eventual production of each cannot be conceived of 
separately from a pure presence they do not contain, which ultimately leads to their 
abjection.  
 
* 
                                                        
96 St. John Butler, ‘Two Darks: A Solution to Beckett’s Bilingualism’, pp.122-123. 
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In January 1977, Beckett began work on a prose text in English entitled ‘Verbatim’ or 
the ‘Voice’. A few months later, in a letter to Ruby Cohn, he explained that he had 
‘[tried] to get going again in English to see [him] through, say for company, but 
broke down. But must somehow [...]’97.  He did indeed ‘get going again’ and from 
May 1977 to August 1979 he worked on the piece that was to become Company. In 
contrast to the forty-year time lag between the composition of Mercier et Camier and 
its translation into English, Beckett began to translate Company into French almost 
immediately upon completion of the English manuscript; in fact, the manuscripts of 
Company and Compagnie share a single notebook. Moreover, both texts were 
published in the same year, 1980, but due to revisions of the English text, the French 
text appeared first. Hence, the cover of the first English edition intriguingly informs 
the reader that Company, although ‘written in English, has already been translated by 
the author and revised in the light of the French text.’98
Each version of Company/Compagnie consists of fifty-nine numbered 
paragraphs that offer the reader a series of scenes and, thus, communicate certain 
themes in an impressionistic manner. Approximately half of these fragments center 
on the text’s fictional ‘characters’ – the hearer, the deviser, and the voice – a fact that 
may give rise once again to the notion that Beckett’s works are divorced from 
external reality. Yet, the other fragments relate scenes based on incidents in Beckett’s 
childhood. In the inside cover of the manuscript notebook, Beckett clearly outlines 
the autobiographical moments in the text and reiterates them later on in the notebook, 
calling them ‘Scenes from the past.’99 As a result, it is hardly surprising to discover 
                                                        
97 Samuel Beckett, letter to Ruby Cohn, May 3, 1977, quoted in Knowlson, 574. 
 
98 Samuel Beckett, Company, described in Joseph Long, ‘The Reading of Company: Beckett 
and the Bi-Textual Work’, in Forum for Modern Language Studies 32: 4 (October 1996): 315. 
It is precisely this revision and this back and forth between the two texts that prompt Krance 
to speak of ‘transtextual confluence’. 
 
99 All references to the manuscript and published versions of Company and Compagnie are 
taken from Krance’s invaluable bilingual variorum edition. Cf. Samuel Beckett’s 
Company/Compagnie and, A piece of monologue/Solo, ed. Charles Krance. New York: 
Garland, 1993.  
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Anglo-Irish cultural references in Company/ Compagnie. 
The English version contains numerous references to people, places, and things 
familiar to Beckett from his childhood in Foxrock: Dr. Hadden (or Haddon), Mrs. 
Coote, Connolly’s Stores, the Ballyogan Road, Croker’s Acres, Stepaside, and the De 
Dion Bouton. The question arises: what role, if any, do these references play in the 
text? Perhaps, despite their grounding in the ‘real world’, they serve a symbolic 
function. However, when asked about the potential symbolism or significance to be 
found in these names, Beckett dismisses any such reading: ‘[les] noms propres et de 
lieux n’ont aucun sens caché. L’épicier, l’accoucheur et la dame s’appelaient ainsi, 
Ballyogan et Stepaside s’appellent ainsi toujours. J’avoue que Stepaside a l’air 
inventé. De même, De Dion Bouton était une marque d’automobile de la belle 
époque.’100 Furthermore, O’Brien notes that Beckett’s father may have owned a De 
Dion Bouton and that, in any event, Sir Horace Plunkett, who lived in the area, did 
own one.101 Perhaps then one might argue that despite the fact that these items 
mentioned in the text point to objects, locations, and people in the ‘real world’, they 
function solely on an autobiographical level, that is, within Beckett’s personal frame 
of reference. Yet, although certain of the references are indeed autobiographical – 
such as Dr. Hadden and Mrs. Coote – most of them, particularly the topographical 
allusions (like those in Mercier et/and Camier), draw on a larger cultural store of 
knowledge and, hence, resonate with the text’s Anglo-Irish reader.102
In his article on Company and Compagnie, Fitch devotes a great deal of 
                                                        
100 Beckett, letter to Antoni Libera, December, 11 1980, quoted in Marie-Claire Pasquier, 
‘Quand comparaison se veut raison’, in TransLittérature 8 (Hiver 1994): 32. 
 
101 ‘Plunkett was reputed to have owned the first motor car in Ireland, a fact subsequently 
proved incorrect. However, he did drive a De Dion Bouton’ [Eoin O’Brien, The Beckett 
Country: Samuel Beckett’s Ireland. Dublin: Black Cat Press / London: Faber and Faber, 1986, 
9n9]. 
 
102 Long confirms that the places Beckett mentions in Company would be ‘familiar to a 
Dubliner’; however, he cautions against ‘a realist mode of reading’, despite the fact that ‘[the] 
topographical references [...] may seem to encourage [it]’. Instead, he suggests that Beckett 
‘ironises the very notion of realist reference’ [Ibid. 321]. [‘The Reading of Company: Beckett 
and the Bi-Textual Work’, p.321.] 
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attention to what he calls the ‘discrepancy between their respective universes’103; in 
short, he examines the various omissions, replacements, and additions that occur in 
the translation. However, Fitch’s primary concern remains the relationship between 
the two versions of the work as opposed to the relationship between the reader and 
the text; thus, despite the fact that he continually makes mention of the reader and of 
the ‘mental images’104 that he or she experiences in reading one version or the other, 
at no point in his discussion does he identify any examples as culturally specific. 
This is particularly odd given that at the very end of the article, he acknowledges ‘the 
inevitable differences of connotation between words in different languages, not to 
mention the differences distinguishing the two cultures involved and hence their 
respective reading publics’105. Indeed, it is precisely Beckett’s awareness of these 
different readers and their respective cultural frames of reference -- Anglo-Irish and 
French -- coupled with his desire to provide each of them with a point of entry into 
the text that may be said to influence certain of his decisions in translation. 
Unlike Fitch, Long wishes to ‘[shift] perspective to the reader’106 in an attempt 
to study ‘[how] the text, French or English, solicit[s] the reader’107. Thus, he does 
discuss how Beckett renders cultural references from English to French and 
concludes that ‘topographical references and elements of local colour appear to have 
been expunged from the French version’108. In support of this position, he offers the 
example of Croker’s Acres, which, he claims, ‘are leveled out to common pastures, 
                                                        
 
103 Brian Fitch, ‘The Relationship Between Compagnie and Company: One Work, Two Texts, 
Two Fictive Universes’, in Beckett Translating/Translating Beckett, eds. Alan Warren 
Friedman, Charles Rossman, Dina Sherzer. University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1987, pp.25-26. 
 
104 Ibid., p.27.  
 
105 Ibid., p.34. 
 
106 Joseph Long, ‘The Reading of Company’, p.315. 
 
107 Ibid. 
 
108 Ibid. p.321. 
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“pâturages”’.109 However, the situation is not as simple as Long would have it appear 
to be. First, the other topographical references found in the English version -- the 
Ballyogan Road and Stepaside -- both appear in the published version of Compagnie; 
hence, Beckett’s deletion of Croker’s Acres from the French version serves as an 
isolated incident and by no means reflects a desire on his part to continually 
‘expunge’ external reality from the text. Second, Long chooses not to examine the 
manuscript variants of Company/Compagnie; he justifies this decision by asserting 
that the manuscripts are more appropriate for a discussion of the text’s genesis, rather 
than the reader’s reception of the text. However, as I illustrate below, an examination 
of the manuscripts reveals that not only did Beckett consider alternate translations of 
each of these topographical references, but more importantly, these variants are 
culturally specific. 
All three of these references occur in the same fragment, number 27:  
 
Nowhere in particular on the way from A to Z. Or say for verisimilitude the 
Ballyogan Road. That dear old back road. Somewhere on the Ballyogan Road in 
lieu of nowhere in particular. [Where no truck anymore.] Somewhere on the 
Ballyogan road on the way from A to Z. Head sunk totting up the tally on the 
verge of the ditch. Foothills to the left. Croker’s Acres ahead. [...] Reckoning 
ended on together from nought anew. [As if] bound for Stepaside. When 
suddenly you cut through the hedge and vanish hobbling east across the gallops 
(14, the underlined portions of the text in brackets are omitted from the French 
version).  
 
                                                        
 
109 Ibid. Long goes on to suggest that this is ‘an eviction which one may choose to regret, as 
Boss Croker was a picturesque figure, an émigré of the Irish famine years who made his 
fortune in the United States, returned to build a residence near Foxrock and became a pioneer 
in the breeding of Irish race horses. In 1907, he caused a near-scandal in British racing 
circles by entering an Irish horse for the Epsom Derby, and precipitated an even greater 
furore by winning that race, so that his name became hallowed in local folk memory’ 
[321-322]. O’Brien notes that Croker’s Acres were also known as ‘Croker’s Gallops’ and 
that ‘Beckett often trod the Ballyogan Road to the Gallops, situated some fifteen minutes 
walk from Cooldrinagh. If he continued climbing the Ballyogan Road, he came to the hamlet 
of Stepaside on the foothills of the Dublin mountains’ [The Beckett Country 45, original 
italics]. 
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Nulle part en particulier sur le chemin de A à Z. Ou pour plus de vraisemblance 
le chemin de Ballyogan. Ce cher vieux vicinal. Quelque part sur le chemin de 
Ballyogan au lieu de nulle part en particulier. | Quelque part entre A et Z sur le 
chemin de Ballyogan. Tête baissée dans tes additions au bord de fossé. A gauche 
les premières pentes. Devant les pâturages. [...] Fini le calcul en avant tous deux 
de zéro à nouveau. | Tout droit sur Stepaside. Mais brusquement vous coupez à 
travers la haie et disparaissez clopin-clopant vers l’est à travers champs (15, ‘|’ 
indicates a place of textual omission). 
 
Let us begin with Long’s example: Croker’s Acres. There is no doubt that 
Beckett found this a difficult item to render in French, for he does not translate at all 
in the first French manuscript; instead, he leaves a blank spot for it, as well as a red 
X in the margin. He considers rendering it as ‘les Vingts Arpents’, then ‘les Longs 
Prés’, and, finally, as ‘les parages’, before deciding upon ‘les pâturages’. Although 
none of these variants convey the specific lore associated with Croker’s Acres 
described by Long and O’Brien, each provides the French reader with a fairly 
accurate physical description of the locale. The first variant also implies the presence 
of a long history with respect to this location via its use of the archaic measure 
‘arpent’ – equal to about an acre. The translation of ‘Stepaside’ follows a similar 
pattern; at first, Beckett does not translate it in the manuscript. He then considers the 
variant ‘Averness’ before rendering it as ‘Stepaside’, perhaps Beckett coins the 
bilingual neologism ‘Averness’, to reiterate the ‘stepping aside’ or ‘averting’ 
undertaken by the figure seen on the Ballyogan Road.110
It should come as no surprise that a similar situation occurs with respect to the 
translation of the Ballyogan Road. If one examines only the published versions, it 
would appear that Beckett merely carries over the Irish topographical reference from 
the English to the French. However, the manuscripts indicate that once again Beckett 
finds the translation troublesome and that in the first draft he does not translate ‘the 
                                                        
110 Despite Beckett’s assertion that are no hidden meanings in these references, I would agree 
with Coe when he suggests that ‘undoubtedly, what Beckett loves best to light upon is the 
existence of a real place whose name conceals an accidental but resplendent symbolism’ 
(46). 
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Ballyogan Road’ at all. In the second draft, Beckett considers rendering it as ‘le 
chemin de Mollien’, then ‘le chemin de Moisy’, before deciding to retain the 
reference to the Ballyogan Road – ‘le chemin Ballyogan’. The name Mollien may 
refer to two historical French figures. The first, Nicolas-François comte Mollien 
(1758-1850), was one of Napoleon I’s ministers, after whom both a room and a 
staircase at the Louvre are named. The second, Gaspard-Théodore Mollien 
(1796-1872), a French explorer and diplomat, was one of the earliest European 
explorers of the West African interior. In addition, as with ‘les Vingts Arpents’ and 
‘les Longs Prés’, several streets in the town of Calais bear the name ‘Mollien’. As for 
‘Moisy’, the name may refer to the clockmaker Jean Moisy (1714-1782) whose 1755 
pendule à orgues may be found in the Musée du Petit Palais; if so, the name 
reinforces the clock imagery of the text, and prefigures the later passage ‘Tu regardes 
en arrière comme tu ne le pouvais alors et vois tes traces. Une grande parabole. Dans 
le non-sens des aiguilles’111. Furthermore, O’Brien recounts that in 1984 Beckett 
asked him for ‘the derivation of the name Ballyogan for translation into French. I 
assumed the derivation to be from Bally Eoghan, which in English would be the 
equivalent of Johnstown, but the derivation is thought to be from the “Town of St. 
Mochainn or Mocheim” a saint who died in AD 584’112. Beckett’s request of O’Brien 
suggests that, despite his claim in his letter to Libera that the names in Company 
have no hidden meanings, the inclusion of Irish topographical references is not due 
to their autobiographical resonance alone. Rather, Beckett may also employ them for 
the associative chains of meaning that they might evoke for the Anglo-Irish reader; 
moreover, he seeks to reproduce similar associations for the French reader of 
Compagnie.  
Other references in Company bring the Anglo-Irish larger cultural context into 
play via their attendant associative chains of meaning; consequently, in Compagnie, 
Beckett often translates these items with an eye to creating new associations for the 
                                                        
111 Eoin O’Brien, The Beckett Country, p.27. 
 
112 Ibid., 23n34. 
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French reader. For example, in the English version of the text the narrator recounts: 
‘A small boy you come out of Connolly’s Stores holding your mother by the hand’ 
(4). According to O’Brien, Beckett’s mother often frequented Connolly’s Stores, 
located near Cooldrinagh in the village of Cornelscourt. However, Connolly’s was 
far more than just a grocery store: ‘[this] establishment had a distinct advantage over 
many general stores; it provided also that institution so essential to every Irish hamlet, 
a public house’.113 This may explain, in part, Beckett’s dissatisfaction with his first 
translation of Connolly’s Stores as ‘l’Epicerie Connolly’. Although ‘l’Epicerie’ 
accurately describes Connolly’s primary function, it does not convey its larger role in 
the Anglo-Irish cultural world of Beckett’s childhood. Thus, in the published version 
of Compagnie, Beckett renders ‘Connolly’s Stores’ as ‘la boucherie-charcuterie 
Connolly’; while a ‘boucherie-charcuterie’ may not reproduce the same associations 
as ‘Connolly’s Stores’, it does suggest new ones to the reader of the French text for, 
unlike an ‘épicerie’, a ‘boucherie-charcuterie’ is an inherently French establishment. 
Two other instances of cultural references in Company and their corresponding 
translations in Compagnie further illustrate how Beckett frequently bears in mind the 
reader’s larger cultural context. The first occurs in fragment 24: ‘Your mother is in 
the kitchen making ready for afternoon tea with Mrs. Coote’114. Beckett translates the 
sentence as: ‘Ta mère est dans la cuisine se préparant au goûter avec Madame 
Coote’115. Whereas ‘afternoon tea’ forms an almost ritualised part of day-to-day 
Anglo-Irish life, it plays no such role in France; however, every French child looks 
forward to the snack, ‘le goûter’, that awaits him or her everyday after school. The 
second example takes place in fragment 40, in which Beckett translates ‘Cloudless 
May day’116 as ‘Journée d’avril sans nuage’117. Fitch holds this passage up as 
                                                        
113 Ibid., p.22. In earlier manuscript variants of Company Beckett has ‘Connolly’s grocery’; 
‘Connolly’s Stores’ does not appear until the third draft. 
 
114 Samuel Beckett’s Company/Compagnie and, A piece of monologue/Solo, p.12. 
 
115 Ibid., p.13. 
 
116 Ibid., p.26. 
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evidence of the incompatibility of the two fictive universes of Company/Compagnie, 
for he claims that ‘by no stretch of the imagination can “avril” [...] be translated as 
“May”’118. However, as Butler points out, Fitch does not consider each of these 
months with respect to their roles in the reader’s broader cultural context: 
 
‘May’ from Chaucer onwards, is the sunny spring month par excellence and 
here Beckett needs a month that will be, as he says, ‘cloudless’; any time spent 
in England or Ireland in the month of April will not lead to memories of 
cloudlessness – as we know, the ‘glory of an April day’ is ‘uncertain’ and it is 
April that brings the sweet spring showers. Now in France, “avril” is just that bit 
sunnier and drier that in England and thus a suitable candidate for the 
description ‘sans nuage’ in a way that English Aprils cannot be. Altogether, 
‘May’ is a better translation of ‘avril’ that ‘April’ would be. This is not 
Beckettian licence stemming from his authorial authority, it is merely thoughtful 
translating.119
 
Moreover, I would argue, this translation is thoughtful precisely because it is 
governed by Beckett’s awareness of a culturally specific reader. 
Let us close with one example of how Beckett handles the literary allusions 
present in Company. Long suggests that ‘[the] most constant feature of the English 
version, and one which sets it most decisively against the French, is intertextual play       
[...], the conjuring up, either by direct quotation or by the suggestive power of 
rhythm and prosody, of another textual presence, be it Milton or Shakespeare, or the 
Bible’120; in short, the text appeals to a larger base of cultural knowledge. Long does 
not deny the presence of such intertextual references in the French Compagnie, nor 
                                                                                                                                                             
117 Ibid., p.27. 
 
118 Brian Fitch, ‘The Relationship Between Compagnie and Company: One Work, Two Texts, 
Two Fictive Universes’, p.28. 
 
119 St. John Butler, ‘Two Darks: A Solution to Beckett’s Bilingualism’, pp.124-125 [original 
italics]. 
 
120 For a more detailed analysis of the literary allusions found in Company, see Joseph Long, 
‘The Reading of Company’, pp.322-325. 
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the fact that these references ‘occasionally enjoy a development independent of the 
English’121. However, he maintains it is only ‘[on] a few rare occasions [that] the 
French text compensates for the loss of the intertextual frame of the English by 
elaborating an alternative of its own’122. In support of this position Long offers the 
following analysis of Beckett’s translation of the phrase ‘hope deferred’123, from the 
Book of Proverbs (XIII, 12) as ‘l’espoir charlatan’124, a reference to the Maximes of 
Chamfort: 
 
The phrase ‘hope deferred’ triggers the intertextual process, opening on to the 
Biblical text: ‘Hope deferred maketh the heart sick’ [...]. The masked presence 
of the Book of Proverbs shapes the text to come, acting as matrix, leading into 
the theme of sickness – ‘Till the heart starts to sicken’ – and imposing the 
rhythm and formulation of a proverb: ‘Better a sick heart than none. Till it starts 
to break.’ In French, however, the scriptural reference has not entered the 
common coin of the language – ‘Espoir différé: langueur du cœur’ – and the 
same intertextual trigger cannot operate. The French version follows an 
alternate path, presenting the striking metaphor of ‘l’espoir charlatan’ and 
generating a more recondite reference, pointing to a maxim of Chamfort.125
 
As the terminology of these statements reveal, Long clearly privileges the English 
version and, in turn, views the French as a weaker text; thus, he views the translation 
of this particular passage, in which Beckett opens up new chains of associative 
meaning for the French reader, as a fortuitous and rare occurrence. In contrast, I 
would argue that this example is indicative of a key principle governing Beckett’s 
translation: a desire to engage the French reader with the French version of the text, 
just as the Anglo-Irish reader does with the English version.  
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Indeed, despite his purported desire to move away from Fitch’s emphasis on 
‘the referential world implied by each text’126 and, instead, to focus on the each text’s 
reader, in the end Long returns to the approaches discussed at the beginning of the 
chapter: he turns both to authorial intentionality and to the materiality of language. 
Witness his closing remarks in the article: 
 
[should] we understand that Beckett saw his native language rather as an ancient 
palimpsest [...], whereas French, a foreign tongue however well assimilated, 
appears as a blank page in the eyes of the foreigner? If that be so, then Company 
has brought us back to the vast palimpsest of memory; and the reader is invited 
not so much to explore a vicarious fictive universe as to enter into the labyrinth 
of language.127
 
As I have demonstrated, Beckett is clearly aware that no language -- be it the English 
of his childhood or the French he acquired later in life -- is ‘a blank page’. Thus, ‘the 
labyrinth of language’ of which Long speaks may be applied equally well to both 
versions of Company/Compagnie. Furthermore, as I have illustrated, each text’s 
‘palimpsest of memory’ draws not from Beckett’s personal experiences alone, but 
rather, from the shared cultural memory of its intended audience. 
As we can see from the above, Beckett’s handling of cultural references is 
indicative of one aspect of the poetics that govern his activity as a self-translator: in 
these instances, Beckett seeks not only to rewrite a given text in a new language, but 
also to inscribe the text into a new cultural field of reference. As my analysis will 
show, the cultural, philosophical, or literary references in Beckett’s texts and their 
‘translations’ draw on a wide range of elements belonging to what may be termed 
shared cultural knowledge. Some references appeal to the reader’s familiarity with 
geographical locations or with certain cultural institutions and structures -- such as 
units of measurement, currency, and time or particular customs and practices --, 
                                                        
126 Ibid., p.315. 
 
127 Ibid., p.327. 
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while others involve the use of proper names -- including specific brand names 
(some of which take on an almost iconic status where the brand stands in for the 
product) --, or the use of literary allusions. Hill is correct in noting that ‘it is far from 
self-evident that Beckett’s practice as a self-translator can be reduced to a single 
uniform strategy’128.  
 
After discussing Beckett’s handling of cultural references, I shall now probe deeper 
into the two texts, into their respective microcosmic linguistic space, to show how 
Beckett’s prose rhymes serve as acoustic images of memory-encounters, particularly 
in the light of his remarkable feats of self-translation, encounters that translate the 
terms in which they are expressed into ‘un langage nouveau’, as Mayoux says of 
Molloy, that gives utterance to a genuine ‘sense of failure’ in the killing style of the 
reason-ridden voice.  
The ‘langue étrangère’ of Proust’s counter-senses is translated into a language 
created by the encounter between two languages, a language that fails at a deeper 
level than the texts’ failure to make clear, to comprehend a context, to sustain a belief, 
the deeper failure to stop the life in the feeling imagination. I shall contrast the 
English and French versions of the texts to establish my ground for human 
confidence in the moments where one disbelieves the remorselessness of the form, 
where a purer imagination finds a form of life. The encounter between different 
aspects of the self, different selves to be precise, is externalized and given flesh by 
Beckett and is consequently strangely dehumanized. What the externalization does is 
to present the split selves as merely other, not memory-images at all. Watt's 
transformation of the piano-tuners into someone else's ill-told tale is achieved with 
the faculty of memory itself. The pseudo-couples are past selves fictionalized into 
unfeeling strangers, like French and English facing each other across the 
untranslatable. The rhyme-work, however, establishes a true meeting of those selves 
within the arena of felt memory recollected, in the same way as it demonstrates the 
                                                        
128 Leslie Hill, Beckett’s Fiction: In Different Words, p.46. 
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common ground possible between Beckett’s two languages. When the two meet, a 
true memory is resuscitated (and/or fabricated) and the imagination is shown 
breathing again.  
At the beginning of the French Molloy (FM), Molloy recalls two men coming 
towards each other outside the town:  
 
C’étaient deux hommes, impossible de s’y tromper, un petit et un grand. Ils 
étaient sortis de la ville, d’abord l’un, puis l’autre, et le premier, las ou se 
rappelant une obligation, était revenu sur ses pas. L’air était frais, car ils avaient 
leur manteau. Ils se ressemblaient, mais pas plus que les autres. Un grand 
espace les séparait d’abord. Ils n'auraient pas pu se voir, même en levant la tête 
et en se cherchant des yeux, à cause de ce grand espace, et puis à cause de 
vallonnement du terrain, qui faisait que la route était en vagues, peu profondes 
mais suffisament, suffisament. Mais le moment vint où ensemble ils dévalèrent 
vers le même creux et c’est dans ce creux qu’ils se rencontrèrent à la fin. [FM 
9-10]  
 
Molloy remembers what amounts to a staged act of memory. ‘Le premier’, prompted 
by memory, retraces his steps. The soundeffects make clear, however, that ‘revenu 
sur ses pas’ is identical with the motive ‘las ou se rappelant’, the ‘rappelant’- ‘pas’ 
sound resemblance sufficiently reinforced by the surrounding phonemes to alert our 
attention – (‘le premier, las ou se rappelant une obligation, étaient revenu sur ses 
pas’). The sound of ‘pas’ echoes through the succeeding sentences in the repeated 
‘grand espace’ with ‘séparait’, in ‘pas plus’, ‘pas pu’ and ‘puis à’, with minor echoes 
in the ‘vallonnement’-'vague' link and the phrase ‘peu profondes mais suffisament, 
suffisament’. The first, by remembering, retraces his steps and meets himself walking 
along the road just where he had been moments before. It is the prose rhymes that tell 
us that this is so by identifying ‘pas’ with the act of weary memory and by then 
repeating the sound of his retracing mind on its way towards the meeting with the 
self of the immediate past.129  
                                                        
129 The unpublished draft ‘8’ is a specific denial of the Molloy meeting: the ‘ways’ are 
one-way, there is no ‘retracing the way up back down’, there is ‘no sign that none before’ 
(Lake, No Symbols, 173). 
 
 108
Other features in the passage confirm this. For instance, Molloy’s odd 
assertiveness that it was ‘deux hommes’, as though there could have been some 
doubt; the way calling one of the men ‘l’autre’ subtly changes the sense of the denial 
of likeness (‘pas plus que les autres’) – other past selves are suggested; the odd way 
Beckett manipulates common features of French, the reflexive, the ‘re-’ verbs, a 
phrase like ‘ils avaient leur manteau’, hinting at an identity. The repetitions in the 
passage are curious too (‘grand espace’, ‘suffisament’, ‘creux’) – and even more so 
in the light of the fact that Molloy is remembering an act of memory. The two men 
are repetitions of each other brought together by the sound of their footfalls (‘pas’) 
which are little externalized acts of recall in action.  
Here is the English version:  
 
It was two men, unmistakably, one small and one tall. They had left the town, 
first one, then the other, and then the first, weary or remembering a duty, had 
retraced his steps. The air was sharp, for they wore greatcoats. They looked 
alike, but no more than others do. At first a wide space lay between them. They 
couldn't have seen each other, even had they raised their heads and looked about, 
because of this wide space, and then because of the undulating land, which 
caused the road to be in waves, not high, but high enough, high enough. But the 
moment came when together they went down into the same trough and in this 
trough finally met. [T 9] 
 
‘Rhymes: two men dressed the same, looking the same, two by two’, Stephen had 
thought. One of Watt’s backward sentences remembers Stephen’s thoughts about 
rhyme: ‘Dis yb dis, nem, owt’ [W 166], or ‘two men, sid by sid’. Watt and Knott are 
literally rhymes of each other, and Molloy’s pseudo-couple rhyme too – ‘small’ and 
‘tall’. It is memory that, by repeating its original, creates a rhyme, the present self 
living side by side with its twin dead self. As in the French, ‘remembering’ and 
‘retraced’ are aligned (weary or remembering a duty, had retraced his steps', an 
alignment reinforced by the r-run). The ‘pas’ rhymes are left untranslated, but 
‘retraced’ is echoed in the ‘wide space’ repetition with a supporting ei-run (all the 
‘they’s, ‘lay’, ‘raised’, ‘waves’). The rhyming identity between the two men (‘one 
small and one tall’) leads to a rhyming meeting-place – ‘high enough, high enough 
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[...] the same trough and in this trough’.  
The possibility that the scene is an allegory of memory, remembering mind 
retracing its steps to meet its trace, is underlined by the French ‘pas’-string, and in 
the English with the full rhymes. In the English the two men are made one by the 
implications of the rhymes – they are rhymes of each other. In the French the two 
men are made one by the identity of their ‘pas’ with the act of recall itself. The two 
different routes meet in the final analysis, just as the two men meet finally in the 
same trough. The rhyming approach between the two versions sets out a 
memory-encounter that speaks of translation itself, the resemblances and differences 
between the two languages and their encounter in Molloy, Beckett’s second major 
venture into French.130 Northrop Frye first described the two halves of Molloy as a 
representation of an encounter between Irish English and French.131 Over the 
undulating prose of the novel, Beckett’s Irish-English imagination meets its French 
counterpart, his ‘secondmouth language’132; ‘traduced into jinglish janglage for the 
nusances of dolphins born’133 the way is vice versa, a rhyme of itself.  
The act of self-translation, then, could be seen as the linguistic manifestation of 
the particular malaise of the voice and its memory. The self over time is split into a 
series of distinct successive selves. Beckett's two languages make each other foreign. 
The persistent memory of the other language in the mind dislocates the lexical 
accents of the voice, making the native unfamiliar and the foreign close to home:  
 
Mahood’s stories are not any old thing, though no less foreign, to what, to that 
unfamiliar native land of mine, as unfamiliar as that other where men come and 
                                                        
130 Molloy was written in French between Sept. 1947 and Jan. 1948. In 1947, Beckett had 
translated Murphy, written Mercier et Camier (the first major venture into French), 13 
French poems, and also the early play Eleuthéria and Quatre Nouvelles in French. Molloy 
was translated into English in 1955 by Beckett in collaboration with Patrick Bowles. 
 
131 ‘The Nightmare Life in Death’, 442-9; corroborated by Hugh Kenner: ‘Molloy and Moran 
are more or less the author's Irish and French selves respectively’ (quoted Alvarez, Beckett, 
53). 
 
132 James Joyce, Finnegans Wake, London: Faber & Faber, 1975, p.37. 
 
133 Ibid., p.275. 
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go, and feel at home [...] Not any old thing but as near as no matter. [T 300]  
 
On one level, Beckett is talking about the strange relationship between his French 
stories and his Irish memory. The Unnamable, in keeping them distinct, wishes them 
both devoid of any relation to each other or to the real world, the ‘dead tongue of the 
living’ [T 314]. Rhyming-effects, present in both versions, bring them close together, 
implying rough identity between Mahood and voice, memory and self, and a certain 
kinship between French and English.  
And they appear at the very point the Unnamable is asserting their differences:  
 
Here, in my domain, what is Mahood doing in my domain, and how does he get 
here? There I am launched again on the same old hopeless business, there we 
are face to face, Mahood and I, if we are twain, as I say we are. [T 300]  
 
The rhymes are there in the French: ‘Ici, dans mon pays, que fait Mahood ici [...] 
Mahood et moi, si nous sommes deux, comme je le dis’ [L’Innommable 47]. The 
rhymes bring both the Unnamable and Mahood together, just as the languages are by 
translation, together against the voice’s arbitrary distinguishing of itself from 
Mahood. This rough unity is brought into a rhyming relation with the languages he 
speaks, the ‘pays’ of the original, the ‘domain’ of the translation. ‘The 
self-accompaniment of a tongue that is not mine’ [T 287] murmurs his deeper 
confession even when the voice believes itself to be coming clean. The ‘tongue’ is 
the voice of the ‘autre être’, the past self made stranger by the voice’s extreme old 
age and by comic, manic dislocation.  
It is also the foreign language Beckett prefers to write in and then translate out 
of. In 1977, Beckett told Charles Juliet that ‘il écrit maintenant en anglais, car cette 
langue est devenue pour lui la langue étrangère’134. The persistence of the ‘pas’ and 
rhyme-sounds in the two versions of the passage from Molloy creates a background 
accompaniment to the fleeting, inconsequential meeting of the two men which 
                                                        
134 Charles, Juliet, Rencontre avec Samuel Beckett. Montpellier, 1986, p.49. 
 
 111
parallels the ‘superflu’ of the Mahood-moi rhyme in the later work. It merges the 
sounds the two men make beyond the limited encounter in the trough. Two languages, 
two selves pace out a secret acoustic kinship unawares.  
The ‘pas’ rhymes of the French Molloy are of particular importance to Beckett. 
He told Juliet, friend of Bram van Velde, of ‘l'importance du pas de l'homme, de nos 
pas sur cette terre’:  
 
Toujours ce va-et-vient ... (Et de la main, il décrit ce mouvement du prisonnier 
dans sa geôle, du fauve dans sa cage.) C'est quelque chose que Bram connaît 
bien, ce bruit des pas ... [FM 47-8]  
 
But their importance lies not only in the fact that they create the impression of men 
and women as prisoners, circus animals in endless come-and-go, but also in the fact 
they remind each man and woman of the species to which they belong. They recall to 
the isolated mind its elemental bodied humanity, the rhythm of the species. All 
Beckett’s pseudo-couples reject this fundamental kinship in discarding all vestige of 
human mercy and companionship, and in so doing, reject each other's part in their 
lives. ‘Pas’ rhymes, ‘ce bruit des pas de l’homme’ to condense Beckett's phrasing, 
recall each one back into themselves, gather both divided selves into human history 
and into fleeting communion. 
 
* 
The analysis above again allows us to speculate on the relationship of the two 
‘versions’ of Beckett’s works. As Connor says of The Lost Ones and Dépeupleur, 
‘each becomes merely a version of the other, and is apprehensible as itself only by 
virtue of its difference from its partner, which in turn has identity only in its 
difference from the other text’135. Although the finding fits into a Derridean abolition 
of the precedence of the original over copy, it also dissolves textual completion into 
                                                        
135 Steven Connor, Samuel Beckett: Repetition, Theory and Text. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1988, p.112.  
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an endless flux reminiscent of abjection. Brian Fitch’s analysis of Beckett’s writing 
process may be seen to confirm this. Although abjection is never approached in 
Fitch’s work on Beckett’s bilingualism, and although his hypothesis of an Ur-text is 
problematic, its affinities with the evocation of an unrecoverable but essential 
pre-linguistic or non-linguistic presence136 are too striking to ignore. His analysis of 
Bing and Ping posits both texts as ‘variants’, suggesting that the eventual production 
of each cannot be conceived of separately from a pure presence they do not contain, 
referring to Beckett’s own comment to Brian Finney on the Six Residua: 
 
Beckett said of the […] Residua […] that they were ‘residual…even when that 
does not appear of which each is all that remains’. Likewise, Bing and Ping are 
variants even though ‘that does not appear of which each is’ a variant. They are 
then variants of something that enjoys no tangible textual existence but whose 
existence is none the less implicit in their very co-existence.137   
 
Although Fitch does not make the connection with abjection, the ‘residue’ left over 
after an expulsion is an increasingly fruitful image in reading Beckett’s writing 
practice. The work must be conceived as a ‘pure’ entity which makes a fraught 
shuttling of differentiation the form of its own composition, so that unity cannot be 
apprehended on the level of the text or work (Note the difference of this position 
from the theorists of self-translation), but in the presence which lurks behind both, 
the textual abject. Fitch addresses the same problem in the context of 
Company/Compagnie: 
 
The existence of Compagnie render Company subject to modification: what was 
originally complete in itself and autonomous (Company) is now rendered 
retroactively incompletely. In this sense, the first version is paradoxically in the 
                                                        
136 Please note that when I call it a ‘pre-linguistic or non-linguistic presence’, I am distancing 
myself from theorists of self-translation who view self-translation as a site where 
‘equivalence’ is verified. I seek to posit no ‘equivalence’ as such, for it proves a futile 
endeavour in the case of Beckett’s self-translation.  
 
137 Brian Fitch, Beckett and Babel, p.135 [original emphasis]. 
 
 113
dependence of the second, and the classic classification of the translation’s 
relationship to its original has been turned upside down.138  
 
Since the name ‘Beckett’ is attached to works which have ‘versions’ or ‘variants’ in 
two languages, the work which appears second may be seen as ‘rewritten’, so that it 
operates as commentary or rewriting of the first version. Here we shall recall that 
Beckett finished work on Company in August 1979, and began to translate it into 
French shortly after. Both texts were published in the same year, 1980, but due to 
revisions of the English text, the French text appeared first. Hence, the cover of the 
first English edition intriguingly informs the reader that Company, although ‘written 
in English, has already been translated by the author and revised in the light of the 
French text’. Here, the reversal of conventionally opposed values is the same as that 
in abjection, subverting what is apparently a clear line of logical reasoning: source 
text must precede translation, which is drawn from its preexisting essence. Fitch’s 
argument inverts this causal relationship, and goes on to suggest that the reversal of 
conventional notions of original or derivative is written into Beckett’s process of 
composition itself. The manuscript variants of Bing/Ping again explode the myth of a 
linear process: 
 
The final English version corresponds to a stage in the drafting of its French 
counterpart preceding the version that had served as the source of the earlier 
English version.139  
 
While the preexistence of the ‘finished’ French text might be deemed the 
indisputable origin of its English counterpart in Beckett’s composition, this proves 
not to have been the case. According to Fitch’s investigation, Beckett frequently 
worked backwards, founding the revolution of the second text on a regression further 
                                                        
138 Brian Fitch, ‘The Relationship Between Compagnie and Company: One Work, Two Texts, 
Two Fictive Universes’, in Beckett Translating/Translating Beckett, eds. Friedman et al. 
University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987, pp.31-32.  
 
139 Brian Fitch, Beckett and Babel, p.73. 
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and further back into the early, discarded drafts of the text in the other language140, as 
though the second texts speeds towards its ever-unattainable destination by retreating 
towards the non-existent origin of the first text.  
Like Beckett’s characters’ preoccupation with bodily residues, his retroactive 
writing process propagates itself precisely by recourse to its own previously 
discarded drafts, its abject material, as the self-contained units of ‘original’ and 
‘translation’ fracture into two parallel, simultaneous, unstable, mutually dependent 
bodies of work. The text is subject to abjection’s spasmodic constitution and 
dissolution, calling into question its unitary identity, repositioning textual origin as 
retroactive, and constituting meaning via the unseen and marginal. Since no 
reference Beckett can be considered as a whole reference, always invoking the 
‘other’ text, Beckett’s corpus derives an unsuspected autonomy and plenitude 
precisely from its failure to achieve wholeness, the ironically celebrated failure of 
abjection.  
  
                                                        
140 Ibid., p.73.  
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 [4] 
 
 ‘TO AND FRO IN SHADOW’141:  
REPETITION, MATERNAL SPACE, AND THE RHYTHMIC CHORA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To begin with, I have to quote the probably most-quoted passage from the entire 
Beckett oeuvre, that ‘expression’ manifesto in his ‘Three Dialogues’ with Georges 
Duthuit when he talked about:  
 
The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, 
nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, 
together with the obligation to express. [PTD 103] 
 
While this statement of obligatory, agentless, sourceless, contentless expression has 
inspired much critical insight into Beckett’s works, it has nonetheless become some 
sort of cliché in Beckett criticism, a necessary banality, perhaps, that seems to have 
in it a destiny of some sort, which the Beckett scholar is never to steer clear of. 
Indeed, the best part of the post-Godot Beckett canon – we are reminded of Lucky’s 
famous monologue [CDW 42-43] – seems to coincide with this ‘obligation to 
                                                        
141 Samuel Beckett, ‘Neither’ [CSP 258] 
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express’, an (in)voluntary verbal discharge so to speak.  
If it is indeed necessary to speak, this is not simply because we are prey to 
language. It is also and above all because as soon as it is named that which is and of 
which we are obliged to speak escapes towards its own non-being. This means that 
the work of naming must always be taken up again, differently. On this point, 
Beckett reveals himself as a disciple of Heraclitus: being is nothing other than its 
becoming-nothingness. This is what is summed up in one of the mirlitonnades:  
 
flux cause      flux causes 
que toute chose     that every thing 
tout en étant     while being 
toute chose      everything 
donc celle-là     hence that one 
même celle-là     even that one 
tout en étant     while being 
n’est pas      is not 
parlons-en [CP 75]    speak on142
 
On this basis, how can the imperative to speak, which governs in particular the 
imperative of the writer – and above all of the one who is ‘good for’ nothing else – 
attune itself with being? Have we some hope that language could stop the flux and 
confer upon a thing (‘that one’, ‘even that one’) at least a relative stability? And if 
not, what good is the imperative that we should ‘speak on’ (parlons-en)?  
 
 
A Womb/Tomb with A View: Beckett and the Kristevan Chora 
 
In his provocative study entitled The Insanity of Samuel Beckett’s Art, Richard J. 
Stephenson argues that Beckett felt compelled to speak in order to establish a 
psychological umbilical cord and he felt compelled to speak to break contact with the 
                                                        
142 The translation here is by Nina Power and Alberto Toscano. See Alain Badiou, On Beckett, 
ed. Nina Power and Alberto Toscano. London: Clinamen Press, 2003, p.1.  
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mother.143 This is by all means a blatant claim, considering Beckett’s own ridicule of 
the psychoanalytic critical process.144  However, the abundance of textual and 
biographical evidence never ceases to tempt critics ‘towards the ploughing of 
furrows through Beckett’s work’145. 
In the previous chapter I have outlined, following Kristeva, how abjection stems 
from the infant’s non-separation with the mother in the ‘archaic dyad’. From Peggy 
Guggenheim’s memoirs and from John Gruen’s interview, we are aware that at least 
twice in his life, as early as 1937 and as late as 1961, Beckett personally admitted his 
fearful memories of being swallowed up inside his mother’s womb.146 In this light, 
Deirdre Bair’s record of the turbulently ambivalent relationship between Beckett and 
his mother becomes all the more meaningful147 for explaining Beckett’s compulsion 
to speak.  
The engulfing dyad, to begin with, is both desired and feared, capable of giving 
rise to ambivalence. Talking about the subject’s fear of engulfment, Norman Holland 
quotes Edmund Bergler who ‘has suggested that all writers are involved in this 
deepest of human wishes; that writers emit words as a way of defending against the 
                                                        
143 Richard J. Stephenson, The Insanity of Samuel Beckett’s Art. Colorado: Paint Brush Press, 
1990, p.37.  
 
144 Beckett is known for his comic send-ups of psychoanalytic terminology and practice – the 
‘dog vomit jargon’ used in sifting through ‘time’s forgotten cowpats’ [Phil Baker, Samuel 
Beckett and the Mythology of Psychoanalysis. London: Macmillan, 1997, xi.]. When the 
well-known analyst Didier Anzieu, author of the 1989 essay ‘Beckett and Bion’, put his 
interpretations to Beckett in 1984, Beckett dismissed them as ‘a psychoanalyst’s phantasms!’ 
[Ibid., p.9] 
 
145  Mary Bryden, Women in Samuel Beckett’s Prose and Drama: Her Own Other. 
Houndmills: Macmillan, 1993, p.161. 
 
146  In Confessions of an Art Addict, Peggy Guggenheim writes, recalling Beckett’s 
ambivalence about his love for her: ‘Ever since his birth he had retained a terrible memory of 
life in his mother’s womb. He was constantly suffering from this and had awful crises, when 
he felt he was suffocating.’ [Confessions of an Art Addict. New York: Universe Books, 1979, 
p.175.] On another occasion, Beckett confirms these ‘memories’ with John Gruen: ‘I have a 
clear memory of my own fetal existence. It was an existence where no voice, no possible 
movement could free me from the agony and darkness I was subjected to.’ [John Gruen, 
‘Samuel Beckett Talks about Beckett’, in Vogue, 127 (February 1970) no.2, P.108.] 
 
147 Deirdre Bair, Samuel Beckett: A Biography. New York: Vintage, 1991. 
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fearful desire to obliterate oneself in a total at oneness with some primal mother.’148 
Indeed, a psychological defense attempts to satisfy both the wish and the defense 
against the wish. Ambivalence to the end, Richardson again suggests, Beckett had a 
fictitious ego ramble all the way to silence, trying to imagine himself free of the wish 
to return to the womb. Admittedly in Beckett, there is abundant textual and 
biographical unease with motherhood to take hold of our attention. If this unease 
does not welcome a psychoanalytic interpretation like Richardson’s, there is always 
the possibility of such an intertextual reading as the similarities are encouraging.  
Beckett, too, shows a similar ambivalence towards motherhood. There is, on the 
one hand, the image of an inhospitable mother. It makes its first appearance as a 
scene observed by the protagonist of ‘The End’ as he makes his way through the 
garden of the cloister in which he has been staying:  
 
There was that straight light which follows a day of persistent rain, when the sun 
comes out and the sky clears too late to be of any use. The earth makes a sound 
as of sighs and the last drops fall from the emptied cloudless sky. A small boy, 
stretching out his hands and looking up at the blue sky, asked his mother how 
such a thing was possible. Fuck off, she said. [CSP 53] 
 
At the moment of his own expulsion from asylum (‘[n]ever come back here whatever 
you do, you would not be let in’ [CSP 53]), the protagonist witnesses a scene of 
maternal rejection. The child’s wonder is met with a violent retort. What is 
recognisably the same episode appears again in Malone Dies, this time in much more 
detail and as one of Malone’s own memories. He has heard an aeroplane flying 
overhead: 
 
I was present at one of the first loopings of the loop, so help me God. I was not 
afraid. It was above a racecourse, my mother held me by the hand. She kept 
saying, It’s a miracle, a miracle. Then I changed my mind. We were not often of 
the same mind. One day we were walking along the road, up a hill of 
extraordinary steepness, near home I imagine, my memory is full of steep hills, I 
                                                        
148 Norman N. Holland, The Dynamics of Literary Response. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1968, p.38. 
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get them confused. I said, The sky is further away than you think, is it not, mama? 
It was without malice, I was simply thinking of all the leagues that separated me 
from it. She replied, to me her son, It is precisely as far away as it appears to be. 
She was right. But at the time I was aghast. I can still see the spot, opposite 
Tyler’s gate. A market-gardener, he had only one eye and wore side-whiskers. 
That’s the idea, rattle on. You could see the sea, the islands, the headlands, the 
isthmuses, the coast stretching away to north and south and the crooked moles of 
the harbor. We were on our way home from the butcher’s. My mother? Perhaps it 
is just another story, told me by some one who found it funny. The stories I was 
told, at one time! And all funny, not one not funny. [T 269-270] 
 
Again it is a scene of maternal rejection, and it appears, again in Company in a final 
version: 
 
A small boy you come out of Connolly’s Stores holding your mother by the hand. 
You turn right and advance in silence southward along the highway. After some 
hundred paces you head inland and broach the long steep homeward. You make 
ground in silence hand in hand through the warm still summer air. It is late 
afternoon and after some hundred paces the sun appears above the crest of the 
rise. Looking up at the blue sky and then at your mother’s face you break the 
silence asking her if it is not in reality much more distant than it appears. The 
sky that is. The blue sky. Receiving no answer you mentally reframe your 
question and some hundred paces later look up at her face again and ask her if it 
does not appear much less distant that in reality is. For some reason you could 
never fathom this question must have angered her exceedingly. For she shook off 
your little hand and made you a cutting retort you have never forgotten. [NO 
12-13] 
 
Paul Lawley provides an interesting interpretation of this scene: ‘The separation of 
hands is a detail that figures in this version but is mentioned in neither of the 
previous ones. Again, it is the phrasing that attracts attention. As the first of 
Company’s past episodes, this one precedes the birth-scene […]; yet it may be read 
as anticipating it. The mother’s retort, with which she shakes off the “little hand”, is a 
“cutting” one. She does not figure, is not even mentioned, in the birth-scene […] But 
here, in an adjacent scene, and within the framework of a text to which the image of 
birth is vital, the separation from the child by a “cutting” appears by a process of 
metaphysical displacement. This too is a birth scene, in which the hands represent the 
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umbilical link.’149  
Lawley’s analysis leads us to the other side of Beckett’s ambivalence towards 
motherhood. If the image of the mother is an inhospitable one, for the Beckettian 
consciousness which holds ‘a great love in my heart too for all things still and rooted’ 
[‘From an Abandoned Work’, CSP 159], the womb is still an anchorage that the 
feotus is unwilling to relinquish. In Fizzle 4, the foetal consciousness is permanently 
split, half (‘he’) felt to be facing the ex-uterine world, the other half (‘I’) remaining 
inside: ‘I gave up before birth, it is not possible otherwise, but birth there had to be, it 
was he, I was inside, that’s how I see it’ [CSP 234].  
This peri-natal vacillation is most manifest when the maternal scenes in 
Beckett’s work appear in the form of vibrant and rhapsodic soundscape, like the 
following from Malone Dies:  
 
When I stop, as just now, the noises begin again, strangely loud, those whose 
turn it is. So that I seem to have again the hearing of my boyhood. Then in my 
bed, in the dark, on stormy nights, I could tell from one another, in the outcry 
without, the leaves, the boughs, the groaning trunks, even the grasses and the 
house that sheltered me. Each tree had its own cry, just as no two whispered 
alike, when the air was still. I heard afar the iron gates clashing and dragging at 
their posts and the wind rushing between their bars. There was nothing, not even 
the sand on the paths, that did not utter its cry. The still nights too, still as the 
grave as the saying is, were nights of storm for me, clamorous with countless 
pantings. These I amused myself with identifying, as I lay there. Yes, I got great 
amusement, when young, from their so-called silence. The sound I liked best had 
nothing noble about it. It was the barking of the dogs, at night, in the clusters of 
hovels up in the hills, where the stone-cutters lived, like generations of 
stone-cutters before them. It came down to me where I lay, in the house in the 
plain, wild and soft, at the limit of earshot, soon weary. The dogs of the valley 
replied with their gross bay all fangs and jaws and foam. From the hills another 
joy came down, I mean the brief scattered lights that sprang up on their slopes at 
nightfall, merging in blurs scarcely brighter than the sky, less bright than the 
stars, and which the palest moon extinguished. They were things that scarcely 
were, on the confines of silence and dark, and soon ceased. So I reason now, at 
my ease. Standing before my high window I gave myself to them, waiting for 
them to end, for my joy to end, straining towards the joy of ended joy. [T 
                                                        
149 Paul Lawley, ‘Samuel Beckett’s Relations’, in Journal of Beckett Studies, NS Vol. 6, no. 2 
(Spring 1997): 39-40. 
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206-207] 
 
The scene, as Lawley has aptly pointed out, ‘evokes a rapture of reciprocity both 
with and between sounds and sights at the edge of perception. The sounds animate 
the things of the environment in all their particularity and the barking of the dogs 
composes a topographical antiphony within which wilderness is made compliant 
without ceasing to be wild. The human lights merge with those of the stars and the 
moon. The largest reciprocity is between sound and silence, light and dark, and – in 
the boy’s own experience – continuance and ending.’ 150  Here the subject is 
enveloped by a womb-like realm of sounds and silences, and accompanying images 
indistinguishable from the speaking self. This is, to borrow from Julia Kristeva, a 
chora-like semiotic space151 in which the formative subject dwells.  
In Kristeva’s theory, the symbolic is not always the most powerful mode of 
signification. The disruptive, digressing semiotic, forever lurking, can break in and 
disrupt the more orderly process of symbolic signification:   
 
Discrete quantities of energy move through the body of the subject who is not 
yet constituted as such and, in the course of his development, they are arranged 
according to the various constraints imposed on this body – always already 
involved in a semiotic process – by family and social structures. In this way the 
drives, which are ‘energy’ charges as well as ‘psychical’ marks, articulate what 
we call a chora: a nonexpressive totality formed by the drives and their stases in 
a mobility that is as full of movement as it is regulated.152
                                                        
150 Ibid., p.35. 
 
151 Kristeva borrows the term from Plato’s Timaeus to ‘denote an essentially mobile and 
extremely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases’ [see 
Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. M. Waller. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1984, p.24.]. But even with Plato on her side, Kristeva’s notion of the chora is hazy: 
the chora is often translated as womb or receptacle, but Kristeva does not seem to mean that 
it is just a space; she says it is an articulation, a rhythm, but one that precedes language. It is, 
in other words, the meaning that is largely semiotic: the echolalis, glossalalias, rhythms, and 
intonations of an infant who does not yet know how to use language to refer to objects, or of 
a psychotic who has lost the ability to use language in a properly meaningful way. The 
semiotic chora may also make itself felt in symbolic communication.   
 
152 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. M. Waller. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984, p.25. 
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 Kristeva emphasizes the chora’s mobility, which means exhibiting or being capable 
of spontaneous movement. She wants to see that chora as capable of generating (not 
just receiving) energy – the energy which helps fuel the signifying process. She finds, 
‘in this rhythmic space, which has no thesis and no position, the process by which 
significance is constituted.’153 It is first of all a place, one that is not easy to make 
intelligible because it is not, strictly speaking, representable. To speak about the 
chora at all is paradoxical, given that to do so is to give it a place in the Symbolic.  
Kristeva sees the chora as a mobile and ‘extremely provisional articulation 
constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases’154, a dynamic space where 
differences exist without duality and where the subject is caught up in the continual 
process of construction and destruction. This rhythmic energy constitutes a 
subversive force which repeatedly launches its assaults on the traditional structures 
of the Symbolic. However, Kristeva also associates the chora with the Freudian 
death-drive, through the interaction within the chora of the rhythm of the pulsions, 
and moments of temporary stasis, anticipating the final stasis of death: ‘The semiotic 
chora, converting drive discharges into stases, can be thought of both as a delaying 
of the death drive and as a possible realisation of this drive, which tends to return to a 
homeostatic state.’155  The mother’s body remains the site where difference is 
reconciled, but instead of being embraced in a process of where difference is 
endlessly produced and dissolved, the maternal body is both restored as the original 
lost object and provides a space where reconciliation of difference may be 
imaginatively realized or rehearsed. The implication of this for Beckett is that stasis 
and change, desire and entropy, identity and dispersal, are always intertwined in such 
a way as to give the body jouissance.  
One of Beckett’s later plays, Rockaby (1981), recalls the rhythms of the chora in 
                                                        
153 Ibid., p.26. 
 
154 Ibid., p.25. 
 
155 Ibid., p.128. 
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its nonchronological, repetitious, spiraling, cumulative, fluid language. On one level, 
Rockaby tells the story of an old woman approaching and entering death after a long 
and lonely existence. As Hersh Zaifman has noted, ‘… we see a woman, rocking 
away, listening to a tale – a tale that is narrated rather than dramatised’156. The 
narrative summarises its subject’s existence as a perpetual search for an other: 
 
all eyes 
all sides 
high and low 
for another 
 
The desired other, however, is an other ‘like’ the self, whose need in turn for an other 
would reflect the need of the self: 
 
for another 
another like herself 
another creature like herself 
a little like 
going to and fro 
all eyes 
all sides 
 
The desire to perceive the other seems to be the desire for a reflection of the self, or 
rather, the desire to recognise the desire of the ‘self’ in the desire of the other. Should 
this other be found, the need of each, instead of circulating endlessly, would respond 
to the other, each becoming simultaneously subject and object of desire in a 
compound circle, as in the final image of Ohio Impromptu where the moment of 
self-recognition consummates the union of the self with itself in the mirror of the 
other.  
The subject in the first sections of the narrative is identified only with the eyes, 
the only part of her body which is mentioned. Indeed, she seems to have no existence 
                                                        
156 Hersh Zeifman, ‘“The Core of the Eddy”: Rockaby and Dramatic Genre’, in Beckett 
Translating / Translating Beckett, eds. Alan Warren Friedman, Charles Rossman, and Dina 
Sherzer. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987, p.142. 
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beyond her need to see and recognize the other, which condemns her to a ceaseless 
wandering in search of her object. The desire of the subject of the narrative to see the 
other is mirrored by the desire of the figure to hear her own life story. Although the 
figure does not control the voice, the four sections of the narrative and the 
accompanying motion of the rocker are preceded by the four imploring ‘More’s 
uttered by the figure. In Rockaby, this desire is not only narrated in the text and 
suggested in the scenic figure’s utterances, but is materialised in the structure and 
rhythm of the performance. The repeated motion of the search within the text is 
reflected in the rhythm of the recorded narrative, indeed its form counters its status as 
narrative, associated traditionally with the linear development of the plot. The text is 
divided into short rhythmic units, synchronous with the rocking of the chair (and the 
body). Each section contains a limited number of these units which are continually 
repeated, with each new unit woven into a cycle of repetitions. Each of the four 
sections repeats in large measure the previous one(s), but adds a number of new 
phrases which develop the story or narrative while maintaining the circular, repetitive 
rhythm. Jane Hale has compared the form of the text to:  
 
the repetitive narrative songs that seem to be coming to an end, only to 
recommence at the beginning in an endless game of mirrors.157  
 
The motion of repetition becomes the very rhythm of desire, the ‘spirals of need’ 
referred to by Beckett in his article on Denis Devlin’s Intercessions158 or the 
repetition of the child’s game in Freud’s ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’. The need 
of the subject of narrative for the other becomes the need to represent the need, the 
need to hear the history of her need. While need persists, however, the history can 
never be completed, but only renewed or repeated. The desire to end is therefore the 
desire to end the ‘compulsion to repeat’, the desire to end desiring, since the 
                                                        
157 Jane Hale, The Broken Window: Beckett's Dramatic Perspective. Purdue University Press, 
1987, p.133.  
 
158 Samuel Beckett, ‘Denis Devlin’, in Transition, no. 27 (April-May, 1938), p. 290. 
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repetition can only cease when need itself, the animating principle, is laid to rest. The 
elimination of need, however, entails the elimination of the duality of the concepts of 
self and other, need and its object. Only when this difference or margin which 
perpetuates the circulation of desire is resolved into union, if not unity, can need be 
soothed. And because of the particularly repetitive nature of the text, it tends to 
dissolve into the pure sound or rhythm of the voice.  
 
* 
Longing the so-said mind long lost to longing. The so-missaid. So far 
so-missaid. Dint of long longing lost to longing. Long vain longing. And 
longing still. Faintly longing still. Faintly vainly longing still. For fainter still. 
For faintest. Faintly vainly longing for the least of longing. Unlessenable least 
of longing. Unstillable vain least of longing still. [NO 109] 
 
The lack of an approachable, identifiable subject in Beckett’s late writing, as implied 
in the quotation above, creates immediate problems in reading: one is taken into the 
flux, involuntarily encountering a dissolution of concrete identity where one 
demands an accountable subject position. It is in style that Beckett maps out the 
fractured self. The making flesh of the Word serves as an important model for the 
linguistic destitution in Becket’s prose: the direct transmission of a stylistic or 
rhythm to the reader’s body, a visceral transaction with somewhat demonic overtones, 
replaces the translation of a psychic or spiritual essence into language. Between the 
body and the utterances that traverse it there is not in truth a relation, but rather a 
repressed continuity. Literature surges and foams wherever bodies diffuse, vomit 
themselves, melt into each other, and subside into a heaving syrup of language.   
This practice is in part descended from the narratological analyses of Roland 
Barthes in texts like Writing Degree Zero and The Rustle of Language, where style is 
already aligned with the collapse of binary opposition and with a certain experience 
of space arising from the body. As opposed to the ‘horizontal’ process whereby 
words deliver their meaning when the utterance is completed so that meaning moves 
across them, over time, in a constant process, style belongs to a vertical axis in which 
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the utterance exceeds its context, representing an intermittent dynamic which is not 
exhausted by its punctual execution:  
 
Style … has only a vertical dimension, it plunges into the closed recollection of 
the person and achieves its opacity from a certain experience of matter; style is 
never anything but a metaphor, that is, equivalence of the author’s literary 
intention and carnal structure…159  
 
Barthes’ conception of style is part of a theoretical system in which the dramatisation 
of a struggle for domination is continually inter-penetrated and undercut with a 
certain narrative practice, and it is here that its legacy in reading Beckett is at its 
clearest. Here, subjectivity takes on multiple forms and functions, their singularity 
unexpectedly dissolving into the frame of the work. This is a subtle mode of writing 
which, refusing its own constitution as an object, is defined in its dynamic 
relationship with the body.  
 
‘I’m the tympanum’: Beckett's Rhythmed Subject 
 
‘My work is a matter of fundamental sounds (no joke intended) made as fully as 
possible, and I accept responsibility for nothing else.’ ‘I never write a work without 
first saying it out loud.’ ‘Drama is following music.’160 These are a few remarks 
made by Beckett who almost always refused to talk about the meaning and the 
background of his work. As they show, his works can be thought of as an attempt to 
become attuned (joking aside) to ‘fundamental sounds’. In fact, by recalling some of 
his works, we can come up with a variety of sounds, for instance, cruder noises of the 
body, the sound of breathing, the heart beating, constant buzzing in the skull, the 
                                                        
159 Barthes, Roland. A Barthes Reader, ed. Susan Sontag. New York: Hill and Wang, 2001, 
p.33. 
 
160 Dougald McMillan, Martha Fehsenfeld, Beckett in the Theatre, vol. 1. London: John 
Calder, 1998, pp. 15-16. See also Samuel Beckett, Disjecta, p. 109.  
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noise of rushing water in the mother’s womb, or the noise of the little finger as it 
glides over paper and the scrape pf the pencil following it, while silence, of course, is 
very significant in his works. These sounds might be what Beckett means by 
‘fundamental sounds’, though we are never sure. However, a question we are 
interested in asking here is not ‘What does Beckett mean by “fundamental sounds”?’, 
but ‘What does Beckett’s attempt to become attuned to “fundamental sounds” mean 
when we think of the nature of his writing and language?’ Perhaps we can think of 
this question in light of rhythm. His effort to become attuned to ‘fundamental sounds’ 
could be regarded as an attempt to become attuned to the secret of rhythm at the 
limits of language.  
The character in Beckett’s works very often appears as the subject who 
experiences the limit of language or rather who is the limit of language itself. We 
could say that the subject suffers from some kind of speaking disorder or experiences 
that failure of speech. In The Unnamable, one finds the subject whose speech is the 
gap between ‘the madness of having to speak and not being able to’. The subject ‘I’, 
who is obliged to speak of things that he cannot speak of, is the gap itself: 
 
I don’t feel a mouth on me, I don’t feel the jostle of words in my mouth, […] 
Words falling, you don’t know where, you don’t know whence, drops of silence 
through the silence, I don’t feel it, I don’t feel a mouth on me, nor a head, do I 
feel an ear, frankly now, do I feel an ear, well frankly now I don’t, so much the 
worse, I don’t feel an ear either, this is awful, make an effort, I must feel 
something, yes, I feel something, they say I feel something, I don’t know what it 
is, I don’t know what I feel, tell me what I feel and I’ll tell you who I am, they’ll 
tell me who I am, I won’t understand, but the thing will be said, they’ll have 
said who I am, and I’ll have heard, without an ear I’ll have heard, and I’ll have 
said it, without a mouth I’ll have said it, I’ll have said it inside me, then in the 
same breath outside me, perhaps that’s what I feel, an outside and an inside and 
me in the middle, perhaps that’s what I am, the thing that divides the world in 
two, on the one side the outside, on the other the inside, that can be as thin as 
foil, I’m neither one side nor the other, I’m in the middle, I’m the partition, I’ve 
two surfaces and no thickness, perhaps that’s what I feel, myself vibrating, I’m 
the tympanum, on the one hand the mind, on the other the world, I don’t belong 
to either [….] [T 382-83] 
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 The subject ‘I’ no longer feels a mouth or an ear. It no longer knows what it feels. It 
enters the space of exile where there are no words, no organs, no identity, no feeling, 
no thought. It loses itself in being interrupted and divided. But it speaks. Or it cannot 
stop speaking. It just goes on like a broken record player: ‘I don’t, […]’, ‘I feel, […]’, 
‘they’ll, […]’, ‘I won’t, […]’, ‘I’ll, […]’, ‘I’m, […]’. And in this very movement of 
fruitless, meaningless speech or in the failure of speech, ‘I’ senses itself as the 
vibrating tympanum: ‘I’m in the middle, I’m the partition, I’ve two surfaces and no 
thickness, perhaps that’s what I feel, myself vibrating, I’m the tympanum.’ In its 
erring at the edge of language, it paradoxically finds itself in losing itself. ‘I’ finds 
itself as the movement of oscillation between the inside and the outside, between the 
mind and the world, between speechlessness and uncontrollable, mad speech. The 
subject ‘I’ is the partition, the divide, the door which repeats opening and closing just 
like the mouth and the eye in Beckett’s other works. The word ‘tympanum’ (a 
membranous resonator in a sound-producing organ) goes back to a Greek word 
‘tympanum’ meaning ‘a drum’ or ‘a kettledrum’. This word is akin to the Greek verb 
‘typtein’ meaning ‘to beat’. This leads us to think the subject ‘I’, presented here as 
the ‘tympanum’, is the embodiment of rhythm itself (or what we might call 
‘arch-rhythm’). Here, rhythm can be considered as the vacillation between the 
appropriation of the subject and its disappropriation.  
One might think that the subject ‘I’ experiences what Lacoue-Labarthe calls ‘the 
émoi (which can be heard, with the third ear, as é-moi: the caesura of the subject)’ in 
‘L’Écho du sujet’. In the essay, arguing that rhythm is definable only on the basis of 
‘repetition (the spacing and the division in the Same, the repeated 
difference-from-itself of the Same)’161, he depicts rhythm as follows: 
                                                        
161 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘L’Écho de sujet’ in Le sujet de la philosophie (Typographies 
1). Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1979, p.285. ‘The Echo of the Subject’ in Typography, ed. 
Christopher Fynsk. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989, p.196. This essay, which 
focuses on Theodor Reik’s book The Haunting Melody, starts with a question concerning the 
connection between the autobiographical compulsion and music obsession. Later it shows 
that ‘la hantise du rythme [the obsession with rhythm]’ is precisely what connects the two.  
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 […] it should perhaps be recognised that rhythm is not only a musical category. 
Nor, simply, is it the figure. Rather, it would be something between beat and 
figure that never fails to designate mysteriously the ‘ethical’; for the word (and 
perhaps already the concept) already implies – at the very edge of what of the 
subject can appear, manifest, or figure itself – the type and the stamp or 
impression, the pre-inscription [le type et la frappe, la pré-inscrption] which, 
conforming us in advance, determines us by disappropriating us and makes us 
inaccessible to ourselves. A pre-inscription that sends us back to the chaos that 
obviously was not schematised by us so that we should appear as what we are. 
In this sense, perhaps, ‘every soul is a rhythm knot’. We (‘we’) are rhythmed.162  
 
‘L’émoi’ is the moment of rhythmic interruption, ‘the caesura of the subject’, which 
sends the subject back to the chaos and disappropriates it, disrupting the narcissistic 
assurance and immediate certitude. But at the same time, it is ‘the condition of 
possibility of the subject’. It is structural. It makes the subject possible. It is 
important to note that rhythm is described as ‘the type and the stamp or impression, 
the pre-inscription [le type et la frappe, la pré-inscrption]’ – the imprint – and that as 
such it is the repetition.163  
To return to the subject ‘I’ in The Unnamable, we might say that the vibrating 
subject which says ‘I’m the tympanum’ is this ‘rhythmed’ subject, the ‘rhythmed 
knot’. It only attains itself in being divided and torn asunder or in losing itself. It is 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
162 Ibid. p.292-3; trans., p.202.  
 
163 In Heraclitus Seminar, speaking of a lecture ‘Sprache als Rythmus’ [‘Language as 
Rhythm’] and a book Musik und Rythmus bei den Griechen by Thrasybulos Georgiades, 
Heidegger stresses that Georgiades understands rhythm not as ‘flow’ but as ‘imprint 
[Gepräge]’. According to Heidegger, Georgiades cites a verse of Archilochos, ‘Recognise 
which rhythm holds men’, and a passage from Aeschylus’ Prometheus where Prometheus 
says of himself, ‘…in this rhythm I am bound’. Heidegger writes, ‘He, who is held immobile 
in the iron chains of his confinement, is “rhythmed”, that is, joined [gefügt]’. Georgiades 
points out that humans do not make rhythm; rather for the Greeks, the measure is the 
substrate of language, namely the language that approaches us.’ (Maurice Blanchot, too, cites 
this line by Archilochoes and Prometheus when he speaks of rhythm in L’Écriture de 
désastre); Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, Heraklit. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1970, 
pp.91-2; Heraclitus Seminar, trans. Charles H. Seibert. Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1993, p.55. 
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the site of imprint. In fact, one of the significant motifs in The Unnamable involves a 
hidden imprinting device which seems to be at work in the subject ‘I’. The power of 
this device only appears as the power in the paradoxical moment of rhythmic 
interruption when the self becomes inaccessible to the self. Now let us see what kind 
of power is involved in this device:  
 
Not to be able to open my mouth without proclaiming them, and our fellowship, 
that’s what they imagine they’ll have me reduced to. It’s a poor trick that 
consists in ramming a set of words down your gullet on the principle that you 
can’t bring them up without being branded as belonging to their breed. But I’ll 
fix their gibberish for them. I never understood a word of it in any case – not a 
word of the stories it spews, like gobbets in a vomit. My inability to absorb, my 
genius for forgetting, are more than they reckoned with. Dear incomprehension, 
it’s thanks to you I’ll be myself, in the end. Nothing will remain of all the lies 
they have glutted me with. […] On their own ground, with their own arms, I'll 
scatter them, and their miscreated puppets. Perhaps I’ll find traces of myself by 
the same occasion [….], yes, they’ve inflicted the notion of time on me too [….] 
They loaded me down with their trappings and stoned me through the carnival. 
I’ll sham dead now, whom they couldn't bring to life, and my monster’s 
carapace will rot off me. But it’s entirely a matter of voices, no other metaphor 
is appropriate. They’ve blown me up with their voices, like a balloon, and even 
as I collapse it’s them I hear. Who, them? [T 324-5] 
 
Wandering at the edge of ‘their’ language, ‘I’ betrays the secret of the device, of a 
‘poor trick’ that makes the ‘I’ speak in ‘their’ language. It consists ‘in ramming a set 
of words down your gullet on the principle that you can’t bring them up without 
being branded as belonging to their breed’. This shows that the essential function of 
this device is ‘branding’ – ‘imprinting’. Whatever language ‘I’ speaks, whatever 
voice ‘I’ utters, it is always branded as ‘theirs’. It is only through this ‘branding’ or 
‘imprinting’ that ‘I’ becomes ‘I’. In other words, it is the power of branding, cutting, 
or even marking as a sinner (as the etymology of the word ‘brand’ indicates) that 
makes ‘I’ be in the world, that gives ‘I’ time, language, and meaning in the most 
fundamental sense.164 This device has a tremendous power which encloses and 
                                                        
164 The word ‘brand’ meant ‘torch’ and ‘sword’ in Middle English. The acts of burning and 
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entraps the subject within time, language, and meaning, without the subject noticing 
it. In the passage above, we sense a great resistance of ‘I’ to this imprinting device 
and hostility towards it: ‘I’ mumbles, ‘I’ll fix their gibberish for them’, ‘On their own 
ground, with their own arms, I’ll scatter them, and their miscreated puppets’. ‘Their’ 
power is revealed as this imprinting device, and although ‘I’ is well aware that it 
cannot escape from it, ‘I’ never ceases to escape from it. For ‘I’ needs to find the 
traces of its own voice which is not branded as ‘theirs’. Here ‘I’ appears as the 
subject that is always escaping from the confinement of ‘they’, from the invisible 
power of the imprinting device as such. Later in the text, ‘I’ utters, ‘I must go on. So 
I’ll go on. Air, air, I’ll seek air, air in time, the air of time, and in space, in my head, 
that’s how I’ll go on.’ Speaking, seeking a way out. 
 
 
‘The Space of a Door’: Living in Vacillation 
 
‘No, Mother, the motion alone is not enough, I must hear the feet, however faint they 
fall.’ In Footfalls, watching a woman with disheveled grey hair pacing to and fro on 
the stage, the audience hears this line through another woman’s coming from the 
dark upstage. Like this line, Beckett perhaps had to hear the feet, the steps, and the 
beat of his writing. He had to have an im-print, a trace or mark of the motion, and the 
rhythm that maintains his writing at the extreme edge of language. But it should be 
noted that this mark is at once the absence of mark (and the mark of absence.) It is an 
imprint which marks while effacing itself. This echoes what Maurice Blanchot says 
about writing: ‘And such is the responsibility of writing – writing which 
distinguishes itself by deleting from itself all distinguishing marks, which is to say 
                                                                                                                                                             
cutting are involved here. Interestingly, in one sense of the word, it refers to a mark put on 
criminals with a hot iron, which cab be easily linked to what has happened to ‘I’ in this 
passage. The word ‘brand’ is associated with such ideas as sin, disgrace, law, territory, 
ownership, manufacture, classification, death, etc.  
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perhaps, ultimately, by effacing itself (right away and at length: this takes all of time), 
for it seems to leave indelible of indiscernible traces. [Responsabilité d’une écriture 
qui se marquer en se démarquant, c’est-à-dire peut-être – à la limite – en s’effaçant 
(aussitôt comme à la longue – il faut tout le temps pour cela), dans la mesure où elle 
semble laisser des traces éternelles ou oisives.]’165 Beckett’s language finds itself in 
the space of rhythm which consists of the ambiguity of imprint [‘se marquer’/ ‘se 
démarquer’]. Especially in his later works, we see language detach itself from its 
function of carrying meaning (while, at the same time, keeping its own particular 
logic of signification), and open itself as a movement which marks in erasing itself: 
language becomes waves, folds, veils, mist, dust, whirlwind… Detachment from 
signification here does not suggest the undecidability of the signified or that 
Beckett’s words are vague or unclear. This detachment is the state of not being bound 
by the task of signifying something, or an engagement with the movement of 
language that exceeds signification. In other words, the detachment points to the 
duplicity of language: language exists inside the logic of signification and yet outside 
of it.  
In Beckett’s works, we can recall imprints that mark by disappearing: ‘On’ in 
his English text is one of them. The repetition of ‘on’ produces rhythm, which 
maintains the relation between the work and the reader at the place where there is no 
longer any development of story, pronoun stability, or character emotions. The 
Unnamable moves to the rhythm of ‘on’. ‘I’, the condemned speaker, says, ‘To go on, 
I still call that on, to go on and get on has been my only care, if not always in a 
straight line, at least in obedience to the figure assigned to me, there was never any 
room in my life for anything else.’ [T 320] The subject ‘I’, the work, the writer, the 
reader are not only inseparable from the rhythm of ‘on’ but also initially and 
essentially linked by it. ‘On’ is the relation itself. In Worstward Ho, the rhythm of 
‘on’ is repeated almost in a manner of chanting. The text ‘begins’: ‘On. Say on. Be 
                                                        
165 Maurice Blanchot, L’Ecriture du désastre. Paris: Gallimard, 1980, p.58; The Writing of the 
Disaster, trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986, p.34. 
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said on. Somehow on. Till nohow on. Said nohow on.’ [NO 89] And it ‘ends’: ‘Said 
nohow on.’ There are other works that are carried by the resonance of ‘on’. In 
Beckett’s works ‘on’ imprints itself both auditorily and visually. To our ears, ‘on’ 
resounds as familiar, a sound we have heard before. It might sound like the beating 
of our heart or the sound of breathing in and out. To our eyes, ‘on’ looks to be 
ceaselessly plodding and hopping on a white paper surface. Looking at ‘on’ as the 
mirror image of ‘no’, we could say that ‘on’ and ‘no’ are doubles or shadows of each 
other; the inseparable relation between the two bears resemblance to that of ‘pseudo 
couples’ like Vladimir and Estragon, Hamm and Clov, Winnie and Willie, Mercier 
and Camier. If we regard ‘on’ and ‘no’ as a footprint and negation, the French word 
‘pas’ immediately comes to mind. In fact the French title of Footfalls is ‘Pas’. This 
‘on’ or ‘pas’ is probably what Blanchot calls ‘le piétinement de ce qui n’avance 
jamais’ that he thinks The Unnamable makes us hear.166 We are frequently reminded 
by Beckett that ‘on’ indicates not being on the way anywhere but simply being ‘on 
the way’, being in the ‘between’, motion in motionless. Writing goes on and on 
toward somewhere infinitely distant, yet it stays at the same point. It never makes a 
progress, therefore it never arrives anywhere. The voice in Company says, ‘Having 
covered in your day some twenty-five thousand leagues or roughly thrice the girdle. 
And never once overstepped a radius of one from home.’ [WO 50] Or we could say 
that the rhythm in Beckett is what stops and interrupts the movement and at the same 
time keeps it going. Moreover, we can add that the letter ‘o’ of ‘on’ looks as if it were 
a hole made in the page – ‘Black hole agape on all. Inletting all. Outletting all.’ 
[Worstward Ho, WO 90] It looks like a sign, a trace of the unknown.  
We experience the imprint effacing itself in various other places. For example, 
the resonance of the phrases ‘More’ and ‘till in the end’ in Rockaby has this 
ambiguity of imprint. The play starts with a portrait of an old woman facing front on 
the stage, dressed in black evening gown with jet beads. She sits immobile in a 
rocking chair. The light starts with a spotlight on her face, and after a long pause 
                                                        
166 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Où maintenant? Qui maintenant?’ in Le livre à venir, p.290. 
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moves to the rocking chair. The woman utters an opening word, ‘More’. And the 
chair starts rocking mechanically without assistance from her, and the audience hears 
the recorded voice of this woman: 
 
till in the end 
the day came 
in the end came 
close of a long day 
when she said 
to herself 
whom else 
time she stopped 
time she stopped 
going to and fro 
all eyes 
all sides 
high and low 
for another 
another like herself 
another creature like herself 
a little like 
going to and fro 
all eyes 
all sides 
high and low 
for another 
till in the end 
close of a long day 
to herself 
whom else 
time she stopped 
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time she stopped 
going to and fro 
all eyes 
all sides 
high and low 
for another 
another living soul 
one other living soul 
going to and fro 
all eyes like herself 
all sides high and low 
for another 
another like herself 
a little like 
going to and fro 
till in the end 
close of a long day 
to herself 
whom else 
time she stopped 
going to and fro 
time she stopped 
time she stopped 
 
This is how the play begins. We get an impression that the swinging rhythm of the 
rocking chair, almost the rhythm of a cradle, brings the voice into existence and 
maintains it. The word ‘More’, uttered by the woman at the play’s start, is repeated 
four times, and the phrase ‘Till in the end’ (or ‘So in the end’) of the recorded voice 
is repeated regularly. This almost works as a frame that gives a structure not only to 
each section but also to the entire play. The sounds of ‘More’ and ‘Till in the end’ 
engrave themselves in our ears and stay with us, even making us anticipate their 
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return. Together with many other phrases, including ‘time she stopped’, ‘going to and 
fro’, ‘for another / another like herself’, these phrases haunt our ears by repeating 
their ‘come and go’ – by appearing in disappearing, marking in effacing. They have 
the force to carry us into the rhythm that they articulate. This rhythm is revealed as 
excess itself or lack itself, as hinted by the repetition of ‘More’ and that of ‘Till in the 
end’ deprived of a main clause167. There is no stability of a complete sentence and 
meaning here. Each phrase floats and vacillates to a precarious rhythm. A sentence 
can no longer close itself and is left half-open to absence. It is like the mouth of an 
old woman in Not I: the mouth suspended on the stage tells us the story of a ‘she’ 
who stands in a busy shopping centre motionless and staring into space with ‘mouth 
half open as usual’, and stands in court speechless and staring into space with ‘mouth 
half open as usual’. The half-open nature of a sentence also echoes the old eyelids 
that Malone speaks of which are ‘all red and worn that seem hard set to meet’ [T 
233]. To think of the temporality of the play, we could say that ‘More’ and ‘Till in the 
end’ mark or re-mark the absence of the present or the abysmal interval or gap 
between ‘no longer’ and ‘not yet’. The figure ‘she’ has slipped into this enigmatic 
interval of time where the beginning and the end are suspended. ‘She’ continued to 
wander outside looking for ‘another like herself’. ‘She’ continues to go to and fro ‘all 
eyes all sides high and low’. But this no longer ends, for the beginning has not yet 
come. Ironically it is this sense of the absence of temporal frame that gives a frame, 
This singular temporality is maintained by the rhythm produced by the repetition of 
‘More’ and ‘Till in the end’ and by the swinging rhythm of the chair which rocks by 
itself like a machine. A machine that is half-open to the outside, absence, death, 
madness. In brief, the singing movement of rocking chair, the repetition of stop and 
                                                        
167 In The Unnamable, we find the similar motif of a half-open sentence, that is, of forgetting 
an apodosis: ‘If only I could make an effort, an effort of attention, to try and discover what’s 
happening, what’s happening to me, what then, I don’t know, I’ve forgotten my apodosis, but 
I can’t, I don’t hear any more, I’m sleeping, they call that sleeping, there they are again, 
we’ll have to start killing them again, I hear this horrible noise, coming back takes time, 
[…]’ [T 402]. The word ‘apodosis’ is derived from the Greek word ‘apodosis’ which means 
‘return’, or ‘answering clause’. Its verb ‘apodidonai’ means ‘to give back, to deliver’. In the 
passage above, ‘I’ is no longer capable of returning, giving back, answering, which is to say, 
closing a sentence. A sentence is left half-open.  
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advancement, is a manifestation of the rhythm in Beckett’s work. This is where the 
ambiguity of imprinting (marking/effacing) is preserved.  
Another instance of language marking in erasing itself is Beckett’s use of ‘it’ in 
several English texts. The following fragment from Company depicts it well: 
 
In another dark or in the same another devising it all for company. This is at 
sight seems clear. But as the eye dwells it grows obscure. Indeed the longer the 
eye dwells the obscurer it grows. Till the eye closes and freed from pore the 
mind inquires, What does this mean? What finally does this mean that at first 
sight seemed clear? Till it the mind too closes as it were. As the window might 
close of a dark empty room. The single window giving on outer dark. Then 
nothing more. No. Unhappily no. Pangs of faint light and stirrings still. 
Unformulable gropings of the mind. Unstillable.  
 
‘It’ changes. ‘It’ turns. ‘It’ repeats. Almost like a wind, ‘it’ quickly grazes one sense 
and then another, or vacillates between different senses: ‘it all’, the proposition, the 
eye, the mind. ‘It’ is the change itself. We can never determine ‘it’ semantically, for 
‘it’ does not carry any meaning. But ‘it’ is there as a redoubling veil or disappearing 
sound. In its trembling and turning, ‘it’ obscures itself, ‘it’ turns itself away. All ‘it’ 
leaves to us is the confusion, the vacillation of the mind, ‘stirrings still’, 
‘soubresauts’. This is how ‘it’ inscribes itself on us in erasing itself, how ‘it’ leaves us 
an imprint. An imprint that is ‘unstillable’.  
 
* 
Let us go back, at this point, to the opening part of this chapter, to Beckett’s 
‘obligation to express’. If all his life Beckett has been obsessed with physical or 
‘narrative’ immobility, then his language never ceases to move: he watched over its 
movement in order to prevent its freezing and preserve its ‘unstillable’ vacillation 
between sense and non-sense. The rigor and strictness with which he directed his 
theatre works tell the best part of the story.  
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It is well-known that Beckett often expressed the need for great precision in the 
production of his own dramatic pieces. For example, when Beckett himself directed 
Endspiel in Berlin in 1967, he said to he actor who played Clov, ‘You should never 
run slowly, that’s very dangerous for the play.’168 In the case of the premiere 
production of Not I in 1972, according to his biographer Deirdre Bair, ‘Beckett 
instructed Schneider [the director] that he wanted Tandy [the actress who played 
Mouth] to be strapped against a backdrop so here would be no movement on stage 
except her mouth. He did not want the actress to move her head or hands, or to take 
any gesture that might possibly induce her to attempt to contribute something more 
to the part then he had indicated in the script.’169 Just by looking at some of the notes 
that Beckett added to his theatre pieces, we can sense the absolute necessity for the 
meticulous care he took for his work to be a work. For instance, about the actress’ 
costume in Rockaby, Beckett writes, ‘Black lacy high-necked evening gown. Long 
sleeves. Jet sequins to glitter when rocking. Incongruous frivolous headdress set 
askew with extravagant trimmings to catch light when rocking.’ About the seat in 
Come and Go, he says, ‘narrow benchlike seat, without back, just long enough to 
accommodate three figures almost touching. As little visible as possible. It should not 
be clear what they are sitting on.’ His note about the three-fold voice in That Time is 
extremely important for the work: ‘Moments of one and the same voice A B C relay 
one another without solution of continuity – apart from two 10’’ breaks. Yet the 
switch from one to another must be clearly perceptible.’ 
The rigor that we recognise in Beckett indicates vigilance. It is vigilance against 
danger – against the ‘neatness of identification’ or the oblivion of ‘betrayal’. Beckett 
watches over the movement of language to prevent its freezing and preserve the 
vacillation between sense and non-sense. In other words, he is vigilant against the 
hidden power of the imprint which entraps and encloses us, which makes us cling to 
                                                        
168 Enoch Brater, Why Beckett. London: Thames and Hudson, 1989, p.83. 
 
169 Deirdre Bair, Samuel Beckett: A Biography. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978, 
p. 625. 
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it without noticing it, whether the imprint is something that frightens and haunts our 
minds, or something that protects us from all sorts of enemies in life. At the same 
time, vigilance means vigilance over the danger. It is watching over and guarding the 
danger, that is, preserving the movement of danger itself – a secret. Preserving a 
secret as it is. Guarding the force of the centre in Quad, for example. For the 
movement of danger is there as a secret (indeed Beckett calls the centre a ‘danger 
zone’). In this sense, four players who shuffle their feet in a quadrate can be called 
‘four guardians’; this echoes the twelve men in Ill Seen Ill Said who guard the figure 
‘she’ as a secret by ‘letting her disappear’. Vigilance over the danger means keeping 
in mind that it is the danger that watches over us even prior to our watching over the 
danger. The danger watches over us, just like the floating eye, which belongs to 
nowhere, constantly watching over an old woman in Ill Seen Ill Said. ‘The ease of 
dying: such would be the danger watching over us [La facilité de mourir: tel serait le 
danger qui veille sur nous],’ writes Blanchot, suggesting how our vigilance is made 
possible by the vigilance of danger itself.170 This sentence itself requires us to 
experience it with the greatest vigilance possible. For when we face it, it becomes the 
extreme danger. ‘The ease of dying [la facilité de mourir]’ becomes danger, for the 
attraction of death makes one feel ‘wanting to die [l’envie de mourir]’ and we are apt 
to submit to its strong influence. Death attracts one to transgress the limit of life and 
reach for the beyond. The danger here involves the inattentiveness of the person who 
dies inadvertently, whether he or she dies or continues living with attention. But the 
rapidity of death making this inattentiveness possible is at the same time capable of 
preventing one from lingering on it. Hence ‘the danger that watches over us’. The 
danger watching over us, ‘the ease of dying’, can guard us. In other words, the 
vigilance of danger enables us to live with great familiarity and proximity with death 
without falling into a certain heaviness. The vigilance of danger gives us vigilance. It 
gives us vigilance over and against the danger.  
                                                        
170 Maurice Blanchot, ‘La facilité de mourir’ in L’Amitié. Paris: Gallimard, 1971, pp. 
183-185; ‘The Ease of Dying’ in Friendship, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997, pp. 160-162. 
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Imitating Maurice Blanchot who says ‘the danger that watches over us’, we 
could say that in Beckett’s works rhythm watches over us. The opening and closing 
of the eye, the swinging of the rocker, steps pacing to and fro, breathing in and out, 
the heart’s beating – all of these maintain our being. That is to say, rhythm sustain the 
subject at the extreme edge of its life. We recall that in Film the character played by 
Buster Keaton takes his pulse before ascending the stairs, after shutting and locking 
the door, and after ripping all the photographs of attention from his childhood. The 
pulse that he feels on these occasions could be thought of as the rhythm that keeps 
his life going. This is the vigilance of rhythm. Rhythm watches from the threshold of 
life and death.  
 
 
‘In this rhythm I am caught’: Encounters of Voice and Body 
 
While oscillation and vacillation are very important movements when we think of 
rhythm in Beckett’s work, the motif of enclosure found in a variety of places, 
especially in his later works, seems also essential. Very often the experience of 
rhythm takes place in a dark closed space such as a rotunda, a skull, or a closed room. 
For instance, in Malone Dies, the narrator Malone, who lies motionless on a bed in a 
closed room, waiting for the moment of his death, writes:  
 
A few lines to remind me that I too subsist. He has not come back. How long 
ago is it now? I don’t know. Long. And I? Indubitably going, that’s all that 
matters. Whence this assurance? Try and think. I can’t. Grandiose suffering. I 
am swelling. What if I should burst? The ceiling rises and falls, rises and falls, 
rhythmically, as when I was a foetus. Also to be mentioned a noise of rushing 
water, phenomenon mutatis mutandis perhaps analogous to that of the mirage, 
in the desert. The window. I shall not see it again. Why? Because, to my grief, I 
cannot turn my head. Leaden light again, thick, eddying, riddled with little 
tunnels through to brightness, perhaps I should say air, sucking air. All is ready. 
Except me. I am being given, if I may venture the expression, birth to into death, 
such is my impression. The feet are clear already, of the great cunt of existence. 
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Favorable presentation I trust. My head will be the last to die. Haul in your 
hands. I can’t. The render rent. My story ended I'll be living yet. Promising lag. 
That is the end of me. I shall say I no more. [T 182-83] 
 
Feeling rhythm and inscribing it reminds Malone of his subsistence, as if only 
rhythm could articulate his sense of living. Being enclosed in a room that expands 
and contracts repeatedly like a womb, Malone subsists like a dying foetus at the edge 
of his life. ‘I am being given, […], birth to into death,’ he writes. In this closed space 
and as this space – the womb/tomb where birth and death are reversed and folded 
together – rhythm pronounces itself. At the same time, rhythm binds Malone and 
captures him in an interval – the site of ‘the render rent [la déchirante déchirée]’. 
This is where all possibilities (including the possibility of dying, of grandiose 
suffering, of saying ‘I’, even the desert mirage) are put at stake, or ‘épuisées’ to 
borrow Gilles Deleuze’s word.171
Malone’s experience of rhythm as enclosure leads us to Blanchot’s lines on 
rhythm: 
  
‘Know what rhythm holds men.’ (Archilochus.) Rhythm or language. 
Prometheus: ‘In this rhythm I am caught.’ Changing configuration. What is 
rhythm? The danger of rhythm’s enigma.172  
 
That we should speak in order to make sense of rhythm – which is not sensible 
– perceptible and meaningful [pour fair sens du rythme et rendre sensible et 
significant le rythme hors sens]: such is the mystery which traverses us; we will 
not free ourselves from it by revering it as sacred.173
 
‘In this rhythm, I am caught.’ I am bound by rhythm, held by it, and seized in it. I am 
‘imprinted’. This is perhaps the ‘moment’ when the subject feels, ‘I’m the 
tympanum’. The ‘moment’ of rhythmic interruption which, at once, keeps everything 
                                                        
171 Gilles Deleuze, ‘L’Épuisé’ in Quad et autres pieces pout la télévision suivi de L’Épuisé 
par Gilles. Paris: Minuit, 1992, pp.55-106.  
 
172 Maurice Blanchot, L’Écriture du désastre, p.14; The Writing of the Disaster, p.5. 
 
173 Ibid., p.174; trans., p.113. 
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going. The ‘moment’ of appropriation and disappropriation of the subject in which 
the subject finds itself in losing itself. It is the moment of excess which does not 
permit speech. Only immobility speaks at this ‘moment’ of enclosure. Interestingly, 
as Blanchot suggests, the enigma of enclosure encloses us. It captures and traverses 
us by imposing on us the impossible task of speaking so that rhythm which is not 
sensible can be made sensible, ‘rendre sensible et significant le rythme hors sens’. 
Hence the infinite redoubling of enclosure. The mystery of rhythm from which we 
will not be delivered.174 This suffocating space in which the subject is hopelessly 
trapped is, again, reminiscent of Kristeva’s chora. Here the subject is flooded with 
sensations, which are necessarily subdued, nuanced, and composed within the music 
of the syntax of Beckett’s texts.   
In Footfalls, a play written in 1975, May treads a narrow strip on the stage as 
though on a phamtom treadmill, or like a sentry, guarding her pain, whilst the voice 
of her dead mother sounds in the auditorium – they alternate speeches, interspersed 
with some dialogue. From the theatrical cliché ‘treading the boards’, Beckett creates 
a chilling and moving dramatic image of an old age endlessly repeating her grief at 
the loss of a mother, stepping out the close, narrow limits of her maddened solitude. 
Beckett stresses in the stage directions that May’s steps must have ‘a clearly audible 
rhythmic tread’, and the ‘woman’s voice’, in her fourth sentence beats out the steps 
May makes, her voice ‘synchronous with the steps’ [CDW 399]. The distinction is 
blurred between May and the other voice. Beckett strictly avoids saying ‘her 
mother’s voice’: though May and V talk to each other as daughter and mother, in 
                                                        
174 In The Space of Literature, Maurice Blanchot describes the paradoxical site where the 
writer is at once excluded and enclosed by the work. It seems that this site exactly 
corresponds to the experience of ‘In this rhythm, I am caught’: ‘Every writer, every artist is 
acquainted with the moment at which he is cast out and apparently excluded by the work in 
progress. The work holds him off, the circle in which he no longer has access to himself has 
closed, yet he is enclosed therein because the work, unfinished, will not let him go. Strength 
does not fail him; this is not a moment of sterility or fatigue, unless, as may well be the case, 
fatigue itself is simply the form this exclusion takes. This ordeal is awesome. What the 
author sees is a cold immobility from which he cannot turn away, but near which he cannot 
linger. It is like an enclave, a preserve within space, airless without light, where a part of 
himself, and more than that, his truth, his solitary truth, suffocates in an incomprehensible 
separation.’ L’Espace littéraire, p.59; The Space of Literature, pp.53-54. 
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both of their long speeches they show themselves capable of mimicking such 
dialogue in monologue. Both May and mother may very well be each other’s 
fictions.  
The play’s language is gently lyrical with the rhythms of dying falls resolving 
into simple rhymes. It begins in a rhyming stride:  
 
M: Were you asleep? 
V: Deep asleep. [Pause.] I heard you in my deep sleep. [Pause.] There is no 
sleep so deep I would not hear you there.  
 
The extraordinary nature of the majority of the rhymes is their consonance with 
the title of the play, Footfalls: ‘It all’ which ends both sections, repeated eleven times 
in a five-page play; ‘nightfall’, ‘wall’, and the half-rhymes ‘till’, ‘still’, ‘tell’ and 
‘little’ are repeated so often as to make the sound the dominant one of the play, 
rhyming not only with the title but also on the word in the text: ‘I mean, Mother, that 
I must hear my feet, however faint they fall’ [CDW 401].  
All these points give a secondary sense to V’s speech: 
 
V: Will you never have done? [Pause.] Will you never have done…revolving it 
all? 
M: [Halting.] It? 
V: It all. [Pause.] In your poor mind. [Pause.] 
[M resumes pacing.] [CDW 402] 
 
‘It’s all in the mind’ sounds out through the phrasing, transforming the stage into 
May’s mind, having her rhyming tread and voice seem to echo off the walls of her 
skull. Fictionalising habits begin to sound like the self-soothing rituals of mad 
memory.  
As Beckett’s stage directions indicate, many of the footfall-rhymes occur during 
a halt in May’s pacing, or cause her to halt. The voice assumes the rhymes in the 
halts of the imagination. The auditor begins to feel and hear the strangest supposition: 
that the dominant sound in both heard voices is rhyming with the word that names 
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May’s physical action, the sound of her pacing. Stress-lines issue forth from the word 
that defines her pacing, translating bodily movement into the rhythms fabricated by 
phoneme repetition and full rhyme. May’s footfalls beat out a rhythm that both 
voices seem to follow (‘synchronous with the steps’) and also impose, through the 
mind’s translation of the body’s action (‘footfall, footfall …’, etc.), a rhyming pattern. 
The same air that had shuddered to the audible tread of May’s pacing beats with the 
returning stress-lines and stress-patterns of the sounds of that tread translated into 
voiced breath. The echo of the rhymes in the voice resounds in its pauses, whilst the 
voice itself rhymes clearest in the halts of the body: the voiced breath is at once 
echoing, remembering, and conserving the body’s rhythm. The footfalls have become 
pantings in the breath that in rhyming the heard noise and its rhythm into the ghostly 
externalities of the voice’s acoustics, gathers the stage and what is seen and heard 
into voice. The inner rhythm of May’s history takes up the body into staged mind, 
just as the body and its halts seem, inversely, to generate the voices and their pauses.  
This two-way, simultaneous rhyming transformation of voice-breath and the 
sound of the body on its way is deepened by the gathering of weight of the story the 
voices have to tell. The two voices re-enact the beginning of May’s habit when very 
young and, it is hinted, soon after her mother’s death. The pacing starts first within a 
church at nightfall, then within the room where she was born, this retreat strangely 
confusing her own life with her mother’s taken away. This doubling is emphasised 
further in the subsequent strange and dislocated story May tells of Mrs. Winter and 
her daughter, an argument at the table where the mother swears she heard Amy 
respond ‘Amen’ in the church when the daughter was not there. The tale is a close, 
internal inversion of the present state of May’s mind, the grey ghostly semblance in 
the church (that could either be mother or daughter), the imagined voice on the stage 
twisted into the mother’s mishearing of Amy’s response. May’s habit seems to be 
reproducing her own actions soon before and after her mother’s death – she had 
tended for her dying mother for years, and then her grave (the church). She seems to 
be adopting the rhythm of her mother’s illness from the rhymes upon the pacings of 
 145
her own past service and mourning at her mother’s bed- and grave-side.175 Though 
we are looking at the stage inhabited and generated by the fictional procedures of 
May and/or mother, the stage is transformed by the intensity of story and rhyme into 
the physical, external arena for May’s grief, wasted and possessed, shuffling pain. 
The rhymes that bring ‘It all’ and her footfalls together as echoes of each other spell 
out in the air of the auditorium the conceptual rhyme between the rhythm of 
tormented remembering and the habits of the body, a rhyme as much a cause as a 
symptom of the stage of mind we see. What had seemed the mere performative of 
narrative, dramatic power is heard anew as the true painful fabrications of displaced 
memory and its rituals.  
How the title-rhymes deepen and are deepened by the substance of the voice’s 
story is strengthened by the confirmation of Beckett’s French version Pas, where the 
dominant sound is also created by rhymes on the title, an extraordinary translating 
achievement. The ‘It all’ section from Footfalls runs in the French: 
 
V: N’auras-tu jamais fini de ressasser tout ça? 
M s’immobilise de face G. 
M: Ca? 
V: Tout ça. [Un temps.] Dans ta pauvre tête. [Un temps.] Tout ça. [Un temps.] 
Tout ça. 
[Un temps. M repart.] 
 
The rest of the text is similarly preoccupied with the ‘pas’ assonance: ‘déja’ and 
‘jadis’ are repeated, the preposition ‘à’ after ‘jouer’ and ‘se mit’ is emphasised by 
pause-breaks. There are three extended sections of involved and gravely comic 
repetitions in the dialogues, one of ‘pas là’, the other two almost ludicrously 
alternating ‘ça’ and ‘commença’ and ‘suffit pas’ and ‘pas’. ‘Pas’ is heard discretely 
within phrases such as ‘Cette impassibilité apparente!’ and ‘pauvre bras’.  
                                                        
175 ‘It is the revolving, the incessant reliving of a traumatic experience which clearly is the 
foundation of the insistent pattern of seven steps, turnabout, seven steps, turnabout, seven 
steps’. See Martin Esslin, ‘A Theatre of Stasis: Beckett’s Later Plays’, in Patrick McCarthy 
ed., Critical Essays on Samuel Beckett, Boston: Hall, 1986, pp.192-198.  
 
 146
What the French confirms is the necessity of reading and seeing Pas as bringing 
simultaneously before the mind’s eye and the physical eye the suddenness of contacts 
recognised. The rhymes bring voice and body together. This dislocated, revolving 
pain of being possessed by a voice, at once May’s own become her mother’s and her 
mother’s heard, comes into contact with May’s body. The body halts and revolutions 
and ghostly look may be a haunting of the mind, or created by its words; none the 
less they are physically there on stage. The rhymes bring all four into complicated 
contact. May’s memory inhabits and is inhabited by the mechanics of stage directions. 
The ‘pas’ and ‘footfall’ rhymes identify the voice of the past with the movements of 
the present. They bring them together. The body is at once a manifestation of the 
accent and rhythm of the voice of memory, and the creator of it. The mother’s 
presence is recalled out of the dark by May’s while being, action, and voice. This is 
brought into rhyming contact with the other need, to hear the feet fall however faintly; 
in other words to hear herself alive.176  
These meetings of memory, voice, and body change the stage into space of deep 
rhyme and rhythm. The space May paces out, the footfalls that sound in the air and in 
the words fashion a habitation, a manner of habitual life out of the internal shudders, 
torments and revolutions of the imagination’s struggle with itself. That habitation, 
though it brings no comfort, brings May’s mind into intimate rhyming touch with her 
past and her flesh. A remembered life is discovered, made out of madness, itself 
fashioned out of pure theatre. 
The ‘footfall’ and ‘pas’-rhymes then, echo in the audience’s auditory memory, 
rhyming with the audible tread of the actress’s pacing. Beckett brings this 
voice-sound link into rhyming relation with May’s own consciousness of the 
mysterious but necessary identity between the voice of memory and her body and life 
in the present. The ‘pas’-rhymes in Beckett work, from Mercier and Camier onwards, 
                                                        
176 May soothes herself with these multiple recognitions and rhythmical procedures. Beckett 
told David Warrilow to treat Ohio Impromptu ‘like a bedtime story and let it be soothing.’ 
[Jonathan Kalb, Beckett in Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 
p.223]. 
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force into rough unity the feelings of isolation and detachment of a prisoner (where 
the single fictionalising mind is ghosted of all real relation with the past) and of 
essential human continuity (the mind in remembering step with its body and the body 
of all past human selves). By so doing they succeed in crossing the aspects of the self 
in precisely the manner which Krapp most earnestly desires. As Rosette Lamont put 
it, the two voices in La Dernière bande trace a ‘double mouvement’ in the air: 
‘course vers un but intellectuel, encore éloigné, de celui qui fut par rapport à celui 
qui écoute, retour de celui qui est vers celui qui semble être, sa presence rendue 
vivante, presque tangible par la bande.’ What the elder Krapp seeks is ‘un point de 
rencontre dans l’entrecroisement des deux mouvements, course vers l’avenir, recour 
au passé, ou aux passés. Il se retrouvera dans l’adieu à l’amour, épisode auquel 
l’intelligence n’a pas de part’ [‘Krapp, un anti-Proust’, 347-348]. Krapp finds a 
release, a real ‘point de rencontre’ in a powerful nostalgia for what his intelligence 
had detached his fictional self from, just as May’s selves discover their 
‘entrecroisement’ when the ‘pas’-rhymes identify her urge to hear herself alive not as 
mere theatricalised performative but as the dislocated, narrative voice of memory. 
The habits of failure rediscover the roots of feeling that had been abandoned in the 
initial decision to create an abstract drama. Acts of memory in the terrible 
predicament of Krapp and May attempt to counter the ravages of loss by replaying 
and retreading the moment of abandonment.  
These last sections have sought to establish Beckett’s rhymes as signals or 
creators of memory-encounters in the prose and drama that marry traces of emotion 
with the purely abstract and fictionalised words and contexts that seem to belie them. 
The move from a linguistic encounter, between two languages as between 
rhyme-fellows, to a meeting of selves, minds, and the life of other bodies is actuated 
by a pause in the imagination that concedes and allows for the persistence of a 
double consciousness and its two-way echoes. In All Strange Away, the narrator, by 
virtue of his tiny concessions to Emmo’s and Emma’s emotional life, allows into his 
text the sighing breath of an intimacy and its rhyming life:  
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no sound, well say a sound too faint for mortal ear [22]  
 
Memories of past felicity no save one with faint ripple of sorrow of a lying side 
by side [37]  
 
no sound and so exhaled only for the moment with faint sound, Fancy dead, to 
which now add for old mind's sake sorrow vented in simple sighing sound black 
vowel a [43]  
 
no other sounds than these and never were that is than sop to mind faint sighing 
sound for tremor of sorrow at faint memory of a lying side by side and fancy 
murmured dead. [43-4]  
 
The narrator’s voice, in these tiny concessions, shifts into rhyming mode. He allows 
an affecting memory to ripple through his detached prose (the detached tones of a 
narrative technician, arranging his fictional characters), a memory registered in the 
ranked s sounds. The faint ripple of the stress-line along ai and s culminates on ‘side 
by side’, the prose rhyme recall of ‘simple sighing sound’ and ‘sorrow’ preparing for 
and initiating a sorrowful, sighing accent on the very words ‘side by side’, 
discovering the emotional connotations of the summative key phrase.  
The ‘faint memory’, the one memory of past felicity the voice lets slip by, 
inhabits his voice with all the emotional history implicit in Emma’s and Emmo’s 
pose and retrospectively alters his technical narrative voice into one that desires to 
imagine love and its memories. The stress-lane build-up, the manner in which it 
emotionally accentuates ‘side by side’, releasing connotations of remembered 
affections, mimes the narrator's failure to differentiate himself from the real 
urgencies of momentary sops to mind, faint memories fitfully imagined. The shift 
from the acoustic to the semantic rhyme may be a mere matter of imagination, but 
Beckett, by dramatizing the voices imagining the imagination of it, like Malone 
dreaming of dreaming, like May hearing her mother hear her and her footfalls 
together, shows how crucial such mere matter is in rediscovering the gentle 
suddenness of felt memory when all has been abandoned.  
The voice may, only for the moment, for old mind’s sake, pause then touch and 
meet its own humanity and externalised memory. But the emotional power of the 
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rhyme-accents bears witness to the importance of these memory-encounters and the 
way they alter the detached perspectives of the whole text within which they occur. 
The rhymes cross ‘the simple feeling and its voice’ with the self-accompaniment of 
the foreign tongue of the stranger, the other, the body on its way to create bonds of 
feeling that last long enough to sound like memory felt and recognised.   
 
 
Beckett’s Pendulum 
 
So far I have tried to show that each of Beckett’s works, the later ones in particular, 
exists as a rhythmic whole. But it should be noted, after I have analysed a number of 
his later works at their textual, syntactical, visual, and audio-phonetic levels, that the 
rhythm in Beckett does not appear in the world in the same manner as a thing, like a 
pen, a stone, or a tree. In Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation, Deleuze holds that 
rhythm is the vital force which cannot be reduced to the level of seeing or hearing. 
Rhythm is the force by virtue of which an original unity of multiple senses appears, 
for example, in the paintings of Francis Bacon:  
 
Between a colour, a taste, a touch, a smell, a sound, a weight, there should be an 
existential communication that constitutes the ‘pathic’ (nonrepresentative) 
moment of the sensation […] It is therefore the painter’s task to make one see 
[faire voir] a kind of original unity of the senses and to cause a multisensible 
Figure to appear visually. But this operation is possible only if the sensation of 
any particular domain (here the visual sensation) is directly plugged into a vital 
force [directement en prise sur une puissance vitale] that exceeds all domains 
and traverses them. This power [puissance] is Rhythm, which is more profound 
than vision, hearing, etc. And rhythm appears as music when it invests the 
auditory level, as painting when it invests the visual level […] It is 
diastolic-systolic: the world that catches me by closing itself down on me, the 
self that opens itself to the world, and opens up the world itself [le monde qui 
me prend moi-même en se fermant sur moi, le moi qui s’ouvre au monde, et 
l’ouvre lui-même.]177
                                                        
177 The translation here is based on Peggy Kamuf’s translation of the same passage in The 
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 Developing his argument with Deleuze’s understanding of rhythm, Nancy says, 
‘rhythm does not appear; it is the beat of appearing [le battement de l’apparaître] 
insofar as appearing consists simultaneously and indissociably in the movement of 
coming and going of forms or presence in general.’178 So the rhythm itself, ‘la 
puissance vitale’, would be considered as the condition of the opening and at once 
closing of ‘there is’, ‘il y a’, as the condition for the possibility of a form’s initial 
appearance. This nature of rhythm might be precisely what Beckett is concerned with 
in his writing. Especially, the movement of opening and closing of eyes and mouths 
that recurs in his work seems to be essentially related to this secret nature of rhythm. 
In Fizzles, for example, Beckett writes, ‘Quite still then all this time eyes open when 
discovered then closed then opened and closed again no other movement any kind 
though of course not still at all when suddenly or so it looks this movement 
impossible to follow let alone describe’ [CSP 223]. The movement of opening and 
closing is here described as something that is ‘impossible to follow let alone 
describe’. Perhaps it is as this kind of enigmatic movement, which eludes our 
capacity to see and describe, that the secret of rhythm reveals itself, that its ‘beat of 
appearing’ reaches our subconscious, if it does. 
Beckett can be considered an artist who attempts to attune himself to the secret 
of rhythm and expose it or let it appear in the space outside signification. In this 
respect, the short play, Not I, in which the mouth appears as the repetition of opening 
and closing, becomes significant. The play ‘begins’ with unintelligible words heard 
in a darkening enclosed space. The audience hears unintelligible words coming from 
behind the curtain as house lights fade to black. For ten seconds, the unintelligible 
voice continues, and as the curtains rises, the opening of the Mouth is revealed on 
stage. It looks as if the ‘unfathomable abyss’ were unveiled, or a wound were 
                                                                                                                                                             
Muses, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, p.23. Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: 
Logique de la sensation, vol. 1. Paris: Editions de la difference, 1981, p.31. 
  
178 Jean-Luc Nancy, Les Muses. Paris: Galilée, 1994, p.46; The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, p.24. 
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uncovered. Then for the next fifteen minutes, the audience witnesses the rapid 
outpouring of words from the Mouth to the Auditor. The intensity of language 
gradually accumulates until this moment of outpouring strikes the audience. Words 
are experienced not so much as the carriers of meaning but as a force itself, a force 
that could expose the fictionality of identity and the precariousness of meaning. 
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IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three different approaches to the question of subjectivity can be identified in 
different periods of Beckett’s creative life. I will show this by citing one example 
from each of these periods: 
 
The sun shone, having no alternative, on the nothing new. Murphy sat out of 
it, as though he were free, in a mew in West Brompton. […] He sat naked in 
his rocking-chair of undressed teak, guaranteed not to crack, warp, shrink, 
corrode, or creak at night. It was his own, it never left him. The corner in 
which he sat was curtained off from the sun, the poor old sun in the virgin 
again for the billionth time. [Murphy, 1938; M 5] 
 
A speaking subject is still discernible in this passage. He remains omnipotent over 
the subject of his narrative.  
 
…all I say will be false and to begin with not said by me, here I’m a mere 
ventriloquist’s dummy, I feel nothing, say nothing, he holds me in his arms 
and moves my lips with a string, with a fish-hook… [Texts for Nothing, 1955; 
CSP 133] 
 
Here, the speaking subject shows signs of a breakdown. It loses itself as it’s torn 
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between the self and the Other. In the end we have no idea who is speaking to us – all 
we sense is an oscillation between speechlessness and uncontrollable, mad speech.  
 
Say a body. Where none. No mind. Where none. That at least. A place. Where 
none. For the body. To be in. Move in. Out of. Back into. No. No out. No 
back. Only in. Stay in. On in. Still.  
 
All of old. Nothing else ever. Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. 
Fail again. Fail better. [Worstward Ho, 1983; NO 89] 
 
I was taken aback when I first read this passage back in the winter of 2002. This is no 
doubt one of the most hermetic of Beckett’s texts. The work is marked by an extreme 
degree of ellipsis, so much so that in the end, we ‘don’t know who is speaking any 
more. The subject disappears completely.’ That, according to Beckett himself, is ‘the 
end result of the identity crisis’ that the protagonists of previous works have 
encountered.  
I found the text unapproachable; and yet as I read the passage, I felt a strong 
grip on my mind. I was left speechless at the rapid overflow of words whose energy 
overwhelmed me. Calming down, I asked the following questions: Is a stable 
subjective position possible in late Beckett? How does the disturbing power of 
Beckett’s language relate to the theme of subjective positioning? If that disturbing 
power point to an aesthetic in the late texts as a whole, how are we going to situate 
this aesthetic within Beckett’s development as a writer? 
Then I sought to give answers to these questions by examining Beckett’s late 
work in the following four areas:  
 
[1] ‘He Shall Not … You Shall Not’: First-person Absence and the Histrionics 
of Pronouns  
 
[2] ‘Stock Still Staring Out’: Temporal-Spatial Dimensions of Performance 
 
[3] ‘Texts for Nothing/Textes pour rien’: Textualizing Abjection, Abjecting 
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Textuality 
 
[4] ‘To and Fro in Shadow’: Repetition, Maternal Space, and the Rhythmic 
Chora  
 
 
Beckett’s work started where language shows itself as less stable. His first entry 
point is in the deictic referential capabilities of pronouns and the first-person pronoun 
in particular. Having said that, I recall a joke that I read a couple of weeks ago, in 
which a woman pulls at her boyfriend’s sleeves and in an imploring tone says: ‘Say 
you love me, say you love me!’ The man, apparently a little bit impatient, replies 
without even looking at her: ‘Okay okay, you love me.’ The humorous confusion in 
the joke points out the instability of pronominal deictic markers, which function in a 
way that is radically different from the usual nominals. While a common noun refers 
to a fixed or objective notion, there is usually no definable object that a pronoun can 
refer to in identical fashion. What ‘I’ signifies, for instance, is the person uttering the 
present instance of the discourse containing ‘I’; and contrary to common nouns, it no 
longer refers to a previously existing subjective substance, but rather to its own 
saying, becoming itself the ‘referent’ that it is supposed to signify. The instability of 
pronominal deictic markers is the first site where the Beckettian protagonist 
experienced the failure of language.  
As a result, the protagonist of The Unnamable rumbles, ‘it’s the fault of the 
pronouns, there is no name for me, no pronoun for me, all the trouble comes from 
that…’ [T 372]. He takes issue with the pronoun ‘I’ and ends up getting entangled in 
the indeterminacy between the ‘I’ of enunciation and the ‘I’ of statement. 
Consequently the work ends in an aporetics of the ‘I’, lost in hesitation, indecision, 
capriciousness, agitation, oscillation, vertigo, as well as the inability to speak or act. 
Such aporetics creates a space that maintains the latent state of a being not yet fixed 
to the ‘I’.  
This, of course, is a state that points to nowhere. Up to now, the Beckettian 
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subject is no more than a modern Sisyphus who keeps rolling the linguistic stone of 
indecision to no avail. There is no solution to the ‘I’ as a possible or impossible site 
of subjective positioning. After The Unnamable, the plight went on until Beckett 
finished the piece titled Company. Opening with an injunction to ‘imagine’ a voice 
coming to ‘one in the dark’, Company immediately plunges us into an alternation 
between the third-person commentaries directed at the reader, and second-person 
descriptions of journeys into the past directed at the listener.  
 
A voice comes to one in the dark. Imagine.  
 
To one on his back in the dark. This he can tell by the pressure on his hind 
parts and by how the dark changes when he shuts his eyes and again when he 
opens them again. [...] 
 
Use of the second person marks the voice. That of the third that cankerous 
other. Could he speak to and of whom the voice speaks there would be a first. 
But he cannot. He shall not. You cannot. You shall not.  
 
Apart from the voice and the faint sound of his breath there is no sound. None 
at least that he can hear. This he can tell by the faint sound of his breath. [NO 
3-4] 
 
This work can be seen as a pronominal action through which the self is identified as 
‘I’. Through an interplay of pronominal referents, the tropology of the subject 
develops according to dialogic principles. The narrative articulation of the partial 
images of self shows a temporal dynamism which eventually leads to the 
unrepresentable trace of one, but plural, subject. We are shown the temporal 
movement through which the ‘self’ acquires a sense of totality, thanks to these 
dialogic reformulations of self-images. The suspended referentiality of Company 
actually reproduces a process of identification, by refusing to name a subject. This is 
a transition from the self of denial to the self of performance.  
As I said, Beckett usually started where language shows itself as less stable. 
Similarly, his theatre concerns itself with the question of how subjective positioning 
is possible in relation to time and space, two of the less stable coordinates on which 
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traditional theatre has been stabilized.  
While the theatre is generally considered to be a privileged space of presence, of 
the ‘here and now’, Beckett’s plays have always seemed to be directed towards 
absence. From the moment when Victor Krapp turns his back on the audience, 
through Godot’s non-arrival, through the unprovided conclusions of Endgame, 
Happy Days, and Play, Beckett’s theatre has always pointed towards absence, 
towards gaping holes in the dramatic performance.  
In the late plays, however, the nature of that absence changes. This change is 
largely due to Beckett’s change in his conception of time and space within the theatre. 
It could be said that, in the plays from Godot (1953–1955) to Breath (1969), dramatic 
time-space equals performance time-space. All that we can be sure of in the lives of 
Beckett’s characters is what we see in front of us in performance. Similar to the 
narratives of the same period, the characters do not find their selfhood in a coherent 
past or in a planned-out future: they exist only as they act. Now we are reminded of 
the Unnamable. In the later plays, however, even that certainty of the present has 
gone. As we watch his plays, the dramatic time-space, the coherent, organized 
sequence of thoughts, actions, and events that are expected to provide the basic 
structure of the self in conventional drama or even in his earlier drama – none of 
these can be finally determined in his late theatre. Because of this, we encounter 
characters whose subjectivity can never be fully incarnated, since their place in the 
actions and the words of the play can never be grasped. As Beckett told Billie 
Whitelaw, the character May in Footfalls is ‘not all there’. The comment applies to 
all the characters in the later works. The subjectivity of these characters is 
disturbingly evanescent, performed in fragments of action that have no clear 
temporal or spatial connection with each other. These late plays are still directed 
towards absence, though that absence is more disturbingly there through the interplay 
between an (half)empty stage and ‘vast tracts of time’ evoked offstage, between the 
perceptual and conceptual when other times and places are contrasted with the 
visceral power of the stage present. 
In light of this, we could argue that much Beckett’s late theatre is a theatre of 
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border-crossing. It goes across individual borders of identity and shifts between the 
space-time perspective of the actor and that of the spectator. His plays seem to imply 
a recognition of identity as a series of masks, as the representation of ‘self’ becomes 
the reproduction of interchangeable images of existence. Through the juxtaposition 
of scenic and textual forms, spaces, and times, there is a constant evolution in the 
perception of what is being represented. The conventionally stable categories of time 
and space, past and present, external and internal, absence and presence, are 
undermined.  
Chapter 3 takes a more holistic approach to Beckett’s work as a whole. 
Throughout his life, Beckett has associated literary production with a weary disgust 
like the disgust that his characters show for sex and reproduction. He only agreed to 
include most of his works in the corpus under the sign of bodily expulsion. He made 
a number of remarks which distinguish relatively clearly between a primary and 
secondary body of work. He claimed that ‘I wrote all my work very fast – between 
1946 and 1950’, that The Unnamable represented a terminus in the creative process, 
and that the Texts for Nothing constituted ‘an attempt to get out of the attitude of 
disintegration, but it failed’. On the other hand, the Precipitates which accompany 
‘Echo’s Bones’, the six Residua, and the Foirades all evoke cast-off bodily material, 
as does the later collection edited by Ruby Cohn, Disjecta. All these labels imply a 
kind of attachment to the main body of work as ‘improper’ texts in terms of bodily 
expulsion.  
Beckett sections off the later works are ‘residual’ in such a way as to fragment 
the ‘whole’ body from which they are excluded. From here arises the question: if the 
main body is not a whole, the fragment that excluded from it cannot properly be 
described as a fragment, since fragmentation necessarily implies a defining plenitude. 
The threat of disintegration are indicative of those disturbances and 
dysfunctionalities of human physicality, which Julia Kristeva identified as abjection.  
Kristeva defines abjection as the movement by which the body and psyche 
dispute part of itself in its fear of non-separation from the mother. This is because the 
body must, in Kristevan terms, be ‘what the French call propre’ – both clean and 
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one’s own. Horror arises when the borders between subject and object collapse, when 
the edges break down and the body’s contents flow out, threatening repulsive 
engulfment.  
Beckett’s bilingualism also poses a threat to conventional notions of what 
constitutes a proper body of work. It has for some time been realized that Beckett’s 
work inscribes a deeply felt instability within traditional ideas of ‘original’ work and 
‘translation’. Quite often, Beckett wrote the work in one language, started translation 
of it in another language, and then go back to revise the original in light of the 
translation. Here, the reversal of conventionally opposed values is the same as that in 
abjection. It subverts the common logical belief that source text must precede 
translation, that translation must be drawn from original’s preexisting essence.  
In this light, the status of the two texts becomes problematic. One text cannot 
simply be said to be a ‘version’ of its counterpart in the other language. It should be 
seen to be a ‘version’ or product of something else. In other words, the contingency 
of the two texts’ composition produces an unexplained agency in which they are 
complicated, but which they do not contain. Like Beckett’s characters’ preoccupation 
with bodily residues, his retroactive writing process is marked by frequent recourse 
to its own previously discarded drafts, its abject material. In this manner, the 
self-contained units of ‘original’ and ‘translation’ fracture into two parallel, 
simultaneous, unstable, mutually dependent bodies of work. The text is subject to 
abjection’s spasmodic constitution and dissolution, calling into question its unitary 
identity. Since no reference to Beckett can be considered as a whole reference, 
always invoking the ‘other’ text, Beckett’s corpus derives an unsuspected autonomy 
and plenitude precisely from its failure to achieve wholeness, the ironically 
celebrated failure of abjection.  
The thesis closes with a final chapter on the return to the maternal space. It 
concentrates on the interactions amongst the rhythmic repetition of Beckett texts, its 
evocation of the Kristevan chora, as well as the underlying death drive. As I have 
said, the Beckettian protagonist lives at the limit of language, or he is the limit of 
language himself. He lives where language fails, and the failure sends him into an 
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oscillation, into a rhythm that we can call aporia, or following Gilles Deleuze, 
‘repetition’. This rhythm at the limit of language is shown in the prose work as the 
oscillation between assertion and denial, validation and invalidation, and in theatre as 
heartbeat, breathing, the swinging of a rocking chair as in Rockaby, the sounds of 
steps as in Footfalls, going to and fro as in Come and go, the opening of mouths and 
eyes as in That Time and Not I… As a result, each work of Beckett’s exists as a 
pulsing, a succession of beats, or as a rhythmic, disruptive site at the edge of 
language. 
Going one step further to a sub-linguistic level, we could situate this rhythmic, 
disruptive site at limit of the Lacanian Symbolic realm, where the disruptive, 
digressing Semiotic, forever lurking, can break in any time and disrupt the more 
orderly process of Symbolic signification. Now discrete quantities of energy move 
through the body of the subject, enveloping him in a heaving syrup of the 
unsignifiable that expands and contracts repeatedly like a womb. The subject subsists 
like a dying foetus at the edge of his life, who is ‘being given, […], birth into death,’ 
to borrow Malone’s words. In this closed space and as this space – the womb/tomb 
where birth and death are reversed and folded together -- the failure of language 
pronounces itself as a closure where all possibilities (including the possibility of 
dying, of suffering, of saying ‘I’) are put at stake. The subject is hence at once 
protected and threatened by this closure.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, Samuel Beckett’s late aesthetics of subjectivation is first of all an 
aesthetic of the experience of language and its relation to subjective positioning. 
With this vain conclusion in mind I flipped through Beckett’s early critical essay, and 
was immediately put on alert by three statements that he made back in the 1920s, 
1930s and 1940s. The first is from the probably most-quoted passage of the entire 
Beckett oeuvre, that ‘expression’ manifesto in his ‘Three Dialogues’ with Georges 
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Duthuit when he talked about:  
 
The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, 
nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, 
together with the obligation to express. [PTD 103] 
 
The second statement is found in Beckett’s remarks on James Joyce’s Finnegans 
Wake back in 1929:  
 
Here form is content, content is form. You complain that this stuff is not 
written in English. It is not written at all. It is not to be read – or rather it is 
not only to be read. It is to be looked at and listened to. His writing is not 
about something; it is that something itself. [D 27]  
 
If, as in the first statement, an expression is obligatory while being agentless, 
sourceless, and contentless, then the act of expression becomes the sole truth of that 
expression itself. I see this as a precocious piece of criticism, for Beckett apparently 
considered that to be what he thought good art is about and yet it was not until his 
later years that he managed to produce artworks like that.  
A brief look at his late works reveals that nothing remains of Beckett’s language. 
Nothing substantial, nothing even meaningful. Nevertheless ‘something’ that is in the 
movement of language affects us. We read, see, and listen to Beckett’s work, as if 
through some unknown parts of our body, we sense that we see almost invisible 
changes of light and dark and hear distant cries and murmurs. While not at all certain 
what we perceive, we feel that in Beckett’s language ‘something’ vacillates like ‘a 
door that opens and shuts’ as in one of his early poems: 
 
My peace is there in the receding mist 
when I may cease from treading these long shifting thresholds 
and live the space of a door 
that opens and shuts [CP 59] 
 
The Beckettian subject longs for a discrete moment when he can finally coincide 
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with himself, arrive at himself completely by way of this door, and reach the close of 
his restless journey. But the image of the door also suggests his wish to maintain the 
essential ambiguity of language. This has been my particular concern throughout the 
thesis. We might be tempted to name the ‘something’ that vacillates in his language 
the void (or silence or death), and then say simply that Beckett is a writer who 
struggled to write about the void and was trapped in it. However the moment we 
name that ‘something’ the void, the silence, or even death, it eludes us completely. It 
slips away. It resists being named, grasped, or determined. It is the unnamable. 
Perhaps all we can do in reading late Beckett is try to retrace some of the marks that 
the movement of language has left on the text or on us, in us, or again turn our 
attention towards an indecisive stirring of language. 
In light of this, the latter statement about the conflation of form and content 
becomes significant for our understanding of Beckett’s late works, for in that way, 
nothing remains of Beckett’s work except the act of reading/writing/speaking. 
Nothing remains, that is, except the experience of language. His late work is not 
about any subject or spoken by any subject, it is that subject himself. This is 
significant because in many cases, while language in Beckett has remained the object 
of discussion within various philosophical and theoretical frameworks, an 
understanding of the experience of language from within, or how that experience is 
related to subjective positioning, has not been deepened; and it is essentially around 
this question that my thesis has evolved.  
The third statement is found in Beckett’s treatise on Marcel Proust when he says: 
 
… the identification with Albertine is retrospective […] and proceeds to her 
acquaintance by a series of subtractions. […] Thus is established the pictorial 
multiplicity of Albertine that will duly evolve into a plastic and moral 
multiplicity, no longer a mere shifting superficies and an effect of the 
observer’s angle rather than the expression of an inward and active variety, 
but a multiplicity in depth, a turmoil of objective and immanent 
contradictions over which the subject has no control. [PTD 31-32] 
 
We can see that it was not until his later years that Beckett has fully achieved the 
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results which he praised in Proust. If subjectivity in Beckett exists only as the 
experience of language, then it comes as a retrospective effect rather than a concrete 
preexistence. This is exactly the merit that he praised in Proust in the above passage.  
Going back to the questions that I asked of myself, we could conclude that 
subjectivity in late Beckett exists only as the experience of language, as the marks 
that the movement of language has left on the text or on us, in us, the reader, as we 
turn our attention towards the indecisive stirrings of language. Beckett’s late work as 
whole witnesses the maturation of the writer’s aesthetics. A dialogue is latent 
between Beckett’s early critical insights and his late artistic creation. Beckett 
revealed himself to be a precocious critic whose early ideas about art came to shed 
much light on his late works. And the same ideas seem more applicable to his late 
texts than to the writers he studied back in his formative years.  
 
* 
Throughout the thesis I have illustrated that subjectivity in Beckett is never a solid a 
referent to be represented. Rather, subjectivity exists in Beckett as a process of 
subjectivation, a process to be ‘experienced’ by the subject, a site where the force of 
language reveals itself and taps into our unconscious desires. In late Beckett, there is 
an aesthetic which has been largely overlooked and which needs be reevaluated so 
that these works can speak for themselves.  
From the side of theory, there have been interpretations of Beckett’s work as the 
collapse of epistemology and its resurrection, whilst from the side of literature there 
are stories about his work as emancipation in imprisonment, i.e. how it fails, and fails 
better each time. My study has not sought to make these teleological claims. For any 
earnestness of this sort would be the most abject submission to the ethic of 
production, and miss the crucial point, which is that Beckett fails utterly as a writer, a 
fact that is not speculatively redeemed by the way failure finds a voice in his writings. 
That his writings communicate powerfully, propelled by unparalleled resources of 
insinuation, attests merely to the virulence of futility, and not to any subterranean 
productivity of the negative.  
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Beckett’s work produces nothing. His characters, when there are any, implicate 
themselves into the dissolution of narrativity. His work loses itself (ungraspably) 
within itself, rather than succumbing to an intelligible derailing. Yet as I read his 
works, and see them performed, my bones itch, and in the end my mind melts as if 
thawed by an unexpected heat. I am left speechless at Beckett’s rapid overflow of 
words whose energy, once released, flooded the surrounding dark and enter my every 
pore. Somehow, that released life belongs with me but not to me.  
Then I realise that it is not important what Beckett tells us, for his works are not 
to be ‘read’ but ‘experienced’ so that we feel the power of language again. Beckett’s 
failure as a writer, his entrapment within indetermination, be it pathologically 
catatonic or aesthetically aporetic, only provides us with a site where the founding 
force of language is encountered in the midst of destabilising experience.   
Therefore, to describe Samuel Beckett as a writer is not to lend him a personal 
integrity as one who writes, but to scatter the ashes of his name into the river of 
fluent textuality which nag all personalities into pieces, as they bear their luxuriant 
froth of words downstream towards chaos and dearth.  
And the river of Beckett’s work flows through us.  
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EPILOGUE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking back at this point, we don’t have to bother ourselves with the question of 
what Beckett’s works tell us after all. There is a sense in which Beckett’s works – as 
works – are not especially ‘difficult’. They are, indeed, no more problematic than the 
words we use to tranquillize ourselves against love and dying (against the passion to 
die). One might avoid being merely interested in these texts, yet it is still possible 
that the agitation which remained would be dissolved into those little lazinesses and 
indecencies with which we meagrely spice our domesticity. It is for this reason that I 
feel I understand Beckett’s obsessiveness, his repetition, his reluctance to leave us 
with what has already been so clearly said. It is for this reason, too, that any book 
making it easier to understand Beckett is written contra him. The gurus of writing 
will of course say that we should be quite without regard for ‘Beckett’, as if the 
failure of authorialism were properly replaced by a textualist triumph. After all, who 
would not rather be faced with a life or a production, when the alternative to either is 
wreckage?  
As humans we are in one way or another drawn towards two ends, and would 
like to keep them as distinct as possible; blessing telos and cursing terminus. In this 
respect a certain zenith is reached in the Kantian practical postulate of immortality, 
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where the perfection of teleological process requires the infinite recession of 
extinction. One end supplants the other. We are all kantians now (I use the small case 
advisedly) and it has come to seem almost natural that our history be comprehended 
as teleological. And Beckett, as writer and Nobel laureate, is always thought to have 
said ‘something’ of our world of its maladies, of our evolving epistemology. Yet is 
not his thinking without a frightening simplicity? Just as it has said ‘something’, 
some truth about our world of its maladies, has it not said equally much about its 
author and his maladies? We make the two ends meet as we take Beckett’s writing as 
it was originally meant to be.  
Malaise. Silence. That the inability to write should itself become, threatened by 
an inert compulsion to write, utterance and thus text: this most nocturnal of thoughts 
is the restless spectre that the writer can neither still, nor embrace. The sensation 
evoked by its visitation is the same as the one that afflicts the victim of a hopeless 
profound dream, consummated in phrases which – remembered during the hours of 
waking – is degraded into an inanity. The withered remains of those expansive 
impossibilities, the mysterious companions of darkness, silence, and solitude, are 
rediscovered after an interval of sleep, wrought – after the daylight has sucked away 
the last shadows – into mere paradoxes. 
To become degraded to the level of a writer, a good one at that, is to be 
perpetually captivated, and then betrayed, by the figments of method, a resource for 
creation and critique, an inevitability. Writing becomes a summit from which the 
flood-plains of textuality could be perpetually re-inundated, a hieroglyph of utter 
fertility. But the word ‘method’ is rather too philosophical, for what is at issue here is 
a map for traversing unknown terrains, and not for domesticating them; a chart for 
discoveries that accentuate the enigma of the world.  
 
écoute-les 
s’ajouter 
les mots 
aux mots 
sans mot 
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les pas 
aux pas 
un à 
un [CP 71; RUL MS 2901] 
 
folly - 
folly for to - 
for to - 
what is the word - 
folly from this - 
all this - 
folly from all this - 
given - 
folly given all this - 
seeing - 
folly seeing all this - 
this - 
what is the word –  [‘What Is the Word’] 
 
* 
What is the word! The greatness of Beckett is to have led writing to the failure of 
writing. Until he died he had remained a writer of silence, rather than someone who 
had salvaged humanity from the insanity of words. ‘Writing becomes not easier,’ 
talking to John Gruen during an interview in 1969 he remarked, ‘but more difficult 
for me. Every word is like an unnecessary stain on silence and nothingness.’179 This 
is not to say that words come to an end, but only that discourse ceases to dominate 
them. The motor is not discursive competence but the vacant eye of insanity. In all 
forms of love, of suffering, of madness, the writer searches himself: unspeakable 
torture where he has the need of all faith, where he becomes among everyone the 
great invalid, the great accursed one.  
If there ever is a conclusion it is zero. Silence. Words continue as something 
else, as something in any case, or at most; the edge of something (of all things). 
 
                                                        
179 John Gruen, ‘Samuel Beckett Talks About Beckett’, in Vogue (December 1969), p.210. 
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* 
From birth we are brainwashed into conformity with the cage, taught to accumulate, 
to shore ourselves up, to fear madness and death. Trapped in a constricting triangle of 
language routines we tread a narrow circuit in the maze 
 
* 
With this Irishman i scamper in and out of the maze in a way they cannot understand, 
at half-past one on a Sunday morning 
deep in the crypt of dark 
in madness 
i crossed the line of life into the limbo panting 
between what is called Hell where Satan has been dethroned  
and what is called Heaven where the police is in control 
 
* 
There too has been a revolution in the limbo  
Language hangs from a gibbet and rots 
wreathed in the howls of anarchy 
out there beyond the dark 
the cold wind of zero rages without interdiction 
 
 168
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Published Texts by Samuel Beckett 
 
(A) Novels and Short Fiction 
 
Dream of Fair to Middling Women (Dublin: Black Cat, 1992).  
More Pricks Than Kicks (London: Calder & Boyars, 1970).  
Murphy (London: John Calder, 1963).  
Watt (repr. London: John Calder, 1963).  
Mercier and Camier (London: Calder & Boyars, 1974).  
Molloy (London: John Calder, 1959).  
Malone Dies (London: Calder & Boyars, 1975).  
The Unnamable (London: Calder & Boyars, 1975).  
How It Is (London: John Calder, 1964).  
Samuel Beckett’s Comment c’est / How It Is: A Critical Generic Edition, ed. Edouard 
Magessa O’Reilly (New York and London: Routledge, 2001) 
Nohow On [Company, 1980; Ill Seen Ill Said, 1982; Worstward Ho, 1983] (New York: 
Grove Press, 1983)  
Samuel Beckett’s Mal vu mal dit / Ill Seen Ill Said: A Bilingual, Evolutionary, and 
Synoptic Variorum Edition, ed. Charles Krance (New York and London: Garland, 
1996) 
Samuel Beckett’s Company / Compagnie / A Piece of Monologue / Solo: A Bilingual 
Variorum Edition, ed. Charles Krance (New York and London: Garland, 1993) 
The Complete Short Prose, 1929-1989, ed. S. E. Gontarski (New York: Grove, 1995).  
 169
 
(B) Plays 
 
The Complete Dramatic Works (London: Faber & Faber, 1986). 
Eleutheria, trans. Barbara Wright (London: Faber & Faber, 1996).  
Happy Days: Samuel Beckett’s Production Notebook, ed. James Knowlson (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1985).  
The Theatrical Notebooks of Samuel Beckett, 4 vols. (London: Faber & Faber, 1992, 
1993, 1999)  
 
(C) Discursive Writings 
 
Proust and Three Dialogues with Georges Duthuit (London: John Calder, 1987)  
Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, ed. Ruby Cohn 
(London: John Calder, 1983) 
 ‘Denis Devlin’, in Transition, no. 27 (April-May, 1938), pp. 289-290. 
 
 
II. Critical Studies of Samuel Beckett’s Life and Works 
 
Abbott, H. Porter. Beckett Writing Beckett: The Author in the Autograph. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1996.  
Acheson, James. Samuel Beckett’s Artistic Theory and Practice: Criticism, Drama 
and Early Fiction. New York: Palgrave, 1996.  
Acheson, James & Kateryna Arthur (eds). Beckett’s Later Fiction and Drama: Texts 
for Company. London: Macmillan, 1987.  
Ackerley, C.J. & S.E. Gontarski (eds.). The Grove Companion to Samuel Beckett. 
New York: Grove Press, 2004. 
Albright, Daniel. Representation and the Imagination: Beckett, Kafka, Nabocov and 
Schoenberg. University of Chicago Press, 1981.  
Alvarez , Al. Samuel Beckett. New York: Viking, 1973.  
Amiran, Eyal. Wandering and Home: Beckett’s Metaphysical Narrative. Univeristy 
Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1993.  
Asmus, Walter. ‘Practical aspects of theatre, radio, and television: Rehearsal notes 
for the German premiere of Beckett’s “That time” and “Footfalls” at the Schiller 
Theater Werkstatt, Berlin’, in S.E. Gontarski (ed.), On Beckett: Essays and 
Criticism. New York: Grove Press, 1986, p.334-49.  
Badiou, Alain. On Beckett, eds. Nina Power and Alberto Toscano. London: Clinamen 
Press, 2003.   
Baldwin, Hélène L. Samuel Beckett’s Real Silence. University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1981.  
Bair, Deirdre. Samuel Beckett: A Biography. New York: Vintage, 1991.  
Baker, Phil. Samuel Beckett and the Mythology of Psychoanalysis. London: 
Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.  
Begam, Richard. Samuel Beckett and the End of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford 
 170
University Press, 1997.  
Beja, Morris, S.E. Gontarski, and Pierre Astier (eds.). Samuel Beckett: Humanistic 
Perspectives. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1983.  
Baldwin, Hélène L. Samuel Beckett’s Real Silence. University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1981. 
Barker, Stephen. ’Recovering the Néant: Language and the Unconscious in Beckett,’ 
in The World of Samuel Beckett, ed. Joseph H. Smith. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1996.  
Beer, Ann. ‘Beckett’s Bilingualism’, in The Cambridge Companion to Beckett, ed. 
John Pilling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.  
Ben-Zvi, Linda (ed.). Women in Beckett: Performance and Critical Perspectives. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990.  
-----. ‘The Schismatic Self in A Piece of Monologue’, in Journal of Beckett Studies, 7 
(Spring 1982): 12. 
Begam, Richard. Samuel Beckett and the End of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997.  
Birkett, Jennifer. ‘French Feminists and Anglo-Irish Modernists: Cixous, Kristeva, 
Beckett, Joyce’ in Miscelánea: A Journal of English and American Studies. 
Zaragoza: University of Zaragoza, 1997.  
Blau, Herbert. Sails of the Herring Fleet: Essays on Beckett. Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2000.  
Boulter, Jonathan. Interpreting Narrative in the Novels of Samuel Beckett. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001.  
Brater, Enoch. Beyond Minimalism: Beckett’s Late Style in Theatre. New York & 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.  
-----. Why Beckett. London: Thames and Hudson, 1989. 
Bryden, Mary. Women in Samuel Beckett’s Prose and Drama: Her Own Other. 
Houndmills: Macmillan, 1993.  
Butler, Lance St. John. Samuel Beckett and the Meaning of Being. New York: 
Palgrave, 1984. 
-----. ‘Two Darks: A Solution to Beckett’s Bilingualism’, in Samuel Beckett 
Today/Aujourd’hui: An Annual Bilingual Review/Revue annuelle bilingue 3 
(1994).  
Calder, John. The Philosophy of Samuel Beckett. Calder Publications, 2001.  
Coe, Richard N. Samuel Beckett. New York: Grove Press, 1970. 
Connor, Steven. Samuel Beckett: Repetition, Theory, and Text. Oxford and New York: 
Basil Blackwell, 1988.  
Craig, George. ‘The Voice of Childhood and Great Age’, Times Literary Supplement, 
27 August 1982.  
Cronin, Anthony. Samuel Beckett: The Last Modernist. London: Flamingo, 1997.  
Culotta-Andonian, Cathleen (ed.). The Critical Response to Samuel Beckett. 
Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1998.  
Damasio, Antonio. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New 
York: Avon Books, 1994. 
Danziger, Marie A. Text/Countertext: Postmodern Paranoia in Samuel Beckett, Doris 
 171
Lessing, and Philip Roth. New York: Peter Lang, 1996.  
Davies, Paul. ‘Three Novels and four Nouvelles: Giving up the Ghost Be Born at 
Last’ in John Pilling (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Beckett. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994.  
Davies, Paul. Beckett and Eros: Death of Humanism. New York: Palgrave, 2000.  
Davis, R. J. & Lance St. J. Butler (eds). ‘Make Sense Who May’: Essays on Samuel 
Beckett’s Later Works. Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe, 1988.  
Duckworth, Colin. ‘Beckett’s Theatre: Beyond the Stage Space’, in Beckett and 
Beyond, ed. Bruce Stewart. Monaco: The Princess Grace Irish Library, 1999, 
p.95. 
Ehrhard, Peter. Anatomie de Samuel Beckett. Basle: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1976.  
Elam, Keir. ‘Dead Heads: Damnation-Narration in the “Dramaticules”’ in John 
Pilling (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Beckett. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994.  
Essif, Leo. Empty Figure on an Empty Stage: The Theatre of Samuel Beckett and His 
Generation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.  
Esslin, Martin. The Theatre of the Absurd, 3rd Edition, London; Penguin Hooks, 
1983.  
-----. ‘A Theatre of Stasis: Beckett’s Later Plays’, in Patrick McCarthy ed., Critical 
Essays on Samuel Beckett, Boston: Hall, 1986, pp.192-198. 
Federman, Raymond. Journey to Chaos: Samuel Beckett’s Early Fiction. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1965.  
-----. ‘The Writer as Self-Translator’, in Beckett Translating/Translating Beckett, eds. 
Friedman et al. University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1987, pp.31-32. 
Fitch, Brian T. Beckett and Babel: Investigation into the Status of the Bilingual Work. 
Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 1988. 
-----. Reflections in the Mind’s Eye: Reference and Its Problematization in 
Twentieth-Century French Fiction. University of Toronto Press, 1991.  
-----. ‘The Relationship Between Compagnie and Company: One Work, Two Texts, 
Two Fictive Universes’, in Beckett Translating/Translating Beckett, eds. 
Friedman et al. University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1987, pp.31-32. 
Fletcher, John. ‘Bailing Out the Silence’ in Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, ed. 
Harold Bloom: Chelsea House, 1987.  
-----. The Novels of Samuel Beckett. London: Chatto and Windus, 1964.  
-----. ‘Samuel Beckett and the Philosophers’ in Contemporary Literature, 17 (1965), 
43-56.  
Friedman, Melvin J. (ed.). Samuel Beckett Now: Critical Approaches to His Novels, 
Poetry, and Plays. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1975.  
Garner, Stanton B. ‘Visual Field in Beckett’s Late Plays’ in Comparative Drama, Vol. 
XXI, No. 4, Winter 1987-88, pp.349-373.  
Gontarski, S. E. (ed.). On Beckett: Essays and Criticism. New York: Grove Press, 
1986.  
 172
----- (ed.). The Beckett Studies Reader. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
1993.  
-----. ‘Company for Company: Androgyny and Theatricality in Samuel Beckett’s 
Prose’ in James Acheson & Kateryna Arthur (eds.), Beckett’s Later Fiction and 
Drama: Texts for Company. London: Macmillan, 1987.  
-----. The Intent of Undoing in Samuel Beckett’s Dramatic Texts. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1985.  
Gordon, Lois. The World of Samuel Beckett: 1906-1946. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998.  
Graver, Lawrence, and Raymond Federman (eds.). Samuel Beckett: The Critical 
Heritage. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.  
Gruen, John. ‘Samuel Beckett Talks About Beckett’, in Vogue (December 1969).  
Guest, Michael. ‘Beckett and Foucault: Some Affinities’ in Central Japan English 
Studies, English Literary Society of Japan, Chubu, Vol. 15 (1996), 55-68.  
-----. ‘“Between Contiguous Extremes”: Beckett and Brunonian Minimalism, With 
Reference to The Lost Ones’ in Reports of the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Shizuoka 
University (Japan), Vol. 30, No. 1 (1994).  
Hale, Jane A. The Broken Window: Beckett’s Dramatic Perspective. Indiana: Purdue 
University Press, 1987.  
Harvey, Lawrence E. Samuel Beckett: Poet and Critic. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970. 
Hamilton, Alice, and Kenneth Hamilton. Condemned to Life: The World of Samuel 
Beckett. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1976.  
Hoffman, Fredrick J. Samuel Beckett: The Language of Self. Carbondale: South 
Illinois University Press, 1962.  
Homan, Sidney. Beckett’s Theaters: Interpretation for Performance. London and 
Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1984.  
Janvier, Ludovic. ‘Au travail avec Beckett’, in Cahier de l’Herne: Samuel Beckett. 
Paris: L’Herne, 1976. 
Jones, David Houston. The Body Abject: Self and Text in Jean Genet and Samuel 
Becket. Peter Lang AG, 2000.  
Juliet, Charles. Conversations with Samuel Beckett. Academic Press Leiden, 1996.  
-----. Rencontre avec Samuel Beckett. Montpellier, 1986. 
Kalb, Jonathan. Beckett in Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989. 
Katz, Daniel. Saying ‘I’ No More: Subjectivity and Consciousness in the Prose of 
Samuel Beckett. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999.  
Kenner, Hugh. Samuel Beckett: A Critical Study. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1968. 
-----. A Reader’s Guide to Samuel Beckett. London: Thames & Hudson, 1973.  
Kern, Edith. Existential Thought and Fictional Technique: Kierkegaard, Sartre, and 
Beckett. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.  
Knowlson, James. ‘Beckett’s “Bits of Pipe”’, in Morris Beja, S.E. Gontarski, and 
Pierre Astier (eds.). Samuel Beckett: Humanistic Perspectives. Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 1983.  
 173
-----. Damned to Fame: The Life of Samuel Beckett. London: Bloomsbury, 1996.  
Knowlson, James, and John Pilling. Frescoes of the Skull: The Later Prose and 
Drama of Samuel Beckett. London: John Calder, 1979.  
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. ‘L’Écho de sujet’ in Le sujet de la philosophie (Typographies 1). 
Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1979.  
-----. ‘The Echo of the Subject’ in Typography, ed. Christopher Fynsk. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1989. 
Lake, Carlton. No Symbols Where None Intended: A Catalogue of Books, 
Manuscripts, and Other Materials Relating to Samuel Beckett. Texas: 
University of Texas Humanities Research, 1984. 
Lane, Richard J. Beckett and Philosophy. New York: Palgrave, 2001.  
Lawley, Paul. ‘Samuel Beckett’s Relations’ in Journal of Beckett Studies, Vol. 6, No. 
2 (Spring 1997), pp. 1-61. 
Levi, Shimon. Samuel Beckett’s Self-Referential Drama: The Three I’s. London: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1990.  
Locatelli, Carla. Unwording the World: Samuel Beckett’s Prose Works after the Nobel 
Prize. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990.  
Long, Joseph. ‘The Reading of Company: Beckett and the Bi-Textual Work’, in 
Forum for Modern Language Studies 32: 4 (October 1996). 
Lyons, Charles. ‘Perceiving Rockaby – As a Text, As a Text by Samuel Beckett, As a 
Text for Performance’, in Comparative Drama, 16, 4, Winter 1982-3, pp. 
297-311.  
Mackinnon, Lachlan. ‘Gripping Simplicities’, in Times Literary Supplement, 28 
December 1993 – 3 January 1991, p.1407. 
McGuire James, ‘Beckett, the Translator and the Metapoem’, in World Literature 
Today: A Literary Quarterly of the University of Oklahoma 64:2 (Spring 1990). 
McMillan Dougald, & Martha Fehsenfeld. Beckett in the Theatre, vol.1. London: 
John Calder, 1998. 
McMullan, Audrey E. Between Spaces: The Dynamic Principle in Samuel Beckett’s 
Later Drama, Ph.D. thesis. Reading: The University of Reading, 1988.  
-----. Theatre on Trial: Samuel Beckett’s Later Drama. New York and London: 
Routledge, 1993.  
McQueeny, Terence. Samuel Beckett as Critic of Proust and Joyce, Ph.D. these. 
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1977.  
Mercier, Vivian. Beckett/Beckett. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.  
Moorjani, Angela B. The Aesthetics of Loss and Lessness. London: Macmillan, 1992.  
Murphy, P. J. Reconstructing Beckett: Language for Being in Samuel Beckett’s 
Fiction. Toronto University Press, 1990.  
-----. ‘Beckett and the Philosophers’ in John Pilling (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Beckett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.  
O’Brien, Eoin. The Beckett Country: Samuel Beckett’s Ireland. Dublin: Black Cat 
Press / London: Faber and Faber, 1986.  
O’Hara, J. D. ‘Jung and the Narrative of Molloy’ in Journal of Beckett Studies, 7 
(Spring 1982), 19-48.  
 174
-----. Samuel Beckett’s Hidden Drives: Structural Uses of Depth Psychology. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997.  
----- (ed.). Twentieth-Century Interpretations of ‘Molloy’, ‘Malone Dies’, ‘The 
Unnamable’. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.  
Olney, James. Memory and Narrative: The Weave of Life-writing. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998.  
Oppenheim, Lois. ‘Anonymity and Individuation: The Interrelation of Two 
Linguistic Functions in Not I and Rockaby’ in Davis and Butler (eds.), ‘Make 
Sense Who May’, 35-45. 
-----. The Painted Word: Samuel Beckett’s Dialogue with Art. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2000.  
Oppenheim, L. & M. Buning (eds). Beckett on and on.... New York: Plenum Press, 
1996. 
Pasquier, Marie-Claire, ‘Quand comparaison se veut raison’, in TransLittérature 8 
(Hiver 1994): 32.  
Pattie, David. The Complete Critical Guide to Samuel Beckett. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2000.  
Pilling, John. Samuel Beckett. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976.  
-----. Beckett before Godot. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
----- (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Beckett. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994. 
Pountney, Rosemary. Theatre of Shadows: Samuel Beckett’s Drama, 1956-76. 
Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe, 1988.  
Ricks, Christopher. Beckett’s Dying Words. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993.  
Robinson, Michael. The Long Sonata of the Dead: A Study of Samuel Beckett. 
London: Hart-Davis, 1969.  
Rosen, Stephen J. Samuel Beckett and the Pessimistic Tradition. New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976.  
Shenker, Israel. ‘An Interview with Beckett’, New York Times, 5 May, 1956, section 
II, reprinted in Lawrence Graver and Raymond Federman (eds.), Samuel Beckett: 
The Critical Heritage. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. 
Sherzer, Dina. ‘Portrait of a Woman: The Experience of Marginality in Not I’ in 
Ben-Zvi (ed.), Women in Beckett: Performance and Critical Perspectives, 
201-207.  
Smith, Anna. ‘Proceeding by Aporia: Perception and Poetic Language in Samuel 
Beckett’s Worstward Ho’ in Journal of Beckett Studies, Autumn 1993: 21-37.  
Simard, Rodney. Postmodern Drama: Contemporary Playwrights in America and 
Britain. Lanham, New York and London: University Press of America, 1984.  
Stephenson, Richard J. The Insanity of Samuel Beckett’s Art. Paint Brush Press, 1998.  
Sussman, Henry and Christopher Devenney (eds.). Engagement and Difference: 
Beckett and the Political. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.  
Uhlmann, Anthony. Beckett and Poststructuralism. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999. 
Watson, David. Paradox and Desire in Beckett’s Fiction. London: Macmillan, 1990. 
 175
Webb, Eugene. Samuel Beckett: A Study of His Novels. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1970.  
Worth, Katharine. Samuel Beckett’s Theatre: Life Journeys. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
Wilson, Ann. ‘“Her lips moving”: The Castrated Voice of Not I’ in Modern Drama, 
19.1 (March 1976), 35-46. 
Zeifman, Hersh. ‘Come and Go: “A Criticule”’, in Samuel Beckett: Humanistic 
Perspectives, eds. M. Beja, S.E. Gontarski, and P. Astier. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio 
State University Press, 1983. 
-----. ‘Being and Non-Being in Samuel Beckett’s Not I’, in Modern Drama, XIX, 
1976, pp. 35-46.  
-----. ‘“The Core of the Eddy”: Rockaby and Dramatic Genre’, in Beckett Translating: 
Translating Beckett, eds. A. Friedman, C. Rossman, and D. Sherzer. University 
Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvanian University Press, 1987.  
Zurbrugg, Nicholas. Beckett and Proust. Gerrards Cross: Colin Smythe, 1988.  
 
 
III. Other Works 
 
Bakhtin, Mikhail. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. Vadim Liapunov & 
Kenneth Brostrom. Texas: University of Texas Press, 1982. 
Barthes, Roland. A Barthes Reader, ed. Susan Sontag. New York: Hill and Wang, 
2001.  
-----. ‘The Death of the Author’, in Image Music Text, trans. S. Heath. London: 
Fontana, 1977. 
Benjamin, Walter. ‘The Task of the Translator’, in Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn. 
New York: Schocken Books, 1969. 
Benveniste, Emile. Problems in General Linguistics, trans. M.E. Meek. Coral Gables, 
F.A.: University of Miami Press, 1971.   
Blanchot, Maurice. ‘The Ease of Dying’, in Friendship, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
-----. L’Ecriture du désastre. Paris: Gallimard, 1980. 
-----. ‘La facilité de mourir’ in L’Amitié. Paris: Gallimard, 1971. 
-----. ‘Où maintenant? Qui maintenant?’ in Le livre à venire. Paris: Minuit, 1959. 
-----. The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1982.  
-----. The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1986. 
Blau, Herbert. The Eye of Prey: Subversions of the Postmodern. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1987. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994.  
-----. ‘L’Épuisé’, in Quad et autres pieces pout la télévision suivi de L’Épuisé par 
Gilles. Paris: Minuit, 1992, pp.55-106. 
-----. Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation, vol. 1. Paris: Editions de la difference, 
 176
1981.  
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Robert Hurley and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989.  
-----. Kafka: pour une litrérature mineure. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1975.  
Derrida, Jacques. Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
-----. Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997.  
-----. Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980.  
Elam, Keir. The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama. London and New York: Metheun, 
1980.  
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1977.  
-----. Madness and Civilization: A Histroy of Insanity in the Age of Reason. New 
York: Vintage, 1988.  
-----. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences. New York: Random 
House, 1994.  
Garner, Stanton B. Bodied Spaces: Phenomenology and Performance in 
Contemporary Drama. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994.  
Genette, Gérard. Figures of Literary Discourse, trans, Alan Sheridan. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1982. 
Guggenheim, Peggy. Out of this Century: Confessions of an Art Addict. New York: 
Universe Books, 1979.  
Heidegger, Martin. Heraclitus Seminar, trans. Charles H. Seibert. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1993. 
-----. Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper & 
Rows, 1971.  
Heidegger, Martin, & Eugen Fink, Heraklit. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1970.  
Holland, Norman, H. The Dynamics of Literary Response. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968.  
Jakobson, Roman, & Morris Halle. Fundamentals of Language. The Hague: Janua 
Linguarum, 1956, p.95. 
Jefferson, Ann. ‘Bodymatters: Self and Other in Bakhtin, Sartre and Barthes’ in Ken 
Hirschkop and David Shepherd (eds.) Bakhtin and Cultural Theory. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1989.  
Kern, Edith. Existential Thought and Fictional Technique: Kierkegaard, Sartre, and 
Beckett. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.  
Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling, eds. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna 
H. Hong. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1983. 
Kristeva, Julia. Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 
-----. Desire in Language : A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, trans. T. Gora, 
A. Jardine, and L. S. Roudiez. New York : Columbia University Press, 1980.  
-----. The Kristeva Reader, eds. Toril Moi. New York: Columbia University Press, 
 177
1986.  
-----. Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. M. Waller. New York : Columbia 
University Press, 1984. 
-----. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982.  
-----. Tales of Love. trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989.  
-----. Time and Sense: Proust and the Experience of Literature, trans. Ross Guberman. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.  
Lefevere, Andre & Susan Bassnett. ‘Proust’s Grandmother and the Thousand and 
One Nights: The “Cultural Turn” in Translation Studies’, introduction to 
Translation, History and Culture, ed. Susan Bassnett & Andre Lefevere. London: 
Printer Publishers, 1990. 
Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1996. 
Parkin-Gounelas, Ruth. Literature and Psychoanalysis: Intertextual Readings. New 
York: Palgrave, 2001. 
Ricoeur, Paul. Time and Narrative, vols. I-III, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David 
Pellauer. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1985.  
-----. Oneself As Another, tran. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992.  
Rimbaud, Arthur. Rimbaud Complete, trans. Wyatt Mason. New York: Modern 
Library, 2002.  
Scholes, Robert. Structuralism in Literature. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1974. 
Scolnicov, Hanna. ‘Theatre space, theatrical space and the theatrical space without’, 
in J. Redmond ed., The Theatrical Space. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987. 
 
 
 178
